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LAW SCHOOL COMMENCEMENT.
In the golden chain of the history of the
Dickinson School of Law, one more link
has been welded by the closing of the year
1902. Twenty-eight graduates received
the degree of Bachelor of Laws, twentytwo in the three year and six in the two
year course. Increased interest in the
Commencement exercises, as shown by
the large attendance, augurs well, indeed,
for the future of the Law School. The
Baccalaureate service was held in the Allison Memorial Church, Sunday, June 1st,
beginning at 10 a. m. The service was
opened with prayer, and singing by the
choir. The church could not well contain
the crowd. The Baccalaureate address was
delivered by President George E. Reed.
His text was Psalm XVII, Verse 15,
-As for me I will behold Thy face in righteousness; I shall be satisfied when I
awake in Thy likeness." Dr. Reed told of
the search of the ancients for the philosopher's stone, with which they believed
any substance could be touched and converted into gold, and for the elixir of
life, the universal medicine, panacea of

all human ills. He then took up the governmental theories nf to-day, comparing
them and telling of the study of their
champions to find that which reached
perfection. All have been vain. The
philosopher'sstone and the universal medicine are found in righteousness, wherein
alone lies the satisfaction of mankind.
The address was eloquent, forceful, and
deeply impressive. The benediction was
pronounced by Bishop Andrews. Very
inspiring music was rendered by the
church choir.
On Tuesday evening, the commencement was held in Bosler Hall, where an
exceedingly large audience had assembled,
including many visitors from every section of the state, friends of the graduates
and the school. Many ofthe alumni were
present.
Seated on the stage with President Reed
were Dr. Trickett and the Law School
faculty, also several of the incorporators of
the school, and many distinguished
visitors. The overture was by the Steelton orchestra. The class oration followed.
It was delivered by William E. Elmes,
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and was entitled "The Lawyer's Duty."
The oration was thoughtful, and was well
delivered.
Attorney-General John P. Elkin delivered the Baccalaureate address, which
revealed his interest in the Cumberland
Valley and Dickinson College. Both the
Baccalaureate address and class oration
are printed elsewhere in this issue.
Degrees were then conferred by President Reed, and the candidates received
their diplomas, as Secretary Woods called
their names.
Dr. Reed congratulated the class, and
reminded them that integrity and manliness, in law, as in other professions, are
the qualities that win. The names of the
winners of the prizes were read, and the
exercises closed with a selection by the
orchestra.

successful termination of their courses, and
express the hope that they will meet with
an abundant, success: Adamson, Boryer,
Brock, Brooks, Conry, Davis, Elmes,
Houser, Laubenstein, Lonergan, MacConnell, Mclntire, McKeehan, Minnich,
Moon, Osborne, Points, Rhodes, F. H.,
Rhodes, J. L., Sterrett, and Turner.

ALUMNI NOTES.

We call attention to the recent rule laid
down by the Supreme Court relative to
the admission of attorneys to practice before said court.
And now, to wit, May 26, 1902, it is ordered:
1. That there is hereby established a
Board of Examiners, to whom all applications for admission to the Bar of this
Court shall be referred for examination
and report, before action by the Court.
2. Samuel Dickson, Philadelphia; William Scott, Allegheny ; Simon P. Wolverton, Northumberland; Robert Snodgrass,
Dauphin, and William U. Hensel, Lancaster, are appointed a Board of Examiners, with authority to report and recommend to the Court for adoption a plan
of operations including: The term and
conditions of studentship, a course of
study for the preliminary and final examinations, the conditions and requirements
of application to the Board, rules for the
meeting and action of the Board, including the appointment of a secretary, treasurer, clerk or clerks, provision for expenses and compensation, etc. ; such modifications of the present rules of Court as
may be necessary to put the new conditions into operation; such further suggestions or recommendations as they may
deem desirable at this time. The present
rules and practice shall remain in force
until changed by order of the Court upon
the recommendation of the Board.

It has been a great pleasure to notice the
unmistakable interest which the alumni
evidence by their presence during the
Commencement exercises from year to
year. This year an unusually large numberhave been in town. Among them may
be mentioned Garrett B. Stevens, '99; Geo.
W. Aubrey, '00; A. Frank John, 100; Philip
M. Graul, 101; Marlin Wolf, '99; Samuel
E. Basehore, '01 ; Robert W. Irving, 197 ;
Blake Irvin, '97; L. Floyd Hess, '01; J.
Banks Kurtz, '94; Robert H. Smith, '00;
Paul Price, 197; William D. Boyer, '92;
Harry Collins, '00 ; James N. Lightner,
'01; Daniel Kline, '01, and C. W. A. Rochow, '96. Beside this, not a few have
written expressing regrets at their inability
to be present at this time.
Harvey S. Kiser, 197, who has been practicing his profession at Doylestown, Pa.,
since his graduation, has succeeded in
establishing a very excellent practice. In
addition to his practice, lie occupies the
position of secretary of the Board of Examiners and of the Bar Association in his
county.
The following men were admitted to
practice in the several courts of Cumberland county on Wednesday, June 4th.
We wish to congratulate them upon the

On June 4th, upon motion of G. Wilson
Swartz, Esq., the proper credentials having been filed, the following were admitted
to practice in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania: James N. Lightner, of the class
of 1901, and Messrs. Brock, Elmes, Houser,
McKeehan and Turner, of the class of 1902.

SCHOOL NOTES.
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The following named gentlemen have
been elected incorporators of the Dickinson School of Law, to fill vacancies caused
by death:
Hon. S. Leslie Mestrezat, Justice of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
Hon. W. F. Bay Stewart, one of the
judges of the courts of York county.
Hon. John P. Kelly, one of the judges
of the courts of Lackawanna county.
Lewis S. Sadler, Esq., of the Cumberland County Bar.

THESES.
The following are the topicsupon which
the graduating students of this year have
written :
Confessions-Brennan.
Replevin-MacConnell.
Widow's Exemption-Point.
Causes for Absolute Divorce- Mays.
Employers' Duties-Conry.
Law of Divorce in Pa.-Brooks.
Landlord and Tenant-Boryer.
Criminal Liability of Insane Person-Myers.
Consideration in Contracts--Moon.
Expert Testimony-Davis.

PRIZES.
The following prizes have been awarded:
The William C. Allison prize for best
Senior essay on Modification of Writings
by Parol Evidence, to William E. Elmes,
of Berwick.
The Ist Win. D. Boyer prize for best
Middler examination on Evidence, to
Fred B. Gerber, of York.
The 2d Wm. D Boyer prize for best
essay on Replevin, to Henry Al. Hamblin,
of Carlisle.
The 3d Win. D. Boyer prize for best
Junior examination on Torts, to E. L.
Dively, of Altoona.
The 4th Wm. D. Boyer. prize for best
discussion of the Right to Arrest without
Warrant, to Steward F. Shiffer, of Stroudsburg.
The 1st Dean's prize for best Middler
briefs was divided between J. M. Ebbert,
of Greencastle, and Elmer S. Welsh, of
York.
The 2d Dean's prize for best Junior examination on Real Property, was divided
between Thomas B. Wilson, of Bradford,
aud W. L. Houck, of Berwick.
The 3d and 4th Win. D. Boyer prizes are
offered to such students only as are members of the athletic teams of the college.

Recovery of Money Paid Under Mistake

-Rhodes, J. L.
Confessions, as Evidence- Rhodes, F.
H.
Probate of Wills in Pa.-Sterrett.
Character Evidence in Pa.-McKeehau.
Course of Administration in Penna.Thorne.
Negligence, as Affecting Employer and
Employe-Adamson.
Insanity, as Defence in HomicideLonergan.
Ejectment-Minnich.
Jurisdiction of Justices of Peace in Civil
Actions-Osborne.
Debtors' Exemption In Pa.-Welsh.
Distress for Rent-Houser.
Admissions-Schanz.
Competency of Witnesses-Elmes.
Sales of Personal Property-Turner.

ALLISON SOCIETY.
The end of the term found the Allison
Society in a most encouraging condition.
The membership was larger than at any
other time in the year, the interest in the
work was just as great as it was at the
early meetings, and the results accomplished by the year's work were satisfactory to a degree that was unexpected by
the most sanguine.
Among the original programmes introduced were a National Convention and a
meeting of the House of Representatives.
The convention was conducted according
to the rules of the Pennsylvania State
Democratic Convention, and the meetings
of the House of Representatives were conducted along the lines of the National
House of Representatives. Among the
interesting bills passed by the latter or-
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ganization, was a bill to exclude the Chinese. The debate on this measure was
keen, lively and thorough. The men opposed to this bill obtained their information, and several of their strongest points,
from Mr. Wu, the Chinese Minister. The
agreement being that the bill would be
passed upon the merits of the debate, the
opponents of the bill won on Mr. Wu's
points. The result of the debate was sent
to Mr. Wu, and he acknowledged the announcement in an interesting note.
Many members bear ready testimony to
the benefit of the society in assisting in the
acquirement of readiness in debate. The
Parliamentary drill at each meeting has
also been beneficial.
The graduation of the class of 1902 robs
the society of some of its best workers, and
their wise counsel will be missed next
term. They leave, however, with the
knowledge that those who will carry on
the work next year are thoroughly qualified to doso by reason of having associated
and worked with them.

THE DELTA CHI.
The pleasantest memories of the year's
fraternity life, were carried away by the
members of the Delta Chi. No fraternity
in college had a mo~e prosperous, or delightful year, or enjoyed a greater measure of prestige and esteem in town. The
closing event of the year was the annual
banquet held in Assembly Hall, Friday
evening, May 30th. It was the ninth annual. The menu was selected with an
epicurean discrimination, and the viands
were relished. Toastmaster Robert Moon,
opened the post prandial exercises, with a
neat speech. The following toasts were
responded to: The Legal Profession, Malcolm B. Sterrett, Esq. ; Unsolved Problem. , Garrett B. Stevens, Esq., of Reading; The Office of the Law, Philip M.
Graul, Esq., of Lehighton; Fees, Hon.
James M. Weakley; The Future of Our
Alumni, A. F. Johns, Esq., Mt. Carmel;
The Jury, A. V. Dively, Esq., of Altoona;
Our Clients (that are to be) A. T. Walsh;
Pennsylvania Bar, J. E. Shapley, of Carlisle; Domestic Relations, Frederic C.
Woodward, LL. M. ; Castles in Spain, F.
J. Benjamin; Remarks, Marlin Wolf,

Esq., of Shamokin; Remarks, Samuel
Bashore, Esq., of Mechanicsburg.
The responses were replete with sentiment, story, and wit, and were most enjoyable. The unprogrammed numbers which
followed were indeed laughable. Messrs.
A. V. Dively, Walsh and Dively, provoking much laughter.
At the meeting of the fraternity before
the banquet, A. V. Dively, Esq., of Altoona, father of E. L. Dively, of the
Junior Class, was made an honorary
member of Delta Chi.

BOOK REVIEWS.
FREEMAN ON VOID JUDICIAL
SALES.-An exhaustive treatise on
Void executions, Judicial and Probate
Sales, and the rightsof purchasersthereat-By .ton. A. . Freeman-Fourth
Edition-Revised,enlargedand brought
down to date-Central Law Journal
Company, St. Louis, 1902.
This is a very fine treatise on the all important subject of void judicial sales, and
the rights of purchasers thereat. In it,
also, Judge Freeman discusses the constitutionality of curative acts, and that
class of special legislation, attempting
either to validate invalid judicial sales,
or to authorize involuntary sales, in the
absence of any judicial proceedings whatever. Among the important subjects to
which the attention is .directed is the
question, What is a Judicial Sale? The
work has been brought down to date, and
is doubtless the most complete treatise on
the subject ever submitted to the profession. The author has evidently given
much time to the subject which he treats
so admirably. The arrangement of this
work, the Chapters and Sections, and the
general clearness of statement, together
with the mechanical work, makes it a
very desirable addition to the library of
the attorney.
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THE LAWYER'S

DUTY.

(Address by William L. Rlmes.)

Since a fair conception of the duties attaching to any vocation is necessarily a
condition precedent to the accomplishmnt of the greatest good, and the subservience of the highest purpose of which
it is capable, it is our purpose to suggest
some of the fundamental duties, adherence
to which is requisite, if we would obtain
true success.
True success depends, not so much upon
what we, in fact, accomplish, as it doe.4
upon the predominating motives which
have actuated us in our endeavors. Conscientious effort is oft-times uncrowned by
material success, but the result of patient
and persistent industry carries with it the
consciousness of tasks fairly met, of opportunities improved, of duties faithfully and
fearlessly performed, which consciousness
is, in itself, a sufficient reward.
"You do swear (or affirm) that you will
support the Constitution of the United
States and the Constitution of this Conimonwealth, and that you will behave
yourself in the office of attorney, within
this court, according to the best of your
learning and ability, and with all good
fidelity, as well to the court as to the
client, that you will use no falsehood, nor
delay any person's cause for lucre or
malice," is the chart of duties, to the observance of which, we pledge ourselves,
before exercising any of the functions as
officers of the court.
Our highest duty, under this oath, is to
the court and to the client in the prevention of wrong and injustice. Whenever,
in his zeal, a lawyer is carried beyond the
bounds of right, it interferes with his
highest development, and robs him of a
portion of his moral manhood.
Inflexibility of principle should be the
distinguishing mark of a lawyer. Possessing a wholesome regard for what he conceives to be right, he should exercise the
moral courage to use his influence that
right may prevail-to sacrifice, if need ba,
personal popularity and preferment to the
preservation of conscience and rectitude.
When, upon acceding to power in 1868,
Air. Gladstone offered to the Attorney
General of the previous administration,
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Sir Roundel Palmer, the chancellorship
and a peerage, the great prize for which all
lawyers contended was within his grasp.
But, acceptance would have pledged him
to the policy of the Irish Church dis-establishment, and he declined the offeran act of renunciation for conscience sake.
Surely, in this instance, the cynic was
wrong, for every man has not his price.
During Burr's trial, a storm of angry
disapproval burst from both parties, but
the Chief Justice went calmly on, confident
in his own rectitude and the approval of
his conscience. The key to his conduct is
furnished when, at a later period, speaking of the judiciary, he says: "Thejudicial
department comes home in its effects to
every man's fireside; it passes upon his
property, his reputation, his life, his all."
* * * "rt is not unimportant that there
should be nothing to influence him save
God and conscience."
Furnishing, as it does, not only the judicial, but also the logical recruiting ground
for the other departments of government,
there is no profession in which a highertoned morality is more imperatively necessary than that of the law.
In his more direct contact with his fellow-men, how far reaching are the interests
entrusted to him for adjustment, and how
delicately must these interests be adjusted.
All grades and conditions of society are
dependent upon his information and assistance, the rich and the poor, the powerful and the humble, the guilty and the innocent. So manifold are the avenues
through which the lawyer exercises his
influence, and so naturally does his sphere
keep enlarging, that we stand appalled at
the power wielded by this profession.
How can this power be curtailed, is not
only a perplexing problem, it is a problem
incapable of solution. This being true,
the necessity for honesty and integrity is
immeasurable. What we need in all professions and in the rank and file of our
citizens is a widespread regard for thorough-going honesty, that will cast out the
prevalent moral insensibility until our
government is invested with the majesty
of the law and the sacredness of the trust.
It is the duty of every one to strive to have
his influence felt in the high endeavor to
make ours a law-loving, law-abiding, lawenforcing and a law-preserviugcitizenship.
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Political temptations should not prove irresistible allurements to the young lawyer.
To be statesmen and judges "is the fit aspiration of a lawyer's career, but it must
come as the end and reward of professional success, and not as a means to it.
* **
The struggle for preferment in political life before it has been reached in
the profession means failure in both."
Certain it is that early political proclivities are inconsistent with the best prepara
tion for the service of the client, for, it is
all too true that, under the prevailing
system, the lawyer who would obtain
public office, must devote his time not in
familiarizing himself with legal principles, but, in the acquisition of political
friends.
Most provident use of our time is but a
reasonable requirement. Measured by the
physical capacity to perform, how short
the span that measures the days of usefulness of the life even the most devoted to
duty.
Time is a too sacred gift to be lightly
disposed of. In the possession of every
one it should have value. The accident
of birth, the consequent aristocracy of
wealth, does not confer, by divine appointWent, the right to the formation of, and
membership in, a society of indolence.
Neglected to-days unfit us for to-morrows, and every wasted to-day becomes a
flaw in our equipment.
Great occasions are worth exactly what
our antecedent preparation enables us to
make of them. What a signal good fortune in the life of Daniel Webster, was
Hayne's onslaught on New England, the
reply to which won for the northern senator undying fame. But, of what advantage would this splendid opportunity
have been to him had his whole previous
life not been a training and a preparation
for it?
Industry is a virtue. He is not always
to be envied who is endowed by nature
with a tenacious mind, or a mind capable
of quick perception, for, linked with brilliancy of mental equipment all too often
is to be found a disposition towards indolence and procrastination, which immediately counterbalances and ultimately obliterates the greatest natural endowment.
But, fortunate as is the industrious man,
thrice fortunateis he, who,with great activ-

ities, combines great abilities, who appreciates fully his daily opportunities, and by
his use of them accomplishes great and
beneficent results. Speaking of Governor
Taft's assumption of the difficult work in
the Philippines, President Roosevelt said,
"But, hegladly undertook it, and he is to be
considered thrice fortunate, for in this
world, theone thing supremely worth having is the opportunity, coupled with the
capacity to do well and worthily a piece of
work, the doing of which is of vital consequence to the welfare of mankind."
True, relaxation is a necessity. Physical tiredness is in no sense peculiar to the
toiler in the fields and the workman in
the shop. The demand for rest is levied
without discrimination upon the weary
brain and the tired muscle. But, he is
indeed, most unfortunate, who conceives
it to be a physical necessity to be in a
state of perpetual relaxation. He has
learned a great lesson who understands
that industry, and not the vague hope of
prospective inspiration, is the essential
qualification for success; that genius
really means the largest capacity for concentrated, consecutive toil.
Another duty is that we master legal
principles. A lawyer should be preeminently a teacher, and, to exercise this
function, something more than proficiency
in adjudicated cases must be mastered.
The teadency of the courts to dispense
with original research into the principles
of the law, and to rely upon the authorative utterances of other tribunals, many
times results in unwarranted hardship.
En the face of abundant authority, the
judge should exercise no reasoning power,
is an absurd proposition, and its absurdity
should be pointed out whenever adherence to precedent, or the enforcement of a
technicality, will defeat substantialjustice.
But, sacred as are the duties to court
and client, how much more sacred are the
duties we owe ourselves. True to ourselves, to the highest and noblest dictates
of our better natures, true in the disposition of time, in the promulgation of principles, in the influence we exert among
our fellowmen-all these develop and
adorn character.
How little can one person directly accomplish, and yet how infinitely much,
when we contemplate the chain of pro-
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gression, started by one life coming in
contact with others, implanting seeds of
thought, and directing, more by example
than by precept, those lives toward proper
ends.
What greater reward, from the human
standpoint, than that, when our mortal
career is ended, and our lifework comes to
be reviewed, that it can be said of us that,
in all our relations with our fellowmen,
our efforts were directed toward obtaining
conscientious administration of the law as
one who loved justice and dealt righteously, that we ever evidenced fixed integrity
of purpose and an earnest desire that the
right should prevail.
Shall we merit such reward, we shall
have attained that true success which
follows the patient and persistent devotion
to the duty of each passing hour and the
preparation for, and the advantage taken
of, each succeeding opportunity.
That the road to material success is long
and tedious; that the path of preparation
is often strewn with discouragements;
that men put forth their best efforts and
fruitlessly exert their every energy that
they may but have the chance to prove
their worthiness, cannot be doubted. As
has been well said "By divine appointment we are destined to struggle."
But, should there be weary days of
waiting, should prospects be dark and our
pathway be dreary, let us, instead of impatiently fretting, utilize every moment
of our enforced leisure in fitting ourselves
for opportunities when they do come. It
is only as we discharge the duties and
abide the tests of our present obscure
existence that we shall be prepared for
the great requirements, the signal opportunities, the supreme test days that
may be in store for us. "The stone that
is fit for the builder's use does not long lie
in theditch." The world is always searching for men of ability and integrity to fill
places of responsibility, and, you may rely
upon it, that water does not more naturally seek its level, than does work the best
man.
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THE BACCALAUREATE ADDRESS.
(Delivered by the Hon. John P. Elkin, Attorney
General of Pennsylvania.)

I do not know what better advice could
be given the young gentlemen of your
graduating class in this preempted home
of the Scotch-Irish than is contained in
the poem of the Bard of Old Scotland to
his young friend:
"I lang hae thought, my youthfu' friend,
A something to have sent you,
Tho' it should serve nae other end
Than just a kind memento;
But how the subject-theme may gang
Let time and chance determine;
Perhaps it may turn out a sang
Perhaps turn out a sermon.
"Ye'll try the world soon, my lad,
And. Andrew dear, helieve me,
Ye'll find mankind an unco squad,
And muckle they may grieve ye.
For care and trouble set your thought,
Ev'n when your end's attained;
And a' your views may come to nought,
Where ev'ry nerve is strained.
"I'll no say, men are villains a';
The real, harden'd wicked,
Wha hae nae check but human law,
Are to a few restricted :
But och !mankind are unco weak,
An' little to be trusted;
If self the wavering balance shake,
It's rarely right adjusted.
"Yet they wha fa' in fortune's strife,
Their fate we should nae censure,
For still th' importantend of life,
They equally may answer;
A man may haean honest heart,
Tho' poortith hourly stare him;
A man may tak a neebor's part,
Yet hae nae cash to spare him.
"Ay free, affhan' your story tell,
When wi' a bosom crony;
But still keep something to yoursel
Ye scarcely tell to ony.
Conceal yoursel as weel 's ye can
Frae critical dissection;
But keek thro' ev'ry other man,
Wi' sharpen'd, slee inspection.
"The sacred lowe o'weel-plac'd love,
Luxuriantly indulge it;
But, never fempt th' illicitrove,
Tho' naething should divulge it!
I wave the quantum o' the sin,
The hazard of concealing;
But och! it hardens a' within,
And petrifies the feeling!
"To catch dame Fortune'sgolden smile,
Assiduous wait upon her,
And gather gear by ev'ry wile
That's justified by honour ;
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Not for to hide it in a hedge,
Not for a train-attendant;
But for the glorious privilege
Of being independent.

found an attractive place among the foot-

The fear o' hell's a hangman's whip,
To haud the wretch in order;
But where ye feel your honour grip,
Let that aye be your border;
Its slightest touches, instant pauseDebar a' side pretences;
And resolutely keep its laws
Uncaring consequences.

thus seem to have a community of inter-

'The great Creator to revere,
Must sure become the creature;
But still the preaching cant forbear,
And ev'n the rigid feature:
Yet ne'er with wits profane to range,
Be complaisance extended;
An Atheist's laugh's a poor exchange
For Deity offended!
"When ranting round in pleasure's ring,
Religion may be blinded;
Or if she gie a random sting,
It may be little minded;
But when on life we're tempest-driv'n,
A conscience but a cankerA correspondence fix'd wi' Heav'n,
Is sure a noble anchor!
"Adieu dear, amiable youth!
You'r heart can ne'er be wanting:
May prudence, fortitude and truthi,
Erect your brow undaunting!
In ploughman phrase, ' God send you
speed,'
Still daily to grow wiser;
And may you better reek the rede,
Than ever did th' adviser !"
Let me pause a moment at the begin-

hills of the Alleghanies in and around
Indiana.

Your people and mine would

est.
Among the earliest practitioners at the
bar of your county, were James Smith,
George Ross and James Wilson, who were
afterwards sidners of the Declaration of
Independence. The latter of these, James
Wilson, was at one time a resident of your
town, and was by far, the greatest of the
many eminent men, associated in the
practice of law at your bar, in those early
times, if not the foremost man of our
colonial era and early state history. He
rapidly attained distinction at the bar,
and subsequently, as a patriot, proved
himself a giant in the cause of independence, and ordered liberty. He was a
signer of the Declaration of Independence,
and the vote of Pennsylvania was carried
for its adoption by James Wilson, of Cumberland county. Again, his powerful voice
was heard in the Convention of Pennsylvania, for the adoption of the Constitution, in which convention he was facile
princeps. Subsequently, President Wash-

ning of this address to speak a word about
your splendid institution and its environments.

ington appointed him one of the Judges of
the Supreme Court, which position he
held until death. Considering the work

What a history your country has?
About 1730, permanent settlers began to

that he did, and the influence for good,
directly and indirectly, that he exerted on

locate in this valley and along its bordering hills, in the territory subsequently

the formation of our institution, state and
national, it has always seemed to me that
the memory of this eminent man has

embraced in

your county.

The hardy

and resolute Scotch Irish came here at an
early day, and became the guardians of
our frontiers. Your county was organized
i 1750, when but a handful of white men
were settled west of the mountains, within the boundaries of our State. I have always felt an interest in your history and
institutions, because the early settlers of
my own county were Scotch Irish, who

never been adequately honored.
As a fitting step in the progress of this
county, from a wilderness to a highly developed society, we see the foundation of
your college laid in 1783. This was
brought about mainly through the efforts
of John Dickinson, whose honored name
it bears, and Benjamin Rush, of Phila-

pushed their way out through the wilder-

delphia. Many fathers of the Republic,
including Hamilton and Jefferson, were

ness from Cumberland county, until they

contributors to and earnest advocates of
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its foundation. Its forty trustees bore
names now old and honored in the Commonwealth. Well born, its career has
been one of honor. Its graduates number
nearly four thousand, and it has been
truthfully said that therecord of its alumni,
in proportion to the number graduated
cannot be surpassed by any other college
in the land.
It would be interesting to trace the
careers of many of those who have filled
wIth credit the highest positions of honor
and trust in the land, or distinguished
themselves in business and professional
life but we must deny ourselves this pleasure, Among some of the noted graduates
of the Literary Department in the early
years, we might mention Roger B. Taney
ad James Buchanan. The stories of
their lives are a part of the history of the
nation. John Bannister Gibson, too, was
a product of your college: Less than a
volume would not do justice to the work
of this great man, who was said by Jeremiah Black to have mastered every department of the difricult science of jurisprudence. His fame was co-extensive
with the language, and his opinions were,
among the earliest of his country, to be
recognized in the Courts of Westminster.
Your School of Law, connected or associated with Dickinson College from an
early period, has a splendid record. Associated with it ever is the name of Hon.
John Reed, instrumental in its institution; and among its graduates may be
found such names as Andrew G. Curtin,
Francis Wade Hughes, James H. Campbell, Alexander Ramsey, Nathaniel B.
Smithers, Carroll Spence, James 1. Kelley, and many others equally prominent.
What inspiration there is in the history
and tradition of the place you bave chosen
for the pursuit of your studies! Carlisle,
with its Dickinson, its School of Law, and
its Indian School, with its surroundings
of unsurpassed beauty and thrift, is redolent of elevating and ennobling culture.
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Young gentlemen, there are moments
in the history of every mau's life when he
almost involuntarily stops to consider
what he is and whither he is drifting.
Such a period you have now reached. For
several years you have been engaged in
school work, and now that you are about
to sever your connection with the lecture
room, it may be well for you to pause a
moment to glance at the past and think
of the future.
You remember how buoyant were your
hearts with hope when first you entered
the Law Department a few years agowith how much expectation you peered
into the future, and with what pride you
looked forward to the time when, armed
with a diploma and a knowledge of Blackstone, you should go out into the world as
conquering heroes, needing but to beat
the morning reveille to awake an army
of clients. That bright hour has arrived,
but the army of clients and the legal lore
with which to marshal it spread out like
a broad expanse of an ocean. You stand
upon the beach, scarcely daring to launch
your little barque on such an uncertain
sea. Hope gives you courage, from despair
you gather strength, and, like the sailor
wrecked in mid-ocean, you determine to
make the best of what means and opportunities you have.
It is for the purpose of a brief consideration of your work yet to be done-not,
however, wishing to add any new thought
so much as to recall some old truths-that I desire to speak to you a short time
to-night.
The young lawyer is very apt to consider the geometrical maxim that "A
straight line is the shortest distance between two given points," as especially
applicable in demonstrating the problem
of life. His first point is Blackstone, the
second, money, and to travel the shortest
route from Blackstone to money is the
greatest ambition of many students of
law.
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Now, we were blind to our own interests, insensible to our welfare, and unmindful of the happiness of a home, did
we ignore the value of money. Money is
the motive power of nations. It is an aid
to the happiness of individuals, makes the
fireside bright and cheerful, spreads the
table with the comforts of life, and holds
together that which is dearest to man and
sweetest in the sight of God-the family.
Says Dr. Johnson, "All arguments
which are brought to represent poverty as
no evil show it to be evidently a great one.
You never find people laboring to convince, that you may live very happily
upon a plentiful fortune."
The Romans, however, in their ascendancy, looked upon the spoils of victory as
impedimenta, which may have suggested
to Lord Bacon's philosophical mind that
definition of riches-the "baggage of virtue. "'
It is not the unworthiness of the object,
but the means employed in securing it,
that is liable to mar the young lawyer's
professional career. No lawyer should
earn a fee in a dishonorable way, or for an
unworthy purpose. It is easy for a young
lawyer to mar a promising professional
career, by resorting to doubtful methods,
in securing clients or earning fees.
The young lawyer has a broad field of
hard labor, before he can reap rich harvests. Happy he who can work contentedly and earnestly in this field, and await
"Dame Fortune's golden smile." The
lawyer with no higher view of his profession than a means of pecuniary benefit,
and hastening to every surface scheme to
gain the "paltry dollar, " is like the pendulum, which wears itself out by repeated
oscillations.

harmony of the world," and you see the
exalted subject with which the lawyer
has to deal. Again, law is founded on
justice, which has been defined as
.......
"the golden everlasting
chain,
Whose strong embrace holds heaven,
earth and main. "

Dr. Johnson says: "The law is the last
result of human wisdom, acting on human
experience for the good of the public. "
Add to this Hooker's idea of law, "Her
seat is the bosom of God, her voice the

loving colonists were not fighting for some
theoretical idea of government. John
A dams, the colossus of the floor, who secured its adoption, was a lawyer. They

The student of American law can see, as
but few others, the force of these definitions. Ours being a new government, we
imitated the virtues and thrust aside the
arrogant prerogatives of the older nations.
Our conception of government is the
equality of citizens, and from this fountain
head proceeds the majestic stream of jurisprudence. This is in marked contrast to
the European nations of the past centuries, whose philosophy of government was
all spoken by Louis XIV., when he said,
"I am the state." America has shown
the world that the people are the state,
and they have been slowly yielding to this
advanced idea of civilization.
The lawyer is the practical statesman,
whose advice has done so much for our
system of government. The theorist may
philosophize upon abstract principles, and
from these deduce systems of government,
but they are generally Utopian, and not
likely to be accepted by a practical people.
The wise lawyer understands that laws
are first created in the hearts of the people, and then made binding by legislative
enactment.
In a spirit of fault-finding, it has been
said by some would-be critics that the
Declaration of Independence contains
nothing new; that it only prescribed
methods bf procedure and stated principles
already familiar to the colonists. This
may be true, but Thomas Jefferson was a
lawyer, and well knew that the liberty-

ushered the new nation into being, they
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clothed it with the necessary habiliments,
which were liberty, equality, and a new
regime of government by the people.
Into this field of purer morals, of higher
justice, must the young American lawyer
prepare to enter. What a glorious field it
is! Liberty's home, Freedom's cradle,
Religion's altar, Humanity's shrine.
A sterling character is the best equipment of a lawyer, and his success depends
largely upon how well he guards his reputation.
Webster says of John Adams "that his
John
eloquence was his character."
Quincy Adams says of Lafayette, that
"the record of his life is the delineation
lMr. Webster speaks
of his character."
his own character when he says, "the
ends I aim at shall be those of my country,
my God, and truth. " In looking at his
life we cannot help admiring the high
motives which actuated his evdry purpose. It was the character of the man,
filled with the justice of his cause, that
paved the way for his forensic speeches
and won the admiration of the world.
But there is some work incident to a
lawyer's successful career.

I have been

speaking about the nature of our profession and the character of lawyers, but
these alone cannot make a lawyer.

As

well might an eagle attempt to soar aloft
with a broken wing. You must know the
law. What ideas you haVe now serve as
a foundation, upon which to build a noble
legal structure. But it is in your struggle
in the great field beyond that you must
gain the admiration, or lose the confidence of men.
You are now the daffodils of Spring:
the clods are pushed aside, and through
the aperture, you can catch glimpses of
the broad fields of law.
Some one has said, "Be always displeased at what thou art, if thou desire to
attain to that thou art not, for where

209

thou hast pleased thyself there thou
abidest."
The legal mind is not an exception to
the rule that strength is gained by exercise. Nature teaches us that when development ceases, decay sets in. The ripe
apple, luscious and sweet to the taste,
tinged with red and mellow with ripeness, yet lacks but a line of rottenness.
Work and not genius is the touchstone
of a lawyer's success. History is full of
examples. Lord Ellenborough printed
and kept before his eyes "read or starve."
John Scott, afterwards Lord Chancellor,
said in reply to Wilberforce, who asked
the elements of success in a lawyer, "he
must live like a hermit and work like a
horse." Rufus Choate worked his constitution out and he quaintly remarked
"I am living on my by-laws." Matthew
Hale, while a student of law, worked
sixteen hours a day.
We may inherit wealth, we cannot
knowledge; we cannot purchase a lawyer's
reputation, we may his library.
Influence and wealth may cause a man
to rise in some positions in life like a
balloon, from sources without, but the
lawyer must rise or fall on his own merits.
In the very nature of things it is impossible for a lawyer to be Andrew, Simon
Peter's brother.
I imagine it would require a greater
amount of ingenious reasoning than any
of you can command to persuade the
business man of to-day to intrust an important case to a lawyer, poor in profession, but, perchance, having some Simon
Peter for a brother.
The civilization of this age demands
men of merit. The people of to-day are
caring, not for what a man might be, but
for what he is. If you desire to enjoy this
enlightened admiration, you must prove
yourself worthy of it. Let us go to the
siege of Acre for an illustration; Sir Sidney
Smith threw a shell which fell near the

210

THE FORUM

FORUM
TH~
feet of Napoleon. Two of the French can have. Then it is you win laurels or
grenadiers, seeing it, embraced him, one lose stars.
before, the other behind, thus making
These opportunities are not wanting in
ramparts of their bodies to save the life of the life of a lawyer, but they only call out
the Little Corsican. Such love and de- what power he has; they create no new
votion were not of spontaneous growth. weapons. Some one has asked, "Can we
It required the siege of Toulon, the be thundering Jupiters, and borrow all
victories over the combined forces of the our thunder ?"
Austrians and Piedmontese, the successes
The lawyer of great resources, like
in Lombardy, the triumphant march into Cicero, " touches nothing but he adds a
Milan, the first tribute of Rome to France, charm ;" or is a Webster, "reaching up to
the standard placed upon the bridge of cull a thunder-bolt, and hurl it at his adversary;" or, like an Horatius at the
Arcola by the hands ofthe brave Napoleon,
to prepare a French grenadier to stand bridge, he stands defiant in the face of
between an English grenade and the legions, and baffles every attempt to cross
greatest general of Europe.
the line of justice.
Before us spreads a harbor. A hundred
In the tactics peculiar to the warfare of
a lawyer, it requires a knowledge of the ships are at rest within its broad protecPandects of theRoman Jurists, the wisdom tion. Yonder clipper's anchor chains are
of " Coke on Littleton," the systematic in. One by one the sails drop from her
delicate spars, and, caught by the passing
arrangement of English laws and customs
in Blackstone's Commentaries, the prece- breeze, are filled into a billowy cloud of
whiteness. Thus stretched out, like angel
dents of Lord Mansfield and Sir Matthew
Hale, the constitutional constructions of wings, she stands against the clear sky in
Chief Justice Story, the admirable lectures all her wondrous purity. Under what
of Chancellor Kent, the opinions of hun- auspicious circumstances her departure.
dreds of eminent jurists, both in England
Nature's kindliest influences seem to surand the United States, to prepare him to round her. Steadily she holds her course,
stand against the intrigues and machina- until, a mere speck, she drops below the
tions of designing men, who would cor- horizon.
rupt the palace of justice and defeat the
With what different impressions we
look upon the great dark hulk of the
ends of law.
You may sometimes grow weary, and ocean steamer. The black smoke rolls
wonder whether it pays to read so many in thick stifling columns from her funnel.
text-books and old authors on legal sub- Her sides are scarred and grimy. Her
jects, but you should bear in mind that to masts and furled sails are dark and sooty.
be strong you must eat strong diet. The With sluggish, steady throb she passes
flesh of the bear and the marrow of the the headlands and disappears in the dislion were the food necessary to make an
tance.
Achilles. Research gives you reserve
Two characters pass out from all these
power. Did you ever hear of an engine influences of their Alma Mater into the
being so constructed that it must exert all surging, struggling voyage of life, the one
of its power in doing its work? This re- blessed with natural graces and adorned
serve force has won many a battle. It was with the refinement of a rich home and
the Imperial Guard which saved Napoleon wealthy friends. Already the smiling
at Austerlitz. There always comes a time omens of success surround him.
when you need all the power you have or
The other, perchance, is ungainly in ap210
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pearance and destitute of either money or
friends. The world looks at him in pity,
but stops not to encourage. His entrance
upon the active duties of life is unnoticed,
but he is nerved by hidden, unseen determination and a steady reliance upon his
own powers.
The former, like the ship, passes on ; in
its external beauty and symmetry, far
eclipsing the uninspiring and unpropitious departure of the dark steamer behind. Thus they depart, but let us follow them beyond the horizon, and see the
result.
The sky darkens, tile lightnings leap
from the overcharged clouds, the mighty
seas are lashed into a fury by the warring
elements. Like a stricken b'rd, with torn
and ruffled plumage, the clipper struggles
against the forces, which, but a short
time since, drove her forward in such
magnificence, but which now seem to
compass her destruction. With naked
spars and storm-swept decks, she is
driven and tossed a plaything of the raging seas.
Through the blackness glows the red
light from the steamer's fires. Though
tons and tons of waves are hurled against
her massive frame, yet with the steady,
unceasing pulsations of the giant power
within, she plunges on through crest and
trough, until the turbulent ocean, with
its tossing waifs, is left behind, and
through the breaking light beyond, with
its gentle winds, and under a cloudless
sky, she gains a safe haven.
The homely, ungainly school boy, without money, and having no influential
friends, but willing to work and wait, will
succeed in life often when those more
favored will fail.
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MOOT COURT.
STAGER vs. HOLLAND.
Decedents' estates-Statute of limitations
-Acts of 1834 and 1893-Partiesto aetion-Bjectment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

William Holland contracted a debt to
Stager, and died January 3, 1890.
Stager sued his administrator, February
17, 1891, and obtained a judgment for
$1,300. On February 7, 1896, a sci. fa.
issued against the administrator, and the
judgment was, after trial, in which payment was alleged, revived'by judgment
for $1,420, on April 16, 1900. At the trial
the widow and heirs were witnesses, and
testified for the defendant. Their testimony, which was to the effect that they
had obtained a release of the debt from
Stager, was not believed by the jury, as
the verdict shows. Stager, on April 27,
1900, issued another sci. fa. to the administrator and to the widow and heirs. The
latter pleaded that the lien of the debt
was lost. Judgment for plaintiff. Sheriff's
sale, Stager being purchaser. Ejectment
against Horace Holland and the otber
heirs.
BRENNAN and MOON for plaintiff.

The issuing of a sci. fa. within five years,
without service, continues the lien. 37
Pa. 263; 110 Pa. 468.
The defendants, not having availed
themselves of the opportunity when the
first sci. fa. was issued, are estopped from
denying the lien. Drum v. Kelly, 34 Pa.
415.
COOPER and TURNER for defendant.

Stager's lien, after judgment obtained
against the administrator, was good for
ten years from the death of Holland, and
no longer. 43 Pa. 155.
The case is governed by the Act of February 24, 1834, for the act of June 8, 1893,
applies only to debts of a decedent dying
after its passage.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

The statute of 1893, June 8, will not be
applicable to this case, as the act itself
states clearly, that it is not to be applied
to the debts of A person dying before the
passage of the act. The act was passed in
1893, and Holland died in 1890, so we
must turn our attention to the act of Feb.
24, 1834. We believe that this act governs
our case. It provides in part, as follows:
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"No debts of a decedent, except they be
secured by mortgage or judgment, shall
remain a lien on the real estate of such
decedent longer than five years, after the
decease of such debtor, unless an action
for the recovery thereof, be commenced
and duly prosecuted against his heirs,
executors or administrators, within the
period of five years, after his decease."
According to this act, if a suit is brought
against the executor or administrator,
within five years after the death of the
decedent, and a sei. fa. to bring in the
heirs, be issued within five years from the
rendition of the original suit, the lien of
the debt upon the real estate will be preserved. Benner v. Phillips, 9 W. & S. 13.
Simply stated it means that where debts
of a decedent are not secured by a mortgage or judgment in the lifetime of the
debtor, they may continue a lien on his
lands, in the hands of his widow or heirs,
for the period of ten years, unless an
action has been commenced against them.
Hope v. Marshall, 96 Pa. 895; Allen v.
Kirps, 119 Pa. 1. A case reported in 107
Pa. 472, Allegheny Valley R. R. Co. v.
Phillips, holds that a suit is "duly prosecuted" as required by tile act of assembly,
if it is begun within five years, and prosecuted to judgment within ten years from
the death of the debtor.
Since the act of 1834 requires that the
suit must be "duly prosecuted" against
the heirs within ten years of the debtor's
death, in order to preserve the lien, and
this was n(t done, we believe that the lien
was lost. The statutory period begins to
run from the death of the decedent and
not from the granting of letters of administration. Denney's Appeal, 43 Pa.
155.
Under the act of 1797, -which is similar
to the act of 1834, a case has been decided
which is reported in 10 Pa. 228, Maus v.
.Hummel. This act provided in part as
follows: "The debts of a decedent remain
a lien on the real estate for seven years
and no longer, unless a suit be brought
within the seven years and duly prosecuted, in which event the lien was continued five years longer." The construction given to the words "duly prosecuted" is, that no matter at what time
within the seven years the suit was
brought, it continued the lien for five
years after the termination of the seven,

although judgment was not obtained
within the seven. Hence, in that case,
the lien extended twelve years from the
debtor's death and no longer. So, in our
case, we believe that the lien will extend
only ten years from the debtor's death,
unless a suit is commenced against the
widow and heirs within ten years from
the debtor's death, and, since this was not
done, the lien was lost at the end of ten
years, and a good title to the property
thereby vested in the heirs, and became
liable for the debts of the heirs.
We believe that Swartz Estate, 14 Pa.
42, is in point, and our case should be so
decided. We believe that a good title to
the property vested in the heirs before the
sci fa, including the heirs was issued, and
the suit to which the heirs*were parties
should have been so decided. Therefore,
we believe that ejectment will not lie, and
find for the defendant. Judgment for the
RuODES, F., J.
defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

For the reason stated by the learned
court below, the act of June 8, 1893, is not
applicable to the lien of Stager's debt.
That lien began with Holland's death,
and was continued for ten years by the recovery of a judgment against the administrator, provided that, within the ten
years, a scire facias issued against the
widow and heirs, followed by a judgment
against them. 3 Liens, 532; Allen v.
Krips, 119 Pa. 1; Allen v. Krips, 125 Pa.
504; Cake's Estate, 157 Pa. 457. The
widow and heirs were not made formal
parties, within ten years from Holland's
death. The death occurred Jan. 3, 1890.
The scirefacias by which the widow and
heirs were brought in, was issued April
27, 1900.
Before this scire facias, a scire facias
against the administrator alone had been
issued, and at the trial the widow and
heirs had been witnesses. Although they
had testified that the debt had been paid,
the jury, disbelieving them, had returned
a verdict that the debt was unpaid. Can
it be said that the widow and heirs, having been heard as witnesses, were virtual
parties to the first scdre facias, and that
the judgment was substantially against
them?
Had they been made parties, they could
have done more than personally appearas
witnesses. They could have employed
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counsel, and through him controlled the
character of the questions put to them.
Through him, they might have obtained
other evidence. They might have more
skilfully cross-examined the adverse witnesses. They might have made a better
argument on fact or law to court and
jury. As a witness one can speak only
concerning that about which he is interrogated, nor can he exercise any influence
over the calling, or the examination, or
cross-examination, of other witnesses, the
views of the law upon which the trial is
made to proceed, or over the personality,
the skill, learning and fidelity, of the
counsel.
There is, in fact, no verdict orjudgment
against the widow and heirs, and we
know of no equivalent.
Judgment affirmed.
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creditor. Passmore v. Elridge, 12 S. & R.
198; McClurg v. Lechy, 3 P. & W. 83.
The assignment to a creditor must be in
perfect good faith, and without any indication of collusion. Hopkins v. Beebee,
26 Pa. 85; Clemens v. Davis, 7 Pa. 263.
WATSON and BISHOP for defendant.
If sufficient property is retained to pay
one's indebtedness, such conveyance is
not necessarily fraudulent. Mateer v. Hissir, 3 P. & W. 160; McDonald v. O'Nie],
161 Pa. 245.
An auditor appointed by the court cannot inquire into the validity of ajudgment.
6 W. & S. 315; 66 Pa. 90.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Can Cristlerand Harrison claim any part
of the proceeds in this ease? We think
not. They have no lien, and it is a well
known rule of law that no one is entitled to
be paid out of the proceeds arising from a
judicial sale under execution, unless their
claim was previously a lien, on the interest which passed by the sale and was diHARPER vs. HARPER.
vested by it. As faras they are concerned,
Auditor's distribution-BRights of those it makes no difference whether the conwho are not judgment creditors-Mort- veyance to Custer was absolute, fraudulent or as security. They can claim nothgage-Paroldefeasance.
ing until they have reduced their claims
to judgments. This they have failed to
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
do. The auditor rightly allowed them
Jacob Harper, having borrowed $1,000
nothing. Now as to Custer. He claims
from William Harper, $2,000 from John
his title is good and refuses to take any of
Cristler and $3,000 from Alvin Harrison,
conveyed his farm, worth $10,000, to Chas. the proceeds. The auditor, after paying
Custer. His intention was that Custer William Harper his judgment, $1,000, allowed Custer the residue, some $2,400.
should hold the farm until he was repaid
a debt due him of $1,500, and until a pur- His claim is only $1,500. We think the
auditor erred in allowing him anything.
chaser was found who would give $10,000
He claims nothing, and is allowed $2,400.
for it, when Custer was to convey to such
Why he excepts we are unable to underpurchaser, pay himself the $1,500, and the
residue to Jacob Harper. William Har- stand. As to what interest in the farm he
per, six months after this conveyance, ob- has or did have before the sale, or what
tained a judgment, issued execution, and interest passed to William Harper by the
at the sale bid $3,550 for the farm. An sale, we think it unnecessary to decide.
auditor is appointed by the common pleas Custer claims his title is good. Let him
to make distribution. The auditor allows set it up against the purchaser at the
William Harper payment in full, and the sale. Helfrick's Appeal, 15 Pa. 382.
Mr. Justice Gordon says in Vetter's Apresidue to Custer. Cristler and Harrison
peal, 99 Pa. 55, "le sets up a title adverse
except, that they should have been allowecl
to prove their claims, and should have to the proceeding which has brought the
been paid pro rata with William Harper. money into court, hence, on the authority
Custer excepts, that the sale did not affect of Bush, Bunn. & Co.'s. Ap. 15 P. F.S.
his title, and he declined to receive the 363, he cannot be permitted to take any of
the money."
The same is held in Geist's
money.
Appeal, 104 Pa. 355, where Mr. Justice
YEAGLEY and WALSH for plaintiff.
Paxson says, "Aside from this it has
Any agreement between a creditor and
debtor which has a direct tendency to pro- been repeatedly held upon the distributect the property of the debtor from his tion of an assigned estate, a claimant
creditors, is fraudulent and void as to such upon the fund mus claim by and thrcugh
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the assignment. He cannot claim ad.
versely to it." We think as Custer claims
to hold the farm by an adverse title, and
did not claim any of the proceeds, he
should not. have been allowed any. The
surplus should have been paid to Jacob
Harper, the defendant in the execution.
The auditor's report is confirmed as to
$1,000 allowed to William Harper. It is
set aside as to the allowance to Custer, and
it is ordered that the surplus, after paying
William Harper's judgment, be paid to
Jacob Harper, defendant in the execution.
CRARY, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The conveyance of Jacob Harper to
Custer, does not seem to have been with a
fraudulent intention. It was made in
order to pay an actual debt of $1,500, and
in order that Custer might sell the land
for $10,000, paying all in excess of the
$1,500 to Harper. But, whatever the intention, the tendency of the conveyance
was to delay and hinder creditors, and
they could treat it as a nullity, so far as
the interest in excess of the $1,500 was
concerned.
It does not appear that Custer knew of
Harper's indebtedness. He had a right to
receive a mortgage, or other lien on the
land. He could accept an absolute conveyance, collaterally conditioned to sell
the premises, pay himself from the proceeds, and pay the residue to his grantor.
The conveyance, as respects other creditors of Harper, is practically a mortgage.
The defeasance, being unwritten, has not
been acknowledged nor recorded; and
there is no evidence that William Harper
knew, when he obtained his judgment, of
the parol defeasance. The mortgage
would therefore be void as to William
Harper. Lahr's Appeal, 90 Pa. 507; 1
Liens, 132. The act of June 8, 1881, 1 P.
& L. 1613, declares that no defeasaice
shall have the effect of reducing a deed to
a mortgage, unless it is made at the same
time, is in writing, is signed, sealed,
acknowledged and delivered, and is withinsixty days recorded. The effect of this
act would, possibly, be to make the conveyance to Custer absolute, as respects
Jacob Harper, but it could not have been
the intention of the legislature that it
should become absolute as to creditors of
Harper. So to hold, would put it in the

power of a debtor to pay a debt to one
creditor, at the expense of others, by a conveyance of land worth many more times
than the debt, by omitting to exact a defeasauce with the qualities prescribed by
the act of 1881.
The deed to Custer being a species of
mortgage with a power of sale in the
nmortgagee, and, of the defeasance neither
actual nor constructive notice being given
to William Harper, not only did the
sheriff's sale divest the mortgage, but
Harper was entitled to be paid first from
the proceeds The price bid at the sale,
is $3,560. The auditor has properly allowed
to William Harper, his debt. Custer,
disclosing the facts, and contending that
they gave him a title to the land, not
defeasible by the sheriff's sale, declined to
take any of the money. This position was
entirely logical. To accept the money,
would be to admit the validity of the sale.
But it does not follow that, if his position
is unsound, in the opinion of the court, he
is to lose both the land and the money.
If the court decided that his title had
been divested, it should have awarded
him the money, if he was entitled. He
could appeal, and it is not to be presumed
that, should the decree of the lower court
be approved above, lie would still persist
in not taking the money. We think the
balance of the fund should have been.
awarded to Custer.
The learned court below has properly
rejected the claims of Cristler and Harrison. They haveobtained nojudgments,
and the proceeds of a sheriff's sale are
distributable to lien creditors only. But,
we cannot understand how Jacob Harper
is entitled to the whole of the fund. (1)
He is not a claimant. (2) If the deed to
Custer could be treated as a mortgage,
lie would be entitled only to what
was left after paying the mortgage debt.
But the act of 1881 seems to forbid
its being treated as a mortgage, as
respects Jacob Harper and Custer. (3)
If the deed is to be treated as absolute, the
money value of the land belongs to Custer.
(4) If, the trust being recognized by
Custer, it is enforceable, its object has in
part been frustrated. It is no longer
possible for Custer to find a purchaser for
$10,000, because the land bas been irrecoverably sold for $3,560. Custer would
have a right to his debt, and would hold
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Lhe balance, if paid to him, under a resulting trust for Jacob Harper.
The learned court below has questioned
the power of one to whom a fund has
been awarded to except to the award.
Ordinarily he could have no motive to
except. But when his acceptance of the
award would constitute an election between two inconsistent rights, as in this
case, we see no difficulty in allowing an
exception. He is entitled either to the
money or to the land, but not to both.
He prefers the land to the money. He has
a right to the judgment of the ultimate
court as to which of the two he may take.
Our conclusion is that of the proceeds of
the sale enough must be paid to William
Harper to cover his debt; then enough
must be paid to Custer to satisfy his debt;
-and the balance, if any, must be paid to
Custer, in trust for Jacob Harper, or to
Jacob Harper.
Decree modified accordiugly.

21.

this ejectment to gain possession of the
contiguous, houses.
The court told the jury (1) If the exterior of the houses made them resemble one
house, so that the ordinary observer would
take them to be but one, there was no
duty to inquire of defendant's tenant or of
defendant.
(2) Although there was notice to Jackson that two families were in the double
house, one of which was Jacob Woodward,
he was not bound to know there was no
interior communication between the parts
of the double house, and to infer that the
other family was in the "A street" end,
and inquire of it. Verdict for plaintiff.

CoNRY and TURNER for plaintiff.
A bona fide purchaser of one who has
given a deed, which has not been recorded within the statutory period, will
be protected from claims of grantees in
that deed. Powers v. McFerron. 2 S. &
R. 44; Farmer v. Fisher, 197 Pa. 114.
The conveyance of Jacob Woodward to
Win. Woodward is void, as against the
plaintiff, as it was not recorded within
JACKSON vs. WOODWARD.
the statutory period. Act of May 19,
Ejectment-Duty of mortgagee to inquire 1893.
McINTIRE, and BORYER for defendant.
of tenant- What constitutesnotice-PriThe recording statute has no effect, exority of unrecordeddeed.
cept where owner has no notice. actual or
Wells v. Van Dyke, 106
constructive.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Pa. 111 ; Smith v. Painter, 5 S. & R. 223.
Jacob Woodward bought two contiguous
It is the duty of the purchasers of real
lots in Newville in 1894, and had erected estate to make inquiry respecting the
on them two contiguous houses. One of rights of parties in possession, and, failing
do so, they are affected with constructive
them was arranged for a store. The houses to
notice of such facts, as would,'have come
were built together, and put under a com- to their knowledge, in the proper dismon roof. The two lots fronted on "A
charge of that duty. Jamison v. Dimock,
street," but that on which the store was 95 Pa. 52.

abutted at the side on "X street." The
entrance to the store was on "A street,"
and that to the residence part of the same
house was on "X street."
The entrance to the other house was on
"A street." On April 3, 1895, Woodward
conveyed the"A street" house to his father,
Win. Woodward, for $2,500, but the deed
was not recorded for seven months, Nov.
2, 1895. August 15, 1895, Jacob Woodward executed a mortgage for $1,800 to
Jackson, who had no actual notice of the
previous conveyance to Win. Woodward;
however, Win. Woodward had a tenant
in the house at the time.
On a judgment on this mortgage a
sheriff's sale was had, at which Jackson
bought, paying $4,800, thus obtaining possession of the corner house. He brings

OPINION OF THE COURT.
It is unquestionably the duty of a purchaser, grantee, or mortgagee, to go beyond the court record to investigate the
validity of the grantor's or mortgagor's
title.
In Jamison v. Dimock, et ux., 95 Pa.
52, it was held to be the duty of purchasers
of real e. tate, to make inquiry respecting
the rights of parties in possession, and
failing to do so, they are affected with
constructive notice of such facts as would
have come to their knowledge in the
proper discharge of their duty.
The same principle was held in a later
case, that of Rowe v. Ream, 105 Pa. 543,
where it was said that, if an occupant,
other than the holder or grantor of the

THEFORUM
recorded title, is in possession, the purchaser is bound to inquire of the occupant,
as to the title under which he is in possession.
The duty is further upheld in that of
Thorpe v. Kendall, 5 Forum 47, also in
the case of Brown v. Carey, 149 Pa. 134.
We fail to see the import of the instructions given the jury by the court below, viz: If the exterior of the houses
made them resemble one house, etc.,
there was no duty to inquire of defendant,
or tenant, as to the tenant's right of possession, or under what title he held.
The occupant was a tenant in possession
and it was his duty to make inquiry as to
his right of possession and under what
title he held. We think the cases cited,
Rowe v. Ream, 108 Pa. 543, Jamison v.
Dumock, et ux, 95 Pa. 52, and Brown v.
Carey, 149 Pa. 134, sufficiently show that
it was his duty to go beyond the record
and he could not set up as a defence the
exterior appearances of the houses.
In Thorpe v. Kendall, 5 Forum, 47, the
following cases were cited, Wright v.
Woods,23 Pa. 120; Kerr, et.al.,v.Day,14 Pa.
112, upholding the following principle laid
down in so many words as follows: "If a
previous grantee has put a tenant in possession, it will be assumed that on inquiry
the tenant will state under whom he
claims so that the inquirer will be referred
to his landlord for further information."
Failing to do this, Jackson must suffer
the consequence and can take only such
title as was in the mortgagor when the
mortgage was given.
The recording act of 1775 followed by a
similar act of May, 1893, the only exception being as to the length of time in
which a deed should be recorded, is but
one of the means of notice. One who has
searched the record, to have fulfilled his
duty, is bound by what his inquiry from
those in possession would have disclosed,
and, if he relies upon the record, simply.
must bear the burden.
Judgment reversed.
BROOKS, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREMEB COURT.

Jacob Woodward conveyed to his father,
William Woodward, a house, on April 3,
1895. The deed was not recorded until
Nov. 2, 1895. Jacob Woodward made a
mortgage, on Aug. 11, 1895, covering both

the house thus previously conveyed and
the house still retained, to John Jackson for
$1,800. On a judgment on this mortgage
a sheriff's sale to Jackson for $4,800 has
been made. It is evident that, as against
the mortgage, had it been duly recorded,
before the deed, the deed would have been
invalid. If it was not recorded before the
deed, although it was recorded within
ninety days of its execution, the deed
would take precedence. It does not appear that the mortgage has ever been recorded. This we think decisive, that as
against the earlier grantee, William Woodward, Jackson has no right to recQver.
Cf. Fries v. Null, 154 Pa. 573; 158 Pa. 15;
[Davey v. Ruffell, 162 Pa. 443].
Had the mortgage bpeu put on record
before the deed, it would then have been
necessary to learn whether, at the time of
lending his money upon the mortgage,
Jackson had notice, actual or other, of the
deed. It is not shown that he had actual
notice. It is shown that William Woodward was in possession of the house conveyed to him. Ordinarily one buying an
interest in a house or other real property,
is bound to inquire of one, other than his
grantor, who is in possession of it, and he
will be considered to know all that he
would probably have learned, had he made
such inquiry. But, the possession must
be such that, with reasonable observation
of the property, it would have been discovered. The double house might give no
suggestion, from its size, form, modes of
entrance, or otherwise, that it was in fact
two houses, which therefore were probably
occupied severally by two persons or families. If it seemed to be one, and that one
seemed to be occupied by the mortgagor
alone, there would be no duty on the mortgagee to know that there were two houses.
each with an occupant, and to make inquiry of the occupant who was not the
mortgagor. We fail to see error, therefore,
in the first instruction of the trial court.
Crosland v. Mutual Saving Fund, 121 Pa.
65.
It is unnecessary to decide whether the
second instruction of the trial court was
erroneous. The court below has not deemed
it worth while to consider it, being so sure
that there was reversible error in the first
instruction. We may, however, express
doubt, at least, of its correctness. Though
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a wife and husband occupy premises together, a purchaser is bound to suspect
that she may be the owner, and inquire of
her-Brown v. Carey, 149 Pa. 134, and it is
likely that if two families seem to the
mortgagee to occupy the same premises,
and in fact do occupy severally a part of
them, the other occupying severally the
other part, he must inquire of them by
whatright they occupy. Werefrain, however, from deciding this question.
Judgment affirmed.
JOHNSON'S ESTATE.
Will-How affected by subsequent narriage-By after born children-Beneficiaries,uncertaintyas to.
STATE51ENT OF THE CASE.

Johnson, then twenty-two years of age,
made a will on Jan. 11, 187.5, when he was
not expecting to be married, in which he
gave to his wife, "should I marry, five
times as much of my estate, as shall be
given to any, or all my children, should I
have any." In 1877, he married Rebecca
Ralston, and had four children. He died
in 1899, his wife and children surviving.
At the distribution of the balance of his
personal estate, which was $14,000, the
wife claimed five-sixths of the fund.
RHODES, J. L., and HOUSER for plaintiff.
A will is not affected by the birth of a
child, after its execution, if the child is
provided for in it. 34 Pa. 483 ; 47 Pa. 152;
121 Pa. 1 ; 199 Pa. 137.
It matters not as to the amount of such
provision. Fidelity Trust Co. 's Appeal,
121 Pa. 1.
The marriage subsequent to the date of
the will, did not ipso facto revoke it.
Fidelity Trust Co. 's Appeal, supra, overruling :Edward's Appeal, 47 Pa. 144.
The act of April 8, 1833, is for the benefit of the widow to be taken advantage of
when she so elects. Fidelity Trust Co. 's
Appeal, supra.
MAcCONNFLI and MOON for defendants.
The intention is to be arrived at after
considering the entire will. Baker's Appeal, 115 Pa. 590 ; 119 Pa. 108.
The revocation, as to the widow, does
not depend upon the provisions made for
her, it results absolutely as a legal consequence of the marriage. 47 Pa. 152; 34
"a. 486; 19 W. N. C. 181.
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OPINION OF THE COURT.

Two questions are presented for determination in this case. Was the will revoked by the marriage, and if not, was it
void for indefiniteness in apportioning the
gifts and in naming the beneficiaries?
The act of 1833, provides that, "When
any person shall make his last will and
testament, and afterwards shall marry, or
have a child or children not provided for
in such will, and die leaving a widow and
child, or either a widow or ciild or children, although such child or children be
born after the death of their father, every
such person, so far as shall regard the
widow, or child or children afterborn,
shall be deemed and construed to die intestate; and such widow, child or children, shall be entitled to such purparts,
shares and dividends of the estate, real
and personal of the deceased, as if he had
actually died without any will." Theactof
1848 adds that, "The act of 1833 shall not
be construed to deprive the widow of the
testator, in case she elects not to take under the last will and testament of her husband, of her share of her personal estate
of her husband under the intestate laws of
this commonwealth, but that the said
widow may take her choice, either of the
bequest or devise under any last will and
testament, or of her share of the personal
estate under the intestate laws aforesaid."
The defendants urge that Edward's Appeal, 47 Pa. 144, should be followed,
which, in the light of these statutes,
holds that the will was rendered absolutely void by the marriage. But this
doctrine is repudiated in Fidelity Ins.
Trust & S. D. Co.'s Appeal, 121 Pa. 1, and
is n' recognized in subsequent decisions,
including one as late as Owens v. Haines,
199 Pa. 137. These cases hold that the
above acts aim simply to give the widow
rights under the intestate law if no better
provision is made, and that the marriage
alone does not invalidate the will. We,
therefore, decide that the will is good so
far as the marriage is concerned.
But is it invalid for indefiniteness ? In
making the gift to his wife. the testator
says: "Should I marry, five times as
much of my estate as shall be given to any
or all my children, should I have any."
The expression is somewhat ambiguous,
but we do not feel called upon to reject
the will when the intention is manifest.
It is a cardinal rule that if the intent can
be perceived, and is not contrary io positive law, it must prevail, although in
giving effect to it some words should be
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rejected, or restrained, in their application. Findlay v. King, 28 U. S. ; 3 Pet.
346 ; Green's Appeal, 42 Pa. 25; Shorb's
Estate, 8 York 17. By the use of the
word " all" if he had "any " children.
we believe that he intended to give his
wife five-sixths of his estate, and his offspring, one-sixth, no matter what the
number might be.
It is contended that the will is invalid,
because at the making of the same, the
wife was not determined. It is true, that
the testator may not have known whom
he should marry, or whether he should
marry at all, but considering the possibility, if not the. probability, he gives fivesixths of his estate to his wife, should he
marry. It is not essential to the validity
of a gift, either of real or personal estate,
that the person who is the intended object of the testator's bounty, should be
actually pointed out on the face of the
will; it is efiough that the testator has
provided the means of ascertaining it, according to the maxim, id certum est quod
certum reddipotest.
For the above reasons the widow should
receive five-sixths of the estate, and the
remaining one-sixth should be equally
distributed among the four children.
BROCK, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Johnson's will, though made when he
was not expecting to be married, gave his
future wife a portion of his estate. The
15th section of the act of April 8th, 1833,
I P. & L. 1450, directs that if a testator
"afterwards shall marry" and die, leaving
a widow, he shall "so far as shall regard
the widow," be deemed and construed to
die intestate. Johnson married and his
wife survives him. If the will was by
the marriage, revoked as to her she can
take but one-third of the personal estate.
If it was not revoked, she may, possibly
take five-sixths of it. It is to her interest,
therefore, to claim under the will rather
than under the intestate law. Thatthewill
is not unconditionally revoked by marriage, (though it was said by Woodward,
J., in Edward's Appeal, 47 Pa. 144, to be
thus revoked) is made clear by Fidelity
Ins. etc. Co's Appeal, 121 Pa. 1; Whitney's
Estate, 18 Phila. Mrs. Johnson has a
right to five-sixths, unless the birth of
children, since the makingofthe will, has
prevented.
The act cited supra, provides that if
any person, after making a will, "afterwards shall * * have a child or children
not provided for in such will, and die
leaving a * * * * * child or children,
* ** every such person so far as shall regard the * * child or children after born.
shall be deemed and construed to die
intestate." The child or children may
take what they could have taken, had the
father died entirely intestate.
Four children have been born to Johnson since this will was written. Are they

"provided for" in such will? Had the
provision been ofa-remainder, or reversion,
whether vested or contingent, it would
not have been deemed enough to prevent
intestacy. Williard's Appeal, 68 Pa. 327;
Edward's Appeal, 47 Pa. 144 Even if the
testator owned only a remainder upon a
life estate, and died before the life estate
fell in, he must give the after born child a
share therein, or lie will die intestate as, to
it. Wilson v. Ott, 160 Pa. 433. A gift of
all his estate to his widow, with a commendation to her discretion, of the support
and education of any children to be born,
is not the provision requisite-Hollingsworth's Appeal, 51 Pa. 518; Walker v.
Hall, 34 Pa. 483, although, if a trust for
the support and education of the children
were charged on her, it would be. Jackson v. Jackson, 2 Pa. 212.
The statute does not direct what the absolute or relative magnitude of the provision for the child shall be. It cannot have
been intended to be at least equal to the
share under the intestate law, and if it
may be less, how much less? Had Johnson died fully intestate, his wife would
have taken $4,666.67, and each of the children $2,333.33. Under the will, she will
take $11,666.66, and each of the children
oifly $583.33.
-It might have been supposed that the
object of the Legislature in requiring a
provision for the children, was to require
evidence in the will that the testator had
not overlooked the possibility of children,
and, notwithstanding, had made the disposition found in it. The earlier act had
insisted that the children should be
"named" in the will. But, that thisisnot
sufficient is apparent from Hollingsworth's
Appeal, Willard's Appeal, Edward's Appeal, supra. Some reference is had to the
sufficiency of the provision.
Johnson's will was made when he did
not think of marriage. He was but twenty-two years old. He gave to a woman
whom he did not know, five times as much
of his property as to all the children of
whom he might subsequently become the
father. He did not marry until two years
had elapsed. He died in 1899. The will
has in some way survived over the marriage, over the married life of twenty-two
years, and over the birth of four children,
and is found after his death among his
papers. Probably, when the will was
written, the writer of it was without any
property. and did not think that he ever
would own so considerable a sum as$14,000.
That the making of such a will was inconsiderate and foolish is clear. We do not
think that the provision for the children
is under the circumstances adequate. The
decedent died intestate as to the children.
The decree is reversed, and it is ordered
that one-third of the fund be paid to the
widow and the remaining two-thirds be
divided equally between the four children.
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ANDERSON vs. FINCH.

claim, presumably $300, the statement of
facts not stating clearly just what amount
Compromise of a disputed claim-Conces- he sues for.
An agreement between a debtor and
sion by one party alone-Consideration
creditor for acceptance of part payment of
-Compromise founded on mistake.
an undisputed claim in satisfaction of the
whole is void for want of consideration.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Land v. Campbell, 92 Pa. 470; Brockley
Finch owed Anderson $1,000 for money
v. Brockley, 122 Pa. 6; Pierson v. Mcborrowed, but claimed that Anderson
Cohill, 21 Cal. 122.
owed him for work and labor worth $800.
But there are several exceptions to this
Anderson insisted that the work was not
rule. It is otherwise when the amount is
worth more than $600. The parties finally
contingent, when there are mutual unsetagreed to settle these claims by the paytled demands, when the creditor obtains
ment of $100 by Finch to Anderson. The
some new benefit or advantage, or when
payment was made accordingly. Anderthe agreement is between composition of
son made this compromise because of his
Land v. Campbell, supra;
creditors.
erroneous belief that Finch would soon
Chamberlain v. McClurg, 8 W. & S. 31;
prove to be insolvent. But Finch did not
Fleming v. Ramsey, 46 Pa. 252; Brown v.
prove to be insolvent, and Anderson sued
Sloan, 6 W. & S. 421.
to recover the balance of his original
Although the English courts adhere to
claim.
the rule, the American courts have exhibFLEITz and BRADSHAW for plaintiff.
ited a tendency to depart therefrom. Our
There is no consideration for the agreement to compromise, and plaintiff is not courts look upon it with much disfavor
concluded from recovering the residue of and will lay hold of a very slight considthe debt. Jaffray v. Davis, 124 N. Y. 164; eration to sustain the transaction. Here,
Leeson v. Anderson, 99 Mich. 247; Ryan
the law is held to be entirely technical
v. Ward, 48 N. Y: 205.
A parol agreemdnt by a creditor to ac- and not supported by reason. Kellog v.
cept from his debtor less than is due by Richards, 14 Wend (N. Y.) 119; Harpe v.
way of compromise is nudum pactum and Graham, 20 Ohio 103.
void, and cannot be set up in bar as an acIn Brooks v. White, 2 Met. 283, the
cord and satisfaction. Daniels v. Hatch,
court said that the rule should not be ex21 N. J. L. 391.
tended beyond its precise import, and it
JA E and HILLYER for defendant.
The compromise of a doubtful claim is a should never be enforced when the techsufficient consideration for an agreement. nical reason on which it is founded does
Chamberlain v. McClurg, 8 W. & S. 31;
Fleming v. Ramsey, 46 Pa. 252 ; Russell v. not exist.
Pollock, in his work on Contracts, comCook, 8 Hill (N. Y.) 504.
After the compromise has been effected, menting upon the rule, says: "It is
the merits of the claims of either party enough to say that the English common
cannot be investigated. Paxson v. Hewlaw rule stands committed to the absurd
son, 14 Phila. 174.
paradox that a debt of 100 pounds may be
An accord executed is satisfaction.
Morehouse v. Bank, 98 N. Y. 502; Sim- perfectly well discharged by the creditors
mons v. Hamilton, 56 Cal. 493.'
acceptance of a pepper corn at the same
OPINION OF THE COURT.
time and the same place at which the 100
pounds are due, or of 10 shillings at an
Finch, the defendant, owed Anderson
$1,000. Anderson was indebted to Finch earlier day, or at another place; but that
for work that the latter performed. The nothing less than a release under seal will
amount due for this work was in dispute, make the acceptance of 99 pounds at the
same time and the same place a good disFinch claiming that it was worth $800,
charge, although modern decisions have
Anderson, that it was worth only $600.
Thus it will be observed, Anderson had a confined the absurdity within the narclaim against Finch for either $200 or $400. rowest possible principle."
Does the case under consideration come
He agreed to take$100, believingthat Finch
would soon prove insolvent. His belief, under the exceptions noted above? We
however, proved erroneous, and now he are convinced that it does.. The immetakes action to recover the balance of the diate settlement of the claim was of ad-
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vantage, a benefit to Anderson, or at least
he considered it so when he proposed the
compromise. At that time there was a
probability that a suit would be necessary
to determine the amount that Finch owed
him ; there was the probability of a vexatious delay by reason of the suit; the
probability of costs incident to the suit accumulating, and the probability that the
conclusion of the suit would find Finch
insolvent. Anderson's judgment would
therefore be worthless. To avoid all thi.s
he proposed a settlement, the terms of
which were more beneficial to the defendant than to him. The settlement, it is
true, was based upon an error ofjudgment,
but this fact would not justify the court
in declaring the settlement void.
The fact that the compromise was apparently beneficial to the plaintiff, and that
the tendency of modern courts is to uphold
such settlements, precludes the plaintiff
from recovering.
Judgment therefore is rendered for the
defendant.
WAIZH, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

That Finch owed $1,000 to Anderson
was not disputed. There was a debt due
from Anderson to Finch, but they differed
with respect to its size. The former alleged that the work done was not worth
more than $600 ; the latter claimed that it
was worth $800. Here then was room for
a yielding by each, of a portion of his supposed right. A compromise "imports a
mutual yielding of opposing claims, the
surrender of some right or claimed right,
in consideration of a likesurrender of some
counter-claim."
Gregg v. Weathersfield,
55 Vt. 385. Had Finch agreed to accept
and Anderson to pay $700, or $750, or $775,
in settlement, there would have been a
compromise. And the compromise would
be binding, because the sacrifice by Finch
of a part of his demand, would be a consideration for Anderson's promise to pay
more than he conceded that he was under
obligation to pay.
But, no such agreement was made.
Anderson was afraid that he would not be
able to secure payment of his uncontested
debt of $1,000. He was induced therefore
to agree to pay the whole of Finch's
claim, $800, by crediting him with $800 on
his own debt, and to remit $100 besides, if
Finch would pay him the remaining $100.

Finch undisputedly owed, overand above
what was owed to him, $200. Hepays$100
and Anderson agrees to accept this in full.
Such an agreement lacks consideration,
and in spite of it, the residue of the debt
can be collected. Water Co. v. Aft. Holly
Springs Borough, 10 Super. 162; Martin v.
Frantz, 127 Pa. 389; Tucker v. Murray, 2
D. R. 497.
It is easy to speak scornfully, as does
Pollock, of the distinction made by courts
between accepting a pepper corn in satisfaction of a debt of $100 and accepting $99
in satisfaction of it. But that distinction
is the result of the doctrine of consideration. Let the principle be laid down
that a promise is not binding without a
consideration, and it becomes necessary to
discover a consideration before enforcing
it. And it is in truth difficult to find a
consideration for A's promising to take
from B $100, in satisfaction of a debt of
$200 already due, on B's paying at once
the $100. At the instant of paying the
$100 he ought to pay another $100, but his
half performance of his obligation is conceived to furnish a consideration for a
promise not to require the other half.
The learned court below has endeavored
to discover a consideration. Avoidance
of a suit is certainly a motive for a creditor's coaxing immediate payment of onehalf the debt, by promising not to exact
the rest. But we fail to see how the
debtor's consenting to pay one-half without suit can be a consideration, when he
ought to have paid all without suit.
Hastening the payment of a part of the
debt, was doubtless one of Anderson's
motives. But the whole debt was overdue, and what he gained which he was
not already entitled to, by his agreement
to remit $100, we fail to discern. Fear of
Finch becoming insolvent was doubtless a
motive for Anderson to hasten the payment of one-half his debt, by the promise
to sacrifice the other half. We think it
very poor policy to recognize any merit in
a debtor's exacting a promise to forgive half
the debt, by means of a conscious or unconscious menace of the probable loss of
the whole- by his insolvency. Debtors
could extort compromises or compounding
by postponing payment, and by accumulating debts more rapidly than property
"Payment of a less amount than is due
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is good as between them ; "it can only be
questioned by the creditors of the alienor."
Eyrick v. Hetrick, 13 Pa. 487.
A man's wife and children have no
legal right to any part of his goods, and
no fraud can be predicated of any act of
his to deprive them of their succession.
Pringle v. Pringle, 59 Pa. 28; Lines v.
Lines, 142 Pa. 149; P. & L. Dig. Dec. Col..
12595-96.
A husband would not be heard to allege
that the notes in question were drawn up
to defeat creditors. Neither should she
claiming under him, be allowed to make
similar allegations. The auditor erred in
allowing such testimony to be introduced.
Ike's Estate, 200 Pa. 202.
THORNE and RHODES, F., for the defendant.
HERSTLER'S ESTATE.
An executor, who is the payee of a note
of his decedent, which is overdue at the
Executors and administrators- Notes time of decedent's death, must clearly
fraudulentlygiven toon, who afterward,- show that he held the note bv a title hosbecomes executor, during lifetime of de- tile to that of decedent. Hoffer's Estate,
156 Pa. 473.
eedent-?ight of widow to object to alA voluntary bond, payable at maker's
lowance of payment of notes so givendeath, given for the purpose of defrauding
Distributionof fund--Executory and ex- the maker's wife, when donee was a party
ecuted contracts for illegal object dis- to the fraud, was not sustained in Hummel's Estate, 161 Pa. 215.
cussed and distinguished.
The decision in Ike's Estate, 200 Pa.
202, is not in conflict with the foregoing.
STATE ENT OF THE CASE.

operates only as a discharge of theamount
paid, leaving the balance still due, and
the creditor may sue therefor, notwithstanding the agreement."
Seymour D.
Thompson, 1 Cyc. 320.
As Finch agreed to pay and paid only
half of what he was unquestionably bound
to pay, there is no consideration for
Anderson's agreement to remit any portion of his claim. He may therefore recover $1,000 with interest, less such debt
as shall be found by the jury to be due to
Finch from him.
Judgment reversed with v.f. d. n.

Herstler gave five notes, each of $1,000,
to his son, Thomas. After his death,
Thomas, being executor, obtained from
the Orphans' Court leave to sell decedent's
land for the payment of debts. In the
schedule of debts accompanying the petition these notes were mentioned. The
widow denied that the notes were debts
and offered to pay all the other debts if
the court would refuse to order a sale. The
sale was nevertheless ordered. The proceeds were brought into Thomas' accou n t.
In the distribution the widow, to whom
the land was devised in fee, proved that
no money was due from Herstler to his
son, but that the notes had been made to
give Thomas the means of selling the
property and coveringit up from creditors,
whom he had later been able to satisfy.
The auditor denied payment to Thomas
and awarded the money, $7,111, to the
widow. Exceptions.
ELMEs and BROOKS for the plaintiff.
A man can never be said to commit a
fraud on the contingent rights of others,
where it depends upon his own act
whether they shall ever exist. Killinger
v. Reidenhauer, 6 S. & R. 531; Buehler
v. Glininger, 2 Watts 226.
A conveyance from a father to a son,
though made to defeat creditors of both,

OPINION OF THE COURT.

All the cases produced by the defendant,
in support of their argument, seems to be
upon the ground that if Thomas were to
receive payment of these notes it would
defraud creditors, but the statement of
facts clearly says "creditors whom he
(Thomas) had later been able to satisfy."
Consequently the question, we think, in
this case, is whether this transfer, which
it is admitted is void as to creditors, is
void as to the widow. Hummel's Estate,
161 Pa. 215, which seems at first to be
strongly in favor of defendant, holds that
"a voluntary bond payable at the maker's
death given for the purpose of defrauding
the maker's wife of her right in his estate
cannot be sustained where the donee is a.
party to the fraud."
In this case the
conveyance was in defraud of the widow,
while in the case at bar the gift was in defraud of creditors.
But in Hummel's
Estate provision was made for the widow
by devising to her a house " aslong as she
lives, or as long as she shall bear my
name."
The widow refused to takeunder
the will, choosing rather to take under the
intestate law. A conveyance in defraud
of the widow's right to take under the law
is of course void.
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In Ike's Estate, 200 Pa. 202, the widow
makes a claim similar to that in the ease
at bar, and it is held that "The right
which the widow asserts came to her
through her husband. He would not be
heard to allege that the notes in question
were drawn up to cheat creditors. Neither
do we think that she claiming under him
should be allowed to make a similar allegation. " A conveyance from a.father to
a son, though made to defeat creditors, is
good, as between them it can only be
questioned by the creditors. 13 Pa. 487.
"A deed made to defraud and defeat
creditors is void as against creditors, but
not as against the grantor or his chi:dren. '1
5 Binn. 1C9; 2 W. 226. If it is not void
against his children, then it certainly is
not void against his wife. It is a settled
law of this state, that during his life a
man may exercise absolute power over his
personal property without his wife's consent, her right attaches only at his death,
and she cannot impeach as a fraud on her
a voluntary gift of personalty made by her
husband in his lifetime. 59 Pa. 281; 142
Pa. 149.
In view of the law cited, we think that
the auditor erred in his distribution. The
exceptions are therefore sustained.
MOON, J.

Likewise, when a party seeks their aid to
annul the accomplished performance of
the contract, and to place him in statu
quo ante, they decline to assist him. If e. g.
a conveyance has been made, in execution
of an illegal contract, the grantee will not
be compelled-to re-convey, nor the grantor
aided by ejectment to recover the possession of the premises. Reichart v. Castator, 5 Binn. 109; Allebach v. Hunsicker,
132 Pa. 349; Hershey v. Welting, 50 Pa.
240.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

In some cases, in which contracts to pay
money have been made to defraud creditors of the promisor, the courts have invoked the above distinction. They have
inquired whether the contract had been
executed, or remained executory, and suspended their decision to aid the promisee
upon the result. In Hershey v. Weiting,
50 Pa. 240, Wooaward, C. J., says, of a
contract to convey in fraud of the grantor's
creditors, "If the question here were upon
enforcing the agreements, there can be no
doubt that Mrs. Hershey (the grantor)
might avail herself of the fraud she complains of, provided always she could establish it to the satisfaction of a jury; but between enforcing and cancelling an agreement, there is a distinction as palpable as
that between an executory and an executed contract."

The refusal of the court to allow the
widow to pay all the other debts of her
husband, than the notes in her son
Thomas' hands, is not such an adjudication that these notes are valid debts, as
precludes the widow from now denying
their validity in the distribution of the
proceeds of the sale of the land. Ike's
Estate, 200 Pa. 202.
The learned court below has decided
that the offer of the widow to show that
the notes were made for the purpose of
giving Thomas the means of covering up
the testator's property, is inadmissible.
The object was illegaj, but, holds the court,
while that illegality vitiates the contract,
as respects those intended to be defrauded
by it, it does not vitiate it, as respects the
parties themselves.
The courts have made a distinction between executed and executory contracts
which are, or whose object is, illegal.
When a party seeks their aid to secure
performance, they decline to give it.

A promise to pay money, with a warrant of attorney to confess judgment, is
held to be executed by the entry of the
judgment, and before the satisfaction of it
by execution, or otherwise, in Blystone v.
Blystone, 51 Pa. 373, and it is intimated
that prior to the judgment, the contract
being executory, fraud towards creditors
of the defendant could be shown in order
to prevent a recovery.
An exception to the principle that the
court will not aid the plaintiff who is
seeking to enforce a promise made in violation of law or policy, or for the purpose
of defrauding, has been often recognized.
It has been said that when the plaintiff
has facts which entitle him to recover, independent of the fraud or other illegal
quality, and the fraud, etc., must be
shown in defence, the plaintiff can recover. In covenant on a sealed promise
to pay $2,000, it was held that, sincetheproduction of the instrument, with evidence of
its execution, was sufficient.in the first in-

-
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stance, to entitle the plaintiff to a recovery, the defence would not be heard that
the object of the covenantee and covenantor was to defraud a third person. Evans
v. Dravo, 24 Pa. 62; Hendrickson v.
Evans, 25 Pa. 441. "The plaintiff," said
Woodward, J., in the latter case, "was
then and is now, in possession of a legal
and valid cause of action. On the face of
the bond there is nothing to show that he
has not a right to enforce it. But the defendant alleges an equity which ought to
restrain him, and to make it out, is
obliged to show the fraudulent transaction. In respect to that matter, the
real substance of the dispute, he is the
actor. He alleges and proves the fraud.
This the maxim [in pan delicto, etc.] forbids him to do."
In Williams v. Williams, 34 Pa. 312, a
scirefa(!asupon a mortgage, the proof of
the execution of the mortgage was for the
plaintiff, primafacie sufficient. The defendant was obliged to prove facts constituting a defence. He was not allowed to
show that the moitgage was given solely
to cover up the mortgagor's property.
Thompson, J., contents himself however,
with the indecisive remark: "The mortgage would be good, as between them
[the parties], -it would be void, only as
against the interests intended to be defrauded,"
Gill v. Henry, 95 Pa. 388, is a judgment
on a bond, which had been opened, at the
instance of the defendant. It was held
that at the trial of the issue, the defendant should not have been allowed to show
that the bond was intended to cover up
the obligor's property. As in 34 Pa. 312, the
reason is generalized. The ability of the
plaintiff to make out aprimafacieright,
without the disclosure of the illegal intention, is not adverted to.
In Winton v. Freeman, 102 Pa. 366, A,
in order to evade his creditors, made a pretended sale of his goods to B, who gave
him judgment notes for the price. The
judgments entered on one of these iiotes,
was opened, and the defence was attempted that the ownership of the goods
was not intended to pass, and that the
notes were without consideration. It
does not appear whether the note was
sealed or not, nor whether the court
thought it necessary for the plaintiff to
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prove a consideration, or that the burden
of disproving it was on the defendant.
Citing Hershey v. Welting and Evans v.
Dravo, supra, Paxson, J., remarks that
"the books are full of cases where a party
to a fraud has sought relief in the courts
from the consequences of his unlawful
act, but the decisions have been uniformly adverse to such applications. It is
not the province of the law to help a
rogue out of his toils." Doubtless, exposing the fraudulent debtor to the loss of his
property, by compelling him to keep his
written promise, is more deterrent than
refusing to assist his confederate in enforcing the promise, would be, and this is
probably the foundation of the policy implied in the dictum of Paxson, J., in Winton v. Freeman, supra, to the effect that
" the intended fraud is a binding consideration, and that although Oscar F. Freeman received no benefit whatever for the
note, he cannot be allowed to impeach it
on that ground. " If one who pretends to
purchase the goods of X, giving X a note
for the price, but with no intention that
he should become owner of the goods or
pay the note, the object being merely to
cheat X's creditors, can be compelled to
pay the note at X's instance, although X
has retained the goods, a serious advantage is given to X, and instead of an inducement to be honest, he would seem to
have a rather strong inducement to be
dishonest.
Unsatisfactory as the state of the law is,
upon this subject, the tendency seems to
be to hold that when any one appears in
writing to assume an obligation towards
another, for the purpose of defrauding the
creditors of either, the apparent assumption shall be enforced, irrespective of the
real assumption, and irrespective of the
existence of a consideration which is ordinarily required to give effect to a promise.
The courts will enforce in favor of the
promisee, not the actual contract, but the
ostensible contract, even when it has no
consideration. Whether the adoption of
this exceptional principle is wise, on ethical or economical grounds, we shall not
consider. It may, in a majority of cases,
more deter from fraud than the adoption
of any of the rival principles.
Had the Herstler notes been negotiable,
a consideration would be presumed. Or,
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had they been under seal, proof of consideration would have been unnecessary. So
far as the case reveals, Thomas Herstler
was compelled in order to recover, to prove
the consideration. He either had to perjure himself, or aver that there was no
consideration, that he was not in fact to
get the money unless it became necessary
in order to cheat creditors, and that it had
not become thus necessary. He is rewarded, either for his perjury, or for his
confederacy with his father to cheat, the
creditors of the latter, and for his own
fraud against his father, in claiming money
which he admits that he was never to get,
by a decree for $5,000. His father may
have repented of his contract, and again
become honest. He seems to have done
so, for he has paid all the creditors. We
find it impossible to allow this son to
take, by means of his own false swearing,
or his avowed conspiracy to cheat creditors, and confessed attempt to cheat his
father, $5,000 from his father's estate, and
the principle we announce is, that when
one to whom a debtor gives a note with
the object, not of paying the money, but
of assisting the promisee to collect it only
when it becomes necessary in order to defraud creditors, is compelled, in enforcing
the note, to show the consideration, and in
doing so, avows the transaction, he will
not be allowed to succeed, or, if he by perjured testimony denies the transaction,
the defendant may show the true nature
of it, and the promisee shall not be allowed to succeed. How aiding such a
scoundrel, by the powerof the court, to collect the money in the teeth of his contract not to collect it, could promote honesty we are too obtuse to discover.
Decree reversed with direction to distribute according to the auditor's report.

The evidence showed that the defendants
not only had agreed to sell, but actually
did so. The fine of $25 was payable to the
informers, and could be collected by a civil
action.
A motion in arrest of judgment is made
on the ground that no criminal offense of
conspiracy was committed, and that the
court is powerless to impose sentence.
MATTHEWS and PaIcKETT for Commonwealth.
The criminal offense of conspiracy is
present the moment an agreement to do
an unlawful act is entered into. It is unnecessary to charge the commission of the
act forming the purpose of the conspiracy.
91 Pa. 145; 2.3 Pa. 355.
When the object of a conspiracy is illegal, the means by which it is to be accomplished are immaterial. 8 S. & R. 420; 23
Pa. 355.
An indictment for conspiracy at common
law will lie against two or more persons
for conspiring to commit an act for which
special provision is made by statute- Com.
v. Putnam, 29 Pa. 296; Com. v. Boyle, 14
Pa. C. C. 561; Com. v. Sullivan, 16 W. N.
C. 14.
DIVELY and Yocum for defendants.

The Acts of Assembly of 1885, 1895, 1899
and 1901, relating to sale and manufacture
of oleomargarine, do not absolutely prohibit its sale, but only regulate the sale.
To sustain a conviction for, and sentence
on, a conviction for criminal conspiracy to
violate the statute, would render the defendants liable to be twice punished for
the same olense. 14 Pa. 228; ArticleV,
Constitution of U. S.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Whether or not the agreement between
the defendants in this case, and the subsequent sale of oleomargarine in consequence of such agreement, are sufficient to
sustain the indictment for conspiracy,
found by the lower court, is the question
we are called upon to consider, and in doing so, we find that both judges and textwriters have experienced great difficulty
in forming a definition which possesses the
COM. vs. JAMES AND EVANS.
requisite characteristics to constitute the
Conspiracy-Agreementto sell oleornarga- offense of conspiracy.
rine-Motion for arrest of judgmentConspiracy is defined to be "a secret
Power of court to sentence.combination of men for an evil purpose,"
"an agreement between two or more perSTATEMENT OF THE CASE.
sons to do an evil act in concert," "a seDefendants were indicted for conspiracy
cret combination to effect an illegal enterand convicted. The agreement was to sell
prise, or a direct agreement with others to
oleomargarine, which was made penal by
commit crime." With these definitions
the statute, a violation of which was made
before us, and the many cases cited by the
punishable by a fine not greater than $25.
learned counsel, we shall endeavor to as-
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certain whether or not the defendants entered into this transaction with the intention of defrauding the public, or whether
the circumstances are such as will warrant
us in finding that the criminal offense of
conspiracy was not committed, and in
awarding a motion in arrest of judgment,
as prayed for by the defence.
Concert of action, then, is one requisite;
and if this element does not appear there
can be no conspiracy. There was no need
ot unison to effect their object; either
Evans or James could have accomplished
the same thing without any concert or cooperation; and, as one of them could not
have been indicted, we fail to see how
their agreement to sell together could have
constituted the offense. They merely
agreed, as a matter of convenience, to contribute toward a common fund for the
purpose of buying and selling an article
which the law does not prohibit, but simply designates in a number of acts as to
how the sale of the same shall be regulated.
There was no agreement to do an evil
act, as the sale of oleomargarine is not an
act malum in se. It was, then, the traffic
in an article in violation of a statute, declaring that the same shall not be sold, and
annexing a fine of twenty-five dollars on
those who violate its provisions.
There is nothing in the statement of
facts to warrant the belief that there was
any secret plot, or that the arrangement
to deal in this article was secretly formed;
on the other hand, we are of the opinion
that it was merely a desire on the part of
the defendants to embark in an innocent
business or enterprise, by which they could
secure a livelihood and enjoy the privileges given every citizen in the Ist section
of Article I., of the Constitution of Pennsylvania.
Contrary to the several Acts of Assembly, viz : 1885, 1895, 1899 and 1901, relating
to the sale and manufacture of oleomargarine, we have in this case an absolute prohibition of such sales, and the sula of
twenty-five dollars imposed as a penalty
for every such violation.; but, how can a
State enforce provisions of an act when
the Constitution of the United States says
the same shall not be enforced. The statement of facts have embodied these words:
"The agreement was to sell oleomargarine,
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which was made penal by the statute;"
but the statutes must not conflict with the
provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment,
Section I., of the Constitution of the
United States, which provides that "No
State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges oi immunities
of citizens of the United States," and with
reference to this right we cite Pa. v. Schollenberger, 171 U. S. 1, in which it was
held that oleomargarine is a healthful food
product. How, then, can this or any other
Commonwealth, by legislative enactment,
place an ab-olute prohibition upon its sale,
and maintain an action for conspiracy
against the defendants consistently with
the Fourteenth Amendment above referred to?
That the legislative branch of a State
may make laws regulating the sale of oleomargarine is not questioned; but we think
it cannot enforce a provision which is an
absolute prohibition of such sale, in support of which we refer to Com. v. McCann,
14 Sup. 221; 198 Pa. 509; Com. v. Powell,
170 Pa. 284, and Com. v. Vandyke, 3 Sup.
484, all of which deal at length with the
right of the Legislature in this respect.
Where an article of food is wholesome in
its pure state, but has been adulterated
with other substances and so made deleterious to health, there is no reason why the
Legislature should, on this account, attempt to prohibit the sale when unadulterated.
An agreement to violate a statute has, in
many instances, been held to constitute a
conspiracy, but much depends upon the
character of the offense and the object for
which such statutes were enacted. The
case of Hazen v. Com., 23 Pa. 355, was
cited by counsel for plaintiff to show' that
an attempt to violate a statute was held to
be a conspiracy; but the reason, we think,
is obvious, as it involved an attempt to
extort money, or an inducement to commit crime, followed by an attempt to extort money to suppress a prosecution,
while Com. v. McKisson, 8 S. & R. 418, is
authority for the holding, that in order
to convict of conspiracy it must be shown
that the object to be attained would be
unlawful and dangerous to the public, for
it is the object that imparts to the conspiracy its'character of guilt or innocence,
and we are of the opinion that the ele-
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ments of conspiracy are lacking in this
case.
It is not difficult to detect the elements
of conspiracy in the case of Com. v. Boyle
et al., 14 C. C. R. 561, cited in support of
this indictment, since this was a case in
which the defendants were found guilty of
conspiracy in altering election returns, nor
to understand why the ease of Com. v.
Putnam, 29 Pa. 296, resulted in the indictment of defendants, for here the offense
was that of assault and battery. In the
former we have an attempt to strike at the
very rudiments of government, while the
latter is a breach which violates the personal rights of the citizen, and overthrows
the foundations of society.
Believing that no harm was intended,
that this agreement lacks the vital principle necessary to constitute the crime of
conspiracy, and that the statute which is
an absolute prohibition of the sale of oleomargarine as oleomargarine is unconstitutional, we grant the motion in arrest of
judgment, as prayed for.
WATSON, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The defendants agreed to sell, and, in
violation of the statute, did in fact sell,
oleomargarine.
They may have been
partners, and as such, have committed
these acts. The state forbids the sale of
oleomargarine if it has been colored in the
process of manufacture. The act of 1885
had prohibited the sale of it, whether it
was deceptively colored or not, and
its constitutionality
was asserted in
Powell v. Commonwealth, 127 U. S. 678.
The milder act of 1899 is therefore not
unconstitutional. McCann v. Commonwealth, 198 Pa. 509 ; 14 Super. 221 ; Commonwealth v. Vandyke, 13 Super 484.
The defendants not only agreed to sell,
but they sold oleomargarine, in violation
of law. They might have been indicted
for the sale. Had they been, their punishment would be a fine not exceeding $25.
The statute does not penalize an agreement
or a confederation to sell.
There seems to be a common law conspiracy, whose margin is so ill defined
that the judges are practically legislators,
and their enactments ex postfacto. Said
Gibson C.J., in Mifflin v. Commonwealth,
5 W. & S. 461, where the defendants were
charged with conspiring to assist a minor

woman to escape from her father's house
in order to marry A, even had the precedents not reached this case "there would
be no reason why the law of conspiracy
should stop short of it now

* *

*

But

were we without even the semblance of a
precedent, we could not hesitate to pronounce the act of which the defendants
have been Sonvicted, a common law offense." Cf. 2 Whart. Crim. Law 209.
When the act to be done is criminal,
though not malum in se, a combination
to do it is criminal, whether it is done or
not. The fact that the act is done, in
pursuance of the conspiracy, does not
merge the latter, in the substantive offense
if that offense be a felony. Commonwealth v. Delany, I Gr. 224; Commonwealth v. McGowan, 2 Pars. 241. As
conspiracy is in many of its forms, a judge
made crime, the penalty to be imposed on
it is a judge made penalty. Gibson C. J.
laid down the principle, in Hartmann v.
Commonwealth, 5 Pa. 60; Williams v.
Commonwealth, 34 Pa. 178, that the conspiracy can not be more severely punished
than the substantive offense. In Scott v.
Commonwealth, 6 S. & R. 224, it had been
held that an attempt to commit a crime
could not be more severely punished than
the crime itself, and "A conspiracy," says
Gibson, C. 3., "is even less than an attempt," 5 Pa. 67. The logic of these
decisions is not wholly satisfactory, for
when the act, which there is a conspiracyto do, is not criminal at all, and therefore
not punishable at all, the conspiracy has
been often held to be criminal and punishable, Mifflin v. Commonwealth, 5 W. & S.
461; 6 Am. & Eng. 850; Twichell v. Commonwealth, 9 Pa. 211.
Though the defendants might be indicted either for the illegal sale of oleomargarine, or for the conspiracy to sell it,
it does not follow that they are liable to
double punishment. If the Commonwealth elects to prosecute for the conspiracy and convicts, the courts will probably hold the conviction a bar to a subsequent prosecution for the completed
offense. Commonwealth v. McGowan,
2 Pars. 347, 357.
Ordered that sentence be rendered on
the verdict.
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KANE vs. BRIDGEWATER TOWNSHIP, ET AL.

22,

OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action of trespass. Plaintiffal-

leges the acts of the defendant in working
Dedication-Rowevidenced-Adverse useir the road, digging the ditch, &c., constiby the public-Permissive joint use not tuted an invasion of her right as owner of
adverse to owner-Trespass.
the road. Defendant defends on the
ground that the road is a public highway,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
and that therefore his acts did not constiMrs. Kane owns a tract of land through tute a breach of duty to the owner of the
which runs a road connecting two public land through which the road passed. Is
roads. This road, though not surveyed,
the road a public highway? This is the
had been open and used by the public for only question raised in the present case
thirty:lve years.
and upon Its solution depends the extent
In August, 1901, William Fitler, the of plaintiff's right to damages. Highsupervisor of Bridgewater township, in
ways are created either by legislative
which said road is situated, was notified authority, by dedication, or by necessity.
that said road was in an impassable condi- Bouvier Law Dict. Vol. 1, page 947. We
tion, and requested to repair it.
have to deal here only with creation of
In pursuance of the request, he started a public highway by dedication. "A dedto repair it, but before any work was done ication arises only when the owner intenhe was notified by the plaintiff that it
tionally confers on the public the right of
was not a public road, that he should not way and where his intention is nmanirepair it. Fitler disregarded the notice, and fested by appropriate acts."
Trickett
in repairing the road in order to drainwater
Road Law, page 603. The fact that the
off it, cut a ditch eighteen inches deep in
road has been open for thirty-five years and
front of plaintiff's house and barn. The has during all this time been used by the
plaintiff, in order to obtain egress from her public is relied on as giving a right by prehome and buildiogs was compelled to scription to an uninterrupted enjoyment,
bridge the ditch which runs along the of the easement in favor of the public.
road about six feet from the center.
Long continued use by the public has
Plaintiff brings this action against the never been considered in itself as amounttownship and Fitler individually, to re- ing to more than evidence of an intention
cover damages sustained.by the trespass in
to dedicate. Nearly all the cases cited by
working the road, cutting the ditch, and the counsel for defendant were causes of
for the cost in bridgingit.
private easements created by prescription,
BERKHOUSE and LANARD for plaintiff. but they are not in point, this being a
A use of land by public jointly with case of public easement. Part of the
owner does not establish a dedication
opinion of the court delivered by Knox,
though long continued. Weiss v. South J., in Com. v. Cole,26 Pa. 187, iscitedas preAppeal,
Griffin's
294;
Pa.
Bethlehem, 136
109 Pa. 150 : Neill v. Gallagher, 10 Phila. cedent for the doctrine that 'The use of the
172; Trickett Limitations, 131. Permis- highway for more than twenty-one years
sive trespass, however long continued, made it a public road, just as effectually
never raises presumption of a grant. 33 as though it had originally been laid out
Pa. 131 ; 10 Pa. 127.
There can be no easement by prescrip- and opened by the proper authority."
This is dictum, and is clearly not suption in favor of the public. 22 Wend. 441.
Presumption from adverse user may be ported by the later cases. That it is not
rebutted. 19 Wend. 309.
the law was expressly declared in Weiss
Houoic and SHIFFER for defendant.
v. South Bethlehem township, 136 Pa.
306. See also Gowen v. Phila. Exchange
The user by the public was adverse.
Esling v. Williams, 10 Pa. 127; Renner Co., 5 W. & S. 141 ; Griffin's Appeal, 10)
v. Stuber, 20 Pa. 458; Garret v. Jackson,
Pa. 150.
20 Pa. 331; adverse user by the public for
Would the facts here proven warrant an
twenty-one years secures a right of way.
Com. v. Cole, 26 Pa. 187, Root v. Com.
inference that there has been a dedica98 Pa. 170.
tion. We think not. So far as appears
The burden of proving the user was not
adverse is on the owner. Garret v. Jack- the road was never before wqrked by a suson, supra; Cooper v. Smith, 9 S. & R. 26. pervisor, and this is a circumstance indi-
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cating that the road was not regarded as
public, and plaintiffis refusal to allow It to
be worked is naturally in accord with a
previous intention, that the use by the
public should be but permission, and indicates a desire to avoid any circumstance
that might tend to strengthen the evidence of dedication already existing by
reason of long use. It appears that the
road was laid out through plaintiff's farm.
It affords a ready and, so far as appears, the
only egress from plaintiff's buildings to
either of the adjoining highways. No
other buildings are located along the road.
From these facts the inference that naturally arises, is that the road was laid out
for plaintiff's own convenience, and the
use allowed to the public was permissive
joint use with the plaintiff (or those
through whom plaintiff claims, it not appearing that the road was laid out by
plaintiff) and that such use was subject to
and dependent upon, plaintiffs use. The
facts as to dedication are at least far from
being unequivocal. "The intention to
dedicate ought to be clearly manifest in
order to deprive the laud-owner of his own
property." Goddard's Law of Easements,
cited and approved in Griffin's Appeal,
109 Pa. 150.
"If there was no dedication to public
use the fact of such joint use with the
owner, and by his mere sufferance would
not establish a right of dedication, no
matter how long it was continued * * * *

When there is no opposing proof, long
continued use by the public is evidence of
an intent to dedicate and always yields to
contrary proof of satisfactory proof. Griffin's Appeal, supra. See also Gowen v.
Phila. Exchange Co., supra.
The only evidence of dedication in this
case is the use of the highway for thirtyfive years. The part of the opinion of C.
J. Gibson in 5 W. & S. supra, quoted by
the defendant's counsel is dictumn, and is
clearly not supported by the later authorities above cited. An owner may make a
limited dedication in favor of the public
resumable at his mere pleasure, or may
suffer a permissive use by the public for
all purposes of passage jointly with himself without in any degree impairing his
right to terminate such privilege at any
time. 136 Pa., supra. Since the facts
would not warrant a holding that there

has been a dedication, weare of the opinion
that the plaintiff is entitled to damages
for such injury as she has sustained by the
trespass of the supervisor, in opening the
road and in digging the dit'h ; she is also
entitled to be reimbursed for the expenses
incurred in building the bridge.
Judgment for plaintiff.
DRUMHELLER, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The dispute between the parties in this
case, is concerning the public or private
character of the road, the plaintiff denying, and the defendant affirming that it is
public.
If it is public, the supervisor
would have a right to make reasonable
repairs on it, and if necessary, to drain it
by means of ditches. Is it then a public
road ?
It was never laid out by the court of
quarter sessions, nor in any other mode
prescribed by law.
It lies across the
farm of Mrs. Katie. The circumstances
of its opening, by whom, when, for what
purpose, it was opened, do not appear. It
has been opened for 35 years, and during
that period, it has been used by the
public. It is inclosed by fences, or by
cultivated fields, or it is in some other
way traced on the ground. If inclosed by
fences, or by fields, Mrs. Kane or her
predecessors have by that fact recognized
it as a way. Her home and barn seem to
be built upon it.
There are in Pennsylvania possibly two
ways in which the public may acquire a
right of way over private land, without
the exercise of the eminent domain, user
for 21 years, by the public, or dedication.
The latter occurs with intention of the
owner to give to the public a right of way,
whilch intention is manifested by some
significant act; a deed, the filing of a plot,
the setting back of the fences; P. F. W. &
C. Railway Co. v. Dunn, 56 Pa. 280, the preparing of the surface for travel, oral notice
to determinate individuals or to the public,
that the right of way is or has been, given
to the public. A long user by the public,
that is, by persons genprally, who desire
friom time to time, to travel along it, will,
acquiesced in by the owner, warrant an
inference that there has been a dedication.
A dedication, if otherwise proved, is
decisive, without user, and, therefore,
without a long user, 56 Pa. 280, supra; but
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long use by the public will, of itself, when
not explained by some other motive for
the owners' toleration of it, be sufficient
evidence of dedication. Griffin's Appeal
109 Pa. 155; Commonwealth v. Phila. etc.
R. R. Co. 135 Pa. 256; Weiss v. South
Bethlehem Borough, 136 Pa. 294.
Not disputing this principle, the learned
court below has concluded that there is
evidence explaining the plaintiff's toleration of the public's use of the road, consistently with the absence of an intention
on her part to give it a right to use the
road. When the owner continues to use
the land otherwise than as a public road
is used, it hws been held that the mere fact
that he allows travellers to use it also, does
not indicate a dedicntion. Weiss v. South
Bethlehem Borough. When there is a
private object, for which the owner excludes from his fences, walls, or curtilage, a
portion of his land, adjacent to a highway,
he will not be inferred to have dedicated
this portion, although he suffers the public to use it as they use the highway.
Griffin's Appeal, 109 Pa. 150; Neill v. Gallagher, 31 Leg. Int. 388; Gowen v. Phila.
Exchange Co., 5 W. & S. 141; Duncan v.
Haubat, 2 Brewst. 362; City of Wilkesbarre, 100 Pa. 313 ; Root v. Com., 98 Pa.
170.
It seems that Mrs.Kane's land is bounded
on two sides by highways. For some
reason her house and barn are located on
neither of these roads, but at a place between them. Perhaps it was desired to
have access to both roads, and the road in
question was laid out, in order to effect this
object. Using it for her own purpose, it
would have been churlish in her to have
refused the use of it to any who chose to
travel over it. We do not think that it
can be inferred, there being a manifest
personal purpose to subserve by the maintenance of the way, that it was the intention of the owner to give a permanent right
to the public, or indeed, any right wlhich
could not be at any time withdrawn. West
College (Dickinson College) is connected
with Main street, West street and College
street by a path over which, for forty years,
the public have been walking without
hindrance. It would not be proper to suspect that the College intended that the
publicshould have a right to continue thus
to cross the campus, nor to allow a jury to

infer that it did. Its own needs explain
the making and continuing of the paths.
The toleration of a simultaneous use of
them by the people of the borough is no
warrant for inferring a dedication.
Whether a public way can be established
by adverse user by the public does not
seem to be clearly established in Pennsylvania. That it can be so established in
some other States, e. g. Michigan, Maine,
Iowa, Illinois, Massachusetts, Connecticut, etc., is indisputable. Ely v. Parsons,
55 Conn. 83; Com. v. Coupe, 128 Mass. 63.
There is an indirect concession that a road
can become public by adverse user in Weiss
v. South Bethlehem Borough, 136 Pa. 294;
Root v. Cool., 98 Pa. 170; Com. v. Railroad Co., 135 Pa. 256. The statement in
Com. v. Cole, 26 Pa. 187, that " the use of
the ground by the public as a highway for
more than twenty-one years made it a
public road just as effectually as though it
had originally been laid out and opened
1)y the proper authorities," if not too absolute, does not discriminate between dedication and adverse user. Cf. Hudson v.
Watson. 2 Super 422. There is perhaps no
less difficulty in allowing the owner of a
determinate tract to acquire a right of
passage over his neighbor's tract, by repeated travel over it through twenty-one
years, than in allowing the whole mass ot
people who may have occasion, to acquire
a right of passage, by the fact that any of
them who during twenty-one years have
had occasion, have passed over it without
permission and without objection.
But, to the hypothesis that a right has
been acquired by user against Mrs. Kane,
an answer, similar to that to the hypothesis of dedication, is available. The road
was of manifest use to Mrs. Kane herself.
The useof it by the public did not interfere
with her use of it. She had no appreciable
motive to exclude them, so long as, for
her own convenience, she maintained it.
(f. Root v. Commonwealth. 98 Pa. 170;
Frankford etc. Railway Co. v. Phila. 175
Pa. 120. Her non-resistance by expostulation, suit, erection of barriers, obiiteration of the road, etc., is fully accounted
for by her own necessity of maintaining
the road and by the purposelessness of any
objection to the concurrent but subordinate use of the public. The public do not
seem to have done anything else than
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travel over it, in the state into which she
put it or allowed it to get, until, at the
end of 35 years, the supervisor attempts to
change the state of the road by digging
a ditch. She instantly resents this first
distinct challenge of ownership.
It could serve no sound public policy
to allow a jury to find from the toleration
of a use by people at large, of a road circumstanced as was Airs. Kane's, either a
dedication of it, on one side, or an adverse
user of it with a consequent barring of the
owners' right, upon the other.
Judgment affirmed.

OPINION OF THE COURT.

In the first place we must look at the

statute and ascertain if possible, what
meaning it really intends to convey.
"All estates, real, personal, and mixed of
every kind whatsoever, situated within
this state, whether the person or the persons dying seised thereof be domiciled
within or out of this state, and all such
estates situated in another state, territory
or country, when the person or persons dying seised thereof shall have their domicile within this Commonwealth, passing
from any person who may die seised or
possessed of such estates either by will or
under the intestate laws of this state."
COMMONWEALTH vs. SAMPSON.
In 12 C. C. 135, Judge Ashman held that
Collateral inheritance tax--Conveyances "to establish its claim to collateral inheriinter-vivos-Applieation of Act of Mlay
tance tax, under Act of May 6, 1887, the
6, 1887-Constitutionality of the act.
Commonwealth must show not only that
the person or persons against whom it
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
claims do not come within the classes exJohn Sampson by deed conveyed for
empted, by the Act, but that the estate
$500, paid to him by Win. Sampson, a
out of which the tax is alleged to be paytract of land containing 147 acres, "reable, passed to those persons from one who
serving nevertheless to the party of the
died seised or possessed of the same."
first part an estate in the said farm for
This, we think, is in perfect harmony
the tern of his natural life. "
with the provision of the part of the act
The grantor lived nine years after the
referred to above, and if this were the
delivery of the deed, when he died.
only provision of the act, the cause of the
Ti Commonwealth contends that it is
plaintiff would necessarily fall; but followentitled to five per cent. on the agreed
ing this is another part of the act which
value of the farm, $8,000, as collateral indirects that "or any part of such estate,
heritance tax. Case stated. The grantee or estates or interest therein, transferred
was the nephew of the grantor.
by deed, grant, bargain or sale, made or
KAUFFMAN and DRUmHELLER for Com. intended to take eftect, in possession or enSince possession is only to be given after joyment after the death of the grantor or
the death of the grantor it is clearly withbargainor, to any person or persons * * *
in the provisions of the Act of May 6,
in trust or otherwise other than to or for
Convell's Estate, 19 Phila. 95;
1887.
father, mother, wife, children and lineal deMorris' Estate, 14 C. C. 171 ; Seifert's Appeal, 110 Pa. 323.
scendants born in lawful wedlock * * *
The right of the Commonwealth to colshall be and they are hereby made subject
lateral inheritance tax is not defeated by
to a tax of five dollars on every hundredI
a conveyance or transfer of title to the
dollars of the clear value of such estate or
propdrty during the lifetime of the owner,
when enjoyment of the property is not inestates * * * provided that no estate which
tended to take effect until the death of
may be valued at a less sum than two
the grantor. Line's Estate, 155 Pa. 378.
hundred and fifty dollars shall be subject
Fox and VASTINE for defendant.
to the duty or tax."
If an instrument is not in law a testaIt is held in Reish's Administrator v.
mentary paper, the property is not liable
the Commonwealth, 106 Pa. 526, that it is
for collateral inheritance tax. I-less v.
not necessary in order to create liability
Hess, 5 Watts 191 ; Greenfield's Estate, 2
for the tax, that the grantor should have
Harris'502; Wall v. Wall, 30 Mass. 96.
The collateral inheritance tax imposed
died seised or possessed of any interest in
by the Act of May 6, 1887, is a tax upon
the land, as the conveyance in that case
the property devised to, or inherited by,
was a conveyance by deed, and that the
collaterals. Bittinger's Estate, 129 Pa.
by the
word "seised" or "possessed"
338.
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terms of the statute, apply fully to transfers by will or under the intestate laws
only.
The letter as well as the meaning of the
act, however, is clear. When an estate
is transferred by deed to any other than
those exempted from the operation of the
statute, intended, however, to take effect
in enjoyment at the death of the grantor,
it is the value of the lands so transferred
which is liable to the duty, not the value
of the interest or part remaining.
In 19 Phila. 105, a testatrix transfers to
legatees a number of shares of R. R. stock
reserving to herself the dividends and income for her support. It was held that
this property was subject to the tax at
her death. See also 14 Outer. 329; Dubois'
Appeal 22W. N. C. 236; Conwell's Estate,
22 W. N. C. 183.
In Orcutt's Appeal, 97 Pa. 179, cited by
the defendant, the testator was a resident
of New Jersey, when he died, and the
bonds being United States bonds were
deposited in this Commonwealth. It was
held that U. S. bonds cannot be said to
have any situs different from the domicile
of the owner. Neither did it appear that
upon final distribution any part of the
fund would go to collateral legatees and
that therefore it was not liable for the tax.
We cannot see how either this case or
that in 26 Pa. 422, applies to the case under
consideration.
In Strode v. Commonwealth, 52 Pa. 181,
it was held that the estate of a decedent,
composed of U. S. securities passing by
will collaterally, is liable to collateral inheritance tax. Also, that such tax is not
on a specific article, but on the estate of
the decedent.
The Act of May 6,1887, was not intended
to introduce a new subje6t of taxation, but
is merely a compilation or codification of
the law as found In the old acts and in the
el Busdecisions of the Supreme Coutt.
tos' Estate, 19 Phila. 113. (The Acts of
Assembly, relating to the collateral inheritance tax, are here discussed at length).
See also 127 Pa. 435.
In Mars' Estate, 14 C. C. 171, Judge
Hanna held that a deed, being intended to
take effect after the death of the grantor,
is beyond all question within the provisions of the Act of May 6, 1887, as is settled by a number of authorities. Seiberts

Appeal, 110 Pa. 329; Lines' Estate, 155 Pa.
378.
The counsel for the defendant make the
following supposition: Suppose that Wm.
Sampson should have aliened this land to
A, and A to B, and so on, who would have
been chargeable with the tax? We are of
the opinion that all the alienees claiming
under the deed of John Sampson would
take title, subject to the reservation (of the
life estate) in said deed. Bonebrake v.
Summers, 193 Pa. 22; Rohn v. Odenwelder, 163 Pa. 352.
In McCormick's Estate, 15 C. C. 64, it
will be seen upon examining the facts that
John McCormick, the grantee, went into
possession and enjoyment of this farm upon
the delivery of the deed, and from that
moment had both the possession and the
enjoyment of said estate. The deed was
delivered in the lifetime of the grantor.
Here the obligation was purely personal,
and we think altogether in harmony with
the statute, and the interpretation of the
same by the Supreme Court. It is not, as
would at first seem, analogous to the case
under consideration. In the case under
consideration, the deed was made and delivered during the life of the grantor, but
was made and intended to take effect after
the death of the grantor ; thus postponing
both the possession and the enjoyment
until after the grantor's death.
Applying the Act of May 6, 1887, as interpreted by the decisions cited supra,to
the case under consideration, it would
seem that the collateral inheritance tax is
collectable, but the counsel for the defendant contend, not for very good reasons, we
think, that the Act of May 6, 1887, is unconstitutional, but, for reasons which we
shall now discuss, we think that this act
is unconstitutional.
In order to determine whether an act
is unconstitutional, we must ascertain
whether there is anything incorporated
into it that violates or is repugnant to any
of the provisions of the Constitution of the
Commonwealth.
If this act offends against the fundamental principles of taxation, or the provisions of our Constitution relating thereto, it is our duty to support and defend the
latter by declaring it unconstitutional,
says Chief Justice Sterrett. In Perkins v.
Phila., 156 Pa. 554, it is held that "every
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department of the government is bound
by its (the Constitution's) provisions."
It is of the very essence of taxation that
it should be relatively equal and uniform,
and where the burden is common, there
should be a common contribution to discharge it. Cooley's Constitutional Limitations, 495.
The Direct Inheritance Act of 1897, lays
a direct inheritance tax on all personal
property, but exempts said property to
the value of $5,000 from payment of such
tax. This act has been declared unconstitutional, because of its being repugnant to
the plain provisions of the Constitution.
For where words of the Constitution are
express, Do exception can be made by construction. Com. v. Rlndall, 32 Legal Intell. 456; 2 W. N. C. 210.
The direct inheritance tax is iu violation
of the clear and explicit declaration of
Article 9, Sections 1 and 2. The tax imposed is not "uniform upon the same
class of subjects," viz.; personal property
within this State. It further exempts personal property to the amount of $5,000.
While Article 9, Section 1, of the Constitution, expressly declares that the only property that can be exempted from taxation
is "public property used for public purposes, actual places of religious worship,
places of burial not used or held for private
or corporate profit, and institutions of
purely public charity."
This specific delegation of authority to
exempt impliedly prohibits exemption
from taxation of any other property, but, to
place this matter beyond the reach of a
doubt, it is expressly ordained in Section
2, Article 9, "that laws exempting property
from taxation other than the property
above enumerated shall be void." Copes'
Estate, 191 Pa. 21.
Several cases have been decided by the
Supreme Court, in which it declared the
direct inheritance act unconstitutional.
Now, considering the collateral inheritance act, and reasoning along this line, for
what will apply to the direct inheritance
act will apply to the collateral tax law, we
are of opinion that if one is unconstitutional, the other must necessarily be. The
collateral inheritance tax act contains the
same clause that the Supreme Court decided was repugnant to the Constitution,
and upon which they decided the uncon-

stitutionality of the direct inheritance tax
act.
Mr. Justice Brewer, in his dissenting
opinion in Magoun v. Illinois Trust and
Savings Bank, said: "Equality in right in
protection, and in burden, is the thought
which has run throu li the life of this
nation and its constitutional enactments
from the Declaration of Independence to
the present hour." So, where a tax law
directly, necessarily and intentionally
creates an inequality of burden, it then
becomes imperative to inquire whether
this inequality created, can find any
constitutionaljustification. Copes' Estate
191 Pa. 21.
It has been suggested that this is a
succession tax and that therefore being
merely a forfeiture, to the State, of a
certain per cent. of the value of said
property, for the privilege to alien to
collaterals. It is held in Copes' Estate
191 Pa. 22, that "The lauguage of Section 1,
as to what rule of uniformity shall embrace, is as broad and comprehensive as
it ,ould possibly have been made. The
words "All laws" must necessarily be
construed to include property tax, inheritance tax, succession tax, and all other
kinds of tax, the subjects of which are
susceptible of just and proper classification."
"A pretended classification that is based
solely on a difference in quantity of
precisely the same kind of property is
necessarily unjust, arbitrary and illegal."
Copes' Estate, 191 Pa. 22. This is just
what the Collateral Inheritance Tax is.
A classification based solely upon a
difference in quantity of the same kind
of property. Judge IHanna in his opinion
in Copes' Estate (note) P. &. L. Vol. 3, Col.
590 says: That "although the question has
never been raised, it would follow that
the exemption not being authorized by
the Constitution, the Collateral Inheritance Act is also invalid."
"If the Collateral tax is to be assessed at all, then all
estates must pay it."
In Curry v.Spencer, 61 N. HL. 624, the
constitutionality of such an act was denied, on the ground that the tax imposing
it was discriminating, unequal, and not
proportional.
Doubt as to the constitutionality of this
tax, on the ground of the exemption, has
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been expressed in State v. Mann, 76
Wis. 469 ; State v. Gorman, 40 Minn. 232 ;
LeDuc v. Hastings, 39 Minn. 110. The
Collateral Inheritance Act was passed in
1826, long before the adoption of our
present constitution, and was valid at
that time, and remained so up until the
adoption of our present constitution in
1874, as the old constitution did not contain the limitations on the powers of the
Legislature, which we have been considering, and which our present constitution
contains.
Upon the adoption of our present Constitution in 1874, the Collateral Tax Act of
May, 1826, being repugnant to Article 9,
Sections 1 and 2, must give way to its provisions, and therefore it became invalid
and of no effect. The Act of May 6, 1887,
being a re-enactment of the Act of 1826,
and also containing the same repugnant
clause, must also be invalid.
Therefore, after due consideration of the
authorities, especially the decision of the
Supreme Court in the direct inheritance
tax case, we are of the opinion that the
collateral inheritance tax act is unconstitutional and therefore invalid. Judgment must therefore be rendered for the
EBBERT, J.
defendant.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Under the Act of May 6th, 1887,2 P. & L.
4485, the Commonwealth contends that it
is entitled to 5 per cent. of the value of the
farm which John Sampson conveyed to
his nephew, and which, it is conceded, is
worth $8000.
The learned court below has concluded
that the act of 1887 is unconstitutional,
and that no tax is payable under it. The
act exempts estates "which may be valued
at a less sum than $250"1 from the"duty or
tax." It does not tax atall, estates of less
than $250, while it does tax estates of $250
and more. It therefore infringes, says the
Court, section 1 of article 9, of the Constitution, which declares that "All taxes shall
be uniform upon the same class of sdbjects
within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax," except that public
and charitable property of certain kinds,
may be exempted. The legislature has
classified estates into those less than and
those not less than $250. The tax imposed
by the act is uniform on the "same class."
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The question is, whether the legislature
can classify on the principle of size. The
answer is rather distinct, in Copes' Estate,
191 Pa. 1, that it cannot. "A pretended
classification," says Sterrett J., "that is
based solely on a difference in quantity of
precisely the same kind of property, is
necessarily unjust, arbitrary and illegal."
But, is it the taxing part or the exempting part, of such a law that is illegal?
Will the courts recognize as valid, the
enactment which imposes the tax on all
estates, and refuse validity to the proviso
merely? Or, because of the proviso, will
the enacting part also be struck down ?
The case cited, 191 Pa. 1, answers this in
the affirmative. Because of the exemption
of some estates, the tax on the non-exempt
shall be declared void. Hence perished
the Act of May 12th, 1897, P. L. 50,
providing for direct inheritance taxes,
under the court's fulmination.
How then are we to save the Collateral
Inheritance Tax Law? In Copes' Estate,
supra, Sterrett, C. J., suggested that it
was saved, because it had been enacted in
1826, and, therefore, prior to the constitution of 1874, but he forgets that the act of
1826, and all prior acts, were repealed by
that of 1887, and that all collateral inheritance tax is now imposed under the latter
There is another refuge. It may be said
that the collateral inheritance law, is'not
a true tax law, but simply a succession
law, specifying that inheritance and acquisition by testation shall be conditioned
on paying a certain percentage of the
thing inherited or devised to the state.
This view has been approved in Strode v.
Commonwealth, 52 Pa. 181; Commonwealth v. Herman, 16 W. N. C. 210;
Orcutt's Appeal, 97 Pa. 179; Finnen's
Estate, 196 Pa. 72. In the case last cited,
the exemption from taxation of charities
was held not so to apply to a bequest to
charities, as to exonerate them from the
so-called "collateral inheritance tax," because that tax was not, in fact, a tax at all.
Of course, if a tax on succession to collaterals is not a lax, a tax on succession to
lineals is not a tax, and Copes' Estate,
supra, is erroneous in so far as it assumes
that a tax on lineal succession is a true
tax in the constitutional sense.
To the suggestion that the lineal succession tax is a regulation of descent and tes-
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tation, and not a tax, Copes' Estate replied that, if that was so, the act of May
12th, 1897, though not violating the constitutional provision concerning taxation,
infringed against that which restrains the
legislature from passing any "local or
special law * * * changing the law of

descent or succession." So far as estates
not greater than $5,000 were concerned,
the act of 1897 made no change in the succession law, whereas it did with respect to
estates beyond $5,000. This, said Sterrett,
C. J., made the law "special."
Fortunately for the act of May 6th, 1887, it repeated the act of 1826 and other acts. It
did not, therefore, make any "change" in
the law of succession. By this suggestibn,
it may be saved despite the logic of Copes'
Estate. But suppcse some future legislature should change the law, by increasing
or dimlinisning the size of the exempted
estates, or by prescribing a different rate of
tax. Then apparently, if Copes' Estate is
sound, such law will be void. The state
must keep unchanged the present collateral inheritance tax law, or it must change
its constitution, or it must procure from
the courts a different interpretation of
that instrument. The collateral inheritance law has been applied in numerous
cases since 1887, and its validity has been
uniformly recognized. Finnen's Estate,
196 Pa. 72. We should feel it easier to repudiate Copes' Estate than to denounce
that law as unconstitutional.
The Act of 1887, imposes the tax on all
real estate, "transferred by deed, grant,bargain or sale, made or intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment after the
death of the grantor or bargainor. " If a
conveyance is made in trust reserving to
the grantor a life estate, with the power to
revoke the trust, the land is subject to
the tax, though the trust is not in fact revoked. Line's Estate, 155 Pa. 378. So it
is if the conveyance is to one in fee, subject to a life estate in the grantor, so that,
at his death, the grantor has no estate to
pass from him. :Reish v. Commonwealth,
106 Pa. 521; Gf. DuBois' Appeal, 121 Pa.
368.
We do not understand, however, that if
a sale is made of a reversion or remainder,
upon a life estate reserved by the grantor,
the parties intending to sell for the actual
value of the reversion or remainder, a col-

lateral inheritance tax would be payable
on it. If A sold his farm in fee to B for a
full price, or for what the parties really
believed to be a full price, and B then reconveyed to A a life estate for the fair
price of a life estate, B would not be bound
to pay a tax to the state, on the death of
A. In the case before us, it does not appear, how old John Sampson was at the
time of his conveyance, nor what his expectancy of life was. At his death, the
farm is estimated at $8,000. The price
paid for it was but $500. It is quite probable therefore that the $500 was not
deemed by the parties the full value of the
reversion, and that the conveyance was in
part gratuitous. The tax is five per cent.
"of the clear value" of the estate. The
"estate" is that which passes to the
nephew as a gratuity. If the value of the
reversion was $4,000, when the nephew
paid $500 for it, seven-eighths of its value
was a gift, and the remainder was purchased. As it does not appear that there
were any liens on the land, by which its
value for Win. Sampson was reduced, it
would be his duty to pay five per cent.
of seven-eighths of the value of the land,
viz., $8,000.
It will be the duty of the court to ascertain how much of the, to the parties apparent, value of the land at the time of
purchase, the $500 paid constituted,
whether J, }, , etc., and to require the tax
to be paid upon the other portion, $8,000
being assumed to be the present value of
the whole farm.
Judgment reversed.

BARNES vs. SALLER.
Bills and notes-Duty of the holder of a
check-esult when funds of drawer
withdrawn before presentment.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Assumpsit on note for $500.
A day before its maturity, Saller delivered to Barnes a check of Win. Temple
for $600, drawn on the XBank, and it was
accepted as payment. The check was not
presented to the bank for two weeks.
Six days before its presentment, Temple
withdrew his deposit and Barnes offered
the check, on payment being refused by
the bank, to Sailer who declined to receive it.
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Temple transferred his deposit to another bank to avoid the payment of thir
check, having satisfied himself since
giving it, that Sailer had no right to the
money. Sailer alleges these facts in defence.
DAvis and LTAUBENSTEIN for the plain-

tiff.
In the absence of evidence that the
drawer of the check has suffered loss by
the delay, he is not discharged. Fleming
v. Denny, 2 Phila. 111; Piece v. Daniel,
16 W. N. C. 35.
A drawer has the right to stop payment
of a check at. any time before actual payment. German Bank v. Deposit Bank,
118 Pa. 294.
RHODES, J., and MACCONNELL for the
defendant.
The holder of a check is under obligation to an indorser to present it for payment, not later than the next day after its
(late. Bank v. Well, 141 Pa. 457; Kilpatrick v. BuildingAssociation, 119 Pa. 30;
McIntire v. Kennedy, 29 Pa. 48; Smith
v. Miller, 43 N. Y. 171.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Did the plaintiff use due diligence in this
matter? We think not. A check is an
order to pay immediately to the one to
whom it is drawn on order. The authoritiesare in harmony on the question of the
time in which a check should be presented.
They say that a check should be presented
for payment on the same day it is drawn,
or not later than the following day, if the
parties reside in the same town or city,
and if not, it should be mailed immediately
to its destination.
When a check is given as payment for
a debt, and the creditor fails to present it
for payment with due diligence, and the
check that is so given becomes worthless,
the debt is released. B. and L. Association v. Kilpatrick, 140 Pa. 405; B and L.
Association v. Kilpatrick, 119 Pa. 30.
A check is not to be endorsed and transferred like a negotiable note, and if it is so
endorsed, it is done at the peril of the
holder.
In Bank v. Weil, the court said that
three days was an unreasonable time for
the holder of a check to keep it before presenting it. A. bank cannot be held if the
fund is withdrawn and the check has not
been paid.
The defendant left the money in the
bank over a week after the check had been
given to the plaintiff, which was certainly
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time enough for Barnes to have drawn the
money had he wished to do so. He was
negligent, and the debt must be held to be
discharged, as the check was good when
given to him, and the funds out of which
it could have been paid were left in the
bank a sufficient time.
Judgment for defendant.
MCINTIRE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Barnes holding a note of Sailer for $500,
the latter delivered to the former the day
before its maturity, a check drawn by
Temple for $600, and Barnes accepted the
check as payment. As the check was not
presented for two weeks, the learned court
below has held that the note will support
no action; although six ddys before the
presentment to the bank of the cbeck,
Temple had withdrawn his deposit.
Had Sailer lost the money, called for by
the check to him, it would be proper to
hold Barnes' claim on the note extinguished. But, what is the evidence that
Sailer has lost the money? The bank did
not fail, while Temple had his money in
it awaiting Sallers' check. If it had, the
cases cited by the learned court below
would have been relevant. Temple withdrew his deposit. Temple cannot defend
against Sailer, because of the delay in
presenting the check, and whatever claim
against Temple Sailer had he still has.
Temple contends that he does not owe the
money to Sailer: and Sailer does not even
aver still less does he prove, that Temple
does owe him. Nor if Temple does owe
him, is there the slightest evidence or suggestion, that the money cannot yet be obtained from Temple.
So far as appears,Saller,having prevented
Barnes' recovering $500 from him, may
immediately take effectual steps to collect
the $600 from Temple. Such a result,
surely, is an offence to justice.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
APPOLD vs. APPOLD.
Parol promise of uncle to convey land to
nephev in consideration of working itHostility of possession taken under the
promise-Prescriptivetitle-stoppel.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Short invited his nephew, Henry
Appold, to come to his farm and till it
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for him, promising that it should be his.
Henry Appold moved on it, tilled it for
nine years and likewise making improvements. John Short then died leaving his
sister, Mary Appold mother of Henry, his
heir. Henry continued in sole possession
of the land and constructed a house,
barn and other buildings on it.
Fifteen
years after John Short's death, Mary Appold died, and her children, Jacob and
William Appold, bring this action of ejectment to recover two-thirds undivided part
in the farm. Defendant defends: 1. Estoppel ; 2. Statute of Limitations; 3. Parol contract to convey.
Though John
Short lived in the house on the farm for
nine years after Henry Appold came to it,
John Short was sick, exercised no control
over the farm, and was treated as a member of the family of Henry, and was feeble,
and needed constant nursing.
WILSON and OLDT for plaintiff.
Possession by permission is not an adverse possession, 81 Pa 203; Weir. and
Bell's Appeal, 2 P. & W. 181; 3 S. & R.
291, 1 Watts 330; 7 S. & R. 173, Transfer
was not effective under Statute of Fraud.
Hart v. Carroll, 85 Pa. 50.4; Ailson Heirs
v. Young, 12 Pa. 15; 12 Watts 195; 107
Pa. 50; 43 Pa. 178; 105 Pa. 432.
WINGERT for the defendant.
Silence while improvements were being
na(le estoppel tie plaintifFs. Moreland v.
Moreland, 121 Pa. 573; Campbell v. Braden, 96 Pa. 388; Dolph v. Howe, 156 Pa.
91; E wing v. Ewing, 96 Pa. 381. Statutes
of Fraud does not apply. I Binn. 378; 3
Norris, 262.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This is an action of ejectment brought
to recover the undivided two-thirds of a
tract of land. The plaintiffs base their
claim to the land on the fact that they are
the heirs of John Short, and that Henry
Appold's right to the land depends upon
his having a written conveyance for the
same, as provided by the statute of frauds
and perjuries.
The defendant has three grounds of defense: 1. Estoppel; 2. Statute of limitations; 3. Parol contract to convey.
We do not think that the doctrine ofestoppel applies to this case, nor is it material to decide the case.
The defendant pleads the statute of
limitations, and bases his claims upon the
fact that he was in possession of the land
for twenty-four years, after the time John

Short invited him to come upon the land.
To constitute adverse possession, it must
be proved that the possession was actual,
visible, exclusive, notorious and uninterrupted and maintained for a period of
twenty-one years. Was the possession in
this case such as mentioned above, or, was
it obtained expressly or legally in subservience to the title of the owner? If it was,
then according to the doctrine of Cadwailer v. App, 81 Pa. 194, the statute does
not, begin to run in favor of such occupant until the privity existing between
him and the owner is ended by some unequivocal act; until such act the possession
does not become adverse.
According to Jones v. Porter,.3 P. &.
W. 132, if Henry Appold's possession was
obtained under the consent of John Short,
by reason of the promise to till the land
for him, then it is a4fact for the jury, and
if the jury find such to be the case, the
statute does not apply. Further, we find
that John Short resided upon the land for
five years after Henry Appold came upon
it. Now, if he performed any act of ownership by residing upon the land, then the
running of the statute is tolled and will
not bar the plaintiffls right of action.
This, we think, following Moreland v.
Moreland, 121 Pa. 573, is a question for the
jury.
The third defence is, that the defendant
entered the land under a parol contract to
convey. For this he relies upon the fact.
that John Short invited him to come
upon the land and till it for Short,
promising that it should be his, and also
that, after entering upon theland, he made
improvements. In Moore v. Small, 19 Pa.
461, the court lays down the rule, "that in
order to make a parol promise to convey
binding, there must be land clearly designated; that open, notorious, and exclusive
possession was taken and maintained
under and in pursuance of the contract;
and the improvements which constitute
the consideration were made on the faith
of the promised conveyance." And in
Moreland v. Moreland, 121 Pa. 573, we
find the lower court sustained, in instructing the jury that, "the real question was
not so much what was intended by the
donor as what the donee's understanding
was, what he claimed and did, and if
the jury find from the evidence that the
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donee believed the gift to be absolute and
under that belief he went into possession
and held adversely to the donor and those
claiming under him for a period of twentyone years, the plaintiffs are not entitled to
recover, and the verdict must be for the
defendant. This case, we think, is on all
fours with the one now before us, and as
the question was left to the jury, we think
it proper to leave this case to the jury.
VASTINE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

When John Short- died, his sister survived him as sole heir. Fifteen years after
Short's death, she died, leaving three
children, Jacob, William, and Henry Appold. Henry is found in sole possession of
his uncle's farm, and his brothers seek, by
this ejectment, to recover respectively undivided thirds. They are entitled to recover unless the facts now to be adverted
to, prevent.
John Short, nine years before his death,
invited his nephew, Henry, to come to his
farm and till it for him, promising orally,
that it "should be his. " Henry obeyed,
moved on the farm, tilled it and improved
it. After Short's death, he continued for
15 years in sole possession, making more
improvements.
The first of Henry's defences is that the
plaintiffs are estopped to deny his ownership. The learned court below has properly determined that facts disclosing an
estoppel do not exist. No estopping fact
other than the making of improvements,
appears. It is not shown that the plaintiffs knew of these improvements, or of
the belief entertained by Henry, concerning his being the owner, which induced
him to make them. Nor is there evidence
that the plaintiffs were silent concerning
their intention to claim shares in the land.
They may never have heard of the alleged understanding between their uncle
and brother. Besides, improvements by
one who claims under oral contracts do
not estop. The contract must be established, and in addition to the improvements, possession must have been taken
iti pursuance of the contract. When
such is done, a title is made without estoppel.
While John Short was on the premises,
simultaneously with Henry Appold for

nine years, he was sick, exercised no control over the farm, and was treated by
Henry as a member of his family. The
jury might well say, therefore, that,
though he was on the farm, he was not in
possession of it, but that Henry Appold
was in sole possession. That Henry was
in sole possession for 15 years after Short's
death is undisputed. Can the two possessions be connected for the purpose of
completing a title ttnder the statute of
limitations? If the possession prior to
Short's death was in Appold's intention,
that of an owner in fee, and if the circumstances were such as to affect Short with
notice of that fact, it can be tacked to the
possession following Short-s death. The
principle, enunciated in Moreland v. Moreland, 121 Pa. 573 ; Campbell v. Braden, 96
Pa. 388; Ewing v. Ewing, 96 Pa, 381, that
the adverseness of a donee's possession of
land is to be decided not by the intention
of the alleged donor, but by the understanding and claim of the donee, must be
qualified. If the alleged donor's words
and acts do not warrant the interpretation
put on them by the donee, and the donee's
acts do not apprise the donor that this interpretation is being put on them, the
posssession -of the donee would har£1ly
make a title.
Though Henry was in sole possession
before Short's death, he might have held
the farm as tenant for years, or from year
to year, for the life of Short or at will.
The promise of Short to Appold was that
it "should be his," if he would come to the
farm and "till It for him," Short. The
natural interpretation of this evidence is,
that Short was to continue owner till his
death; that Henry was to occupy the farm
in order to till it; and that the tilling was
to be, not for himself, but for Short. We
cannot see that the evidence justified the
submission to the jury of the question
whether in Appold's intention, his possession during Short's life was that of "n
owner in fee.

It was hardly the intoation

of Short to denude himself at once of the
farm, without price or security for the
price. It was his purpose, evidently, to
retain the ownership of the farm and of
the crops until his death, and then to
transmit ownership to Henry, in reward
for his services on the farm. Nothing
shows that Short ought to have suspected

238

THE

FORUM

that Henry was in possession, pretending
to be a present owner. That possession
cannot, therefore, be united with the post
mortem possession.
The evidence probably justified the
learned court below in submitting to the
jury the question whether there was a
parol contract that the land should be Appold's at Short's death. If the intention
was to devise the land, that intention was
not carried out. Nor was any deed or
writing subsequently executed. Was sufficient done by Appold to make the parol
agreement enforceable? The taking of
possession by the vendee in pursuance of
the parol contract is necessary, in order to
make it valid, and if the possession has
preceded that contract, its mere continuance afterwardsis not sufficient. Birkbeck
v. Kelly, 19 W. N. 0. 422; Myers v. Bortz,
45 Pa. 368; Christy v. Barnhart, 14 Pa.
260. Although the possession by Appold
was begun as that of a species of tenant, it
was also taken in view of the contract,
that after the expiration of that tenancy
the farm should be his own. The jury
could have properly inferred, that, but for
the posterior interest, the possession would
not have been taken at all. The possession was therefore sufficient for the purpose of tolling the statute of frauds. The
jury may also have found that the consideration, viz.: the tillage of the farm for
Short, had been paid. It could also find
that improvements had been made, after
Short's death, unsusceptible of adequate
compensation in damages. We think no
error was committed in submitting the
facts with the instructions, as respects the
parol contract under the statute of frauds.
But the error in regard to the duration of
the adverse possession is serious.
Judgment reversed, and v. f. d. n.
awarded.
LONG vs. MANN, EXR.
Widow's life estate chargedwith a money
legacy not defeated by the widow's election againstthe will-Such legacy ispreferred to a residuary legacy-Sequestration during widow's life.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

William Morgan died,leaving oil producing land worth about $15,000, and personal

property worth about $17,000.
He left. a
will disposing of his estate as follows:
I give, devise and bequeath to my wife
the farm on which we now reside, containing 150 acres, also all the personal
property that may be on said lands at the
time of my death, to have and to hold
said lands and personal property during
the term of her natural life, upon condition, however, that she comply with the
conditions of this my last will and testament as herein after expressed.
I give, devise and bequeath to Elizabeth
Long, the sum of $2,000, to be paid by my
wife, within two years after my death.
I give, devise and bequeath to my brother
George Morgan, and to his heirs and assigns, all the rest and residue of my property, both real and personal, he to pay my
I
funeral expenses and sustain legacies.
hereby nominate Robert Mann my executor of this my last will and testament.
The wife elects to take against the will.
Ely Long brings this action to recover the
bequest of $2,000, and claims she should be
paid before the residuary legatee.
MowRY and GRoss for the plaintiff.
Specific and demonstrative legatees
shall first be satisfied, and any deficiency
must fall upon the residuary legatees.
Gallagher's Appeal, 87 Pa. 200 ; Ferguson's
Estate, 138 Pa. 208. Hammer's Estate,
158 Pa. 632.
Election against the will does not render
it inoperative except as to the widow; 185
Pa. 472 ; 139 Mass. 102 ; 3 Montg. (Pa.) 23.
WELSH and HAMBLIN for the defendant.
The interest on one-half of the personalty and the rents from one-half of the
land during widow's life, should be sequestered. Sandoe's Appeal, 65 Pa. 314;
Gallagher's Appeal, 87 Pa. 200; Evans'
E-tate, 150 Pa. 218; Calahan's Estate, 7
W. N. C. 180.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Neither the jurisdiction of this court to
maintain the action, nor the right of the
widow to take against the will of her husband, was disputed, for both are provided
for by statutory enactment. The widow's
rights in her husband's estate are paranmount to his will, but her refusal to take
under the will does not invalidate it. It
only disarranges the will pro tanto.
Since the widow, Mrs. Morgan, has
elected to take against the will of her deceased husband, she cannot be compelled
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to pay the legacy of $2,000 to the plaintiff.
Does this defeat the legacy ? We think
not, for the bequest is a certain fixed
amount-$2,000, not to be paid out of some
specific property. That such a legacy is
demonstrative, and therefore takes priority
over all other legacies, has been decided in
Hammer's Estate, 158 Pa. 632, and cases
there cited.
Now, then, as to timeof payment. The
clause reads: "I give, devise and bequeath
to Elizabeth Long the sum of $2,000; to be
paid to her by my wife within two years
after my death." We think that the latter part of the clause was only for the benefit of the widow, who could not take under
the will except "upon condition, however,
that she comply with the conditions of"
the will "as hereinafter expressed." Since
the widow has elected to take against the
will, we are of the opinion that the legacy
becomes payable at the expiration of one
year after the testator's death. Ferguson's Appeal, 138Pa. 208. Assuming that
the year has elapsed, judgment is entered
for the plaintiff.
HICKERNELL, J.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
Although the facts are not distinct, we
assume that the testator devised all his
realty, in value about $15,000, and all his
personalty, in value about $17,000, to his
wife for life, and in remainder, to his
brother, George Morgan. He charged the
life-estate of his widow with the payment
He
of $2,000 to a sister by adoption.
charged the remainder, devised to his
brother, with the funeral expenses and
certain legacies. What these legacies are,
we are not advised, and they may be
ignored.
The widow has elected to claim what
she would take under the intestate law.
One-half of the personalty therefore, about
$8,500, becomes hers absolutely. Her
interest in the land is reduced to a life
estate in one-half of it. She is under no
duty to pay the $2,000 legacy. It does not.
follow, however, that Mrs. Long loses her
right to the legacy. The testator intended
her to have $2,000, and, while giving the
life estate to his widow, purposed to
diminish it by $2,000 in favor of Mrs.
Long. but he has not manifested an intention to condition the gift to Mrs. Long
on the acceptance by Mrs. Morgan of her
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life estate. Young's Appeal, 108 Pa. 17.
The gift to Mrs. Long was made payable
within two years. This postponement
was for the benefit of the widow. She
repudiating the duty of paying, the legacy
becomes payable as in ordinary cases.
Besides, it does not appear whether two
years have elapsed since the death of the
testator.
The testator did not provide for the
rejection, by his widow, of the devised
Although she loses by her
life-estate.
election, the possession of one-half of the
land during life, and the income of onehalf of the personalty, she becomes owner
of the other half of the personalty, and
she escapes the payment of the $2,000 to
Mrs. Long. She, therefore, probably gains
something by her election, and what she
gains, the other legatees and devisees
must lose. The question we have to consider is, whether the testator probably intended the loss to fall on one alone, or to
be distributed between both.
It has been said that a legatee of a
determinate, a definite, sum of money, will
be understood to be preferred by the
testator, in case of a widow's election, to
the residuary legatee. Vance's .Estate,
141 Pa. 201; Ferguson's Estate, 138 Pa. 208;
Gallagher's Appeal, 87 Pa. 200; Young's
Appeal, 108 Pa. 17. Mrs. Long is the
legatee of a definite sum, and, however
the life-estate might have declined in
value, the acceptance-of it by Mrs. Morgan
would have obliged her to pay the $2,000.
In favor of her, there could be no abatement from the definite legacy, because of
any diminution of the value of the lifeestate, after the testator's death. Ferguson's Estate, 138 Pa. 208. The gift to Mrs.
Morgan was, in substance, a gift of the
residue of the life-estate, after subtracting
$2,000.
But the gift of the remainder in the real
and personal estate, was not a residuary
devise, in the ordinary sense. In reduction
of it, no definite legacy was given to Mrs.
Long. The interest in the property was
divided into a life-estate and a remainder.
The life-estate, but not the remainder, was
made residuary, as respects the $2,000.
The testator had made his estimate of the
value of the life-estate, had decided that it
would be so much, and that the $2,000
should be deducted from it, in favor of
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Mrs. Long. Nothing indicates that the
testator would have intended, in any
contingency, that the $2,000, or any part
of it, should be paid by his brother. The
election of the widow has relinquished the
interest on one-half of the personalty, and
the rents of one-half of the realty during
her life, from which the loss to Mrs. Long
and to George Morgan may be in part
made up. George Morgan will ultimately
have lost by the election $8,500 of the
personalty. Mrs. Long has lost the $2,000
by the same event. The .interest on onehalf of the personalty, and the rents from
one-half of the land, during the widow's
life should be sequestered, and so paid out
as ultimately to make the losses of George
Morgan and Mrs. Long proportional. At
Mrs. Morgan's death, George Morgan will
become owner of the land in fee, despite
the widow's election. But, at that time
he will become owner of only $8,500 of
personalty, instead of $15,000. He ought
now to receive a sum that, at the end of
Mrs. Morgan's life, would produce $8,500.
Mrs. Long ought now to receive $2,000.
If the present worth of $8,500, payable at
the end of Mrs. Morgan's life, is $6,000,
George Morgan and Mrs. Long should
share in the interest on the $8,500, not
taken by Mrs. Morgan, and in one-half of
the rents of the land, in the proportion of
six to two, or three to one, for the remainder
of the widow's life, or until Mrs. Long
shall have received $2,000 with interest.
The result thus reached is not out of accord with that in Young's Appeal, 108 Pa.
17, where the legatees, at the death of th6
wife, were not injured by the widow's
election, nor by the appropriation of the
interest accruing during her life, from the
portion of the estate liberated by her election, to the payment of the annuity which
had been charged on the life-estate. The
definite legacies not being payable until
the widow's death, the interest earned on
their amount, during her life, was devoted
to the payment pro tanto of the annuity;
and the rest of the annuity was charged
on the residuary legatees.
Judgment reversed, with v. f. d. n.

JOHN BINGHAM vs. SAMUEL
THORPE.
Trespass-iqhtsof riparianowners--Evidence-Duty of producing proof.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Bingham owned a tract of land along
the Susquehanna river, in York county.
On the shore stood a post, which, at high
water, was in the water, but at low, on the
dry ground. Thorpe was floating a raft
down the river, and, needing to get assistance, tied it to .the post for four hours,
when he resumed the floating of the raft.
This is an action of trespass.
SHomo and DiVELY for plaintiff.
Where land is bounded by a navigable
stream, the boundary line is the low water
mark. Stover v. Jack, 60 Pa 339; Wood
v. Appal, 63 Pa. 210, Freeland v. R. RI.,
194 Pa. 529. As to the intervening space
between high and low water mark, the
title to the private owner is subject to the
public right of navigation, and such
ownership gives him title to the soil, subject only to this public right. Fulmer v.
Williams, 122 Pa.. 191; Wainwright v.
McCullough, 63 Pa. 66.
LOURIMER and COOK for defendant.
The public may use the space between
high and low water for the purposes connected with navigation without compensation, and may protect it against unauthorized use, even by the owner of the
land. Stover v. Jack, 60 Pa. 339. The
public have a right of passage over all
streams which afford capacity for that purpose. 10 Mich. 459.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Trespass, in the present case, is alleged to
have been committed by the defendant
fastening a raft he was floating down the
Susquehanna river, to a post standing
within the intervening space between
high and low water mark.
The Susquehanna river, upon which defendant floated said raft, is conceded to be
a navigable stream. This is admitted by
the plaintiff and sustained by 2 Binny 474.
Riparian owners along navigable rivers
have absolute ownership of the land to
high water mark. From high watermark
to low water mark their ownership is only
a qualified one. At low water mark their
ownership ceases. 63 Pa. 210.
The plaintiffs rights in this space of
ground lying between high and low water
mark are subject to the public's greater
right, that of navigation, and he can
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make use of it, only in such ways that
will not interfere with navigation.
Stover v. Jack, 60 Pa. 339.
The plaintiff maintains that defendant
could not have confined his operations to
the space between high and low water
mark. That if defendant found it neceshe
sary to seek assistance ashore,
would have been compelled to go upon
plaintiff's land where he had absolute
ownership.
The facts disclose that he
tied the raft to this post, but do not reveal
that he sought further assistance ashore.
But, however, had his raft become unmanageable, or threatening to come to
pieces, as for any cause that made it necessary to draw it to the bank, tie it, and
seek assistance upon plaintiff's land, he
would have been perfectly justified in doing so, provided that he could not have
procured that assistance elsewhere. Not
every entry upon the land of another is
to be regarded as trespass. The question
whether one is a trespasser must be determined by the circumstances in each case.
For example, the defendant would be justified in running even into the plaintiff's
house to escape from a savage animal. He
would not be expected to ring the bell and
wait an answer before entering.
In fact, any entry upon land of another
is justifiable, if such entry is by reason of
necessity and without fault of the person
entering.
"The defendant enters upon the plaintiff's premises to pass a portion of the
highway flooded with water at that
point. The entry isjustifiable." Bigelow
on Torts. Since the defendant was engaged in a legitimate business when his
need of assistance came, and since he was
conducting that business in a propermanner, and no actual damage appears to
have been suffered by the plaintiff, judgment is entered for the defendant.
PHILLIPS, J.
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necessary to anchor there, or to tie to post
or tree growing there, it had the right thus
to anchor or tie. Purcell v. Stover, 110 Pa.
43. It would be impossible sharply to define the maximum time of such stoppage.
Protracted unduly, and repeated with excessive frequency, it would be without
right. Wall v. Pittsburg Harbor Co., 152'
Pa. 427. The plaintiff has shown a delay
of four hours. We do not see that this is
transparently in excess of right. No circumstances are exhibited tending to show
that it was irksome or inconvenient to the
plaintiff. Nor do we think that the burden was on the defendant to affirmatively
justify-his act, until something furtherlhad
been proven by the plaintiff.
The post, it appears, was in the water,
when high, and on dry land, when the
water was low. But, itis not shown what
the state of the water was, when the alleged trespass occurred. If it was then
high, we see no wrong in the mere tying
of the raft to the post for the period of four
hours, for the purpose of procuring assistance, and no other facts are given to us.
Pursell v. Stover, 110Pa. 43. If the water
was low, Thorpe had, probably, no right
to step on the dry land and tie the raft
to the post. Pursell v. Stover, supra. But,
it was the plain duty of the plaintiff to reveal the state of the water at the time.
The evidence justified the court in directing a verdict for the defendant.
Judgment affirmed.
JONES vs. METHODIST CHURCH.
Wills-Devise of realand personalproperty in consideration of maintainance
during balance of life and the payment
of funeral expenses-Subsequent disposal
by deed to devisee named in will, with
money consideration recited-Ademp.
tion-Death within calendar monthjectment, when it will lie, discussedAct of April 26, 1855, discussed.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COUIT.

Bingham's tract being riparian, and the
Susquehanna being a navigable stream, he
owned to low watermark. Between high
and low water mark the public likewise
had rights, which qualified his rights as
proprietor. Freeland v. Penna. R. R. Co.,
197 Pa. 529. While the water lay between
these marks, it could navigate there. If,
in the course of navigation, it became

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
On December 17, 1901, Samuel Smith
made his last will and testament, wherein
lie provided as follows: "I hereby will
and bequeath unto the Methodipt Church,
in Good Hope, Pa., all my real and personal property. In lieu of above bequest
said church shall provide for me a home
during the balance of my life, and gi-
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me Christian burial, paying all funeral
expenses. I hereby appoint Henry Felix
as executor of this my last will and testament."
From the day of the execution of his
will down to the time of his death, a
home was provided for him by said
church.
On December 31, 1901, he
deeded all his real estate to said church in
consideration of the sum of $700, but no
money was paid to him by said church
for said property. The deed was placed
on record January 6, 1902. He died January 9, 1902, at the age of eighty-five years.
On January 28, 1902, letters of administration on his estate were granted to Michael
Jones.
The will of Samuel Smith was never
probated. Prior to and at the time of the
death of Samuel Smith, Henry Felix
acted as his agent, and was the custodian
of all his money and papers. On February 4, 1902, Felix surrendered all the personal property in his possession to the administrator, but claimed that the real
estate belonged to said church. John
Jones, who is one of the heirs of Samuel
Smith, deceased, brings this action in
ejectment to recover said property from
the Methodist church.
POINTS and LONIRGAN for plaintiff.
The devisee is under the duty to prove
that the transaction is righteous-that the
testator possessed testamentary capacity
and that there was no undue influence.
Darlington's Appeal, 86 Pa. 518; Herstu
v. Herstu, 122 Pa. 253; Haydock v. Haydock, 33 N. J. Eq. 494.
Ejectment is the proper remedy to enforce equitable rights in respect to real
estate. Title and Trust Co. v. Shallcross,
147 Pa. 485; Peebles v. Reading, 8 S. & R.
484; McCullough v. Staver, 119 Pa. 482.
The consideration maybe inquired into.
Hamilton v. Moore, 4 W. & S. 572 ; Of. 2
Yeates, 108; 6 Binn. 111; 1 S. & R. 443.
ELMES and MOKEEHAN for defendant.
The consideration was valuable, no
more objection to making a will stipulating for maintainance than an absolute
conveyance for that purpose. Logan v.
McGinnis, 12 Pa. 27; Travis' Appeal, 8
Atl. 601; P. & L 6483.
The rule excluding parol evidence to
contradict written instruments does not
prevent showing a consideration not mentioned in the deed, i. e., maintainance
from date of will to death-if this consideration is not directly inconsistent with
that expressed. Greenlief, 285, 304. Cf.
Jack v. Dougherty, 3 W. 151; Buckley's

Appeal, 48 Pa. 496; Taylor v. Preston, 79
Pa. 436.
Ejectment does not lie when the vender
has parted with the legal title. Myers v.
Myers, 25 Pa. 100; Vaughan v. Ledyard,
14 Phila. 176 ; R. R. Co. v. Gourley, 99 Pa.
171.
The Act of 1855 does not apply, since
this disposition of property was "bona
fide made," for a fair and valuable consideration.
OPINION OF THE COURT.
The decision of this case rests upon the
validity of the deed from Samuel Smith to
the Methodist Church.
The property
supposed to have been devised, as was so
earnestly contended by counsel for plaintiff, having been disposed of by deed subsequent to the makingof the will, the latter
was revoked. The will never having been
probated, is evidence to show the Church
did not pretend to claim under the will.
Counsel for plaintiffs claim the deed to
be invalid, there being no consideration
for it. While it is true, as the statement
of facts shows, there was no consideration
passed, that is, none of the money was
paid, there is not any evidence to show
there was not a consideration. The statement of facts explicitly states there was a
consideration. The mere fact that the deed
avers that there was a consideration, is sufficient to prove that there was.
That the defence of undue influence, so
eloquently and strenuously made by plaintiff, is a good defence, the court does not
deny. It would be sufficient evidence to
establish the invalidity of the deed if there
was evidence in this case to substantiate
it. While, as the plaintiff's counsel claim,
Felix, who stood in very close relationship,
may have used his influence upon the
mind of this aged gentleman, there is no
evidence to maintain this question. Felix's
having been associated with Smith's
affairs for years, and having acted as custodian of all his moneys, and the fact that
a consideration passed, show implicit confidence was placed in him. Mr. Felix
not having received any money or
benefit from either transaction, we cannot
come to any other conclusion than that he
acted honestly and fairly in this transaction. The fact that one is dealing with a
person 85 years of age, may lead one to
scrutinize carefully his dealings with such
a person, but is not sufficient to show undue
influence. And, while it is easier to prey
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upon the mind of one at such an age, it is
not to be presumed there were undue
measures taken to induce this aged gentle
man to make this deed. Some persons at
85 years have very good judgment, and
are not, as is commonly said of old people,
in their dotage. Notwithstanding his being 85 years of age, there being no evidence
of any kind whatsoever to show that undue influence was used, we cannot grant
that contention of the plaintiff.
The argument of plaintiff that there
being a consideration and no purchase
money paid, a resulting trust arises, is
disposed of by numerous cases. The payment of money is not a condition for
passing legal title, neither does its nonpayment raise a trust, as was held in McMullin v. Glass, 27 Pa. 131; Erb v. Underwood, 3 Yeates 172; Wilt v. Franklin, 1
Binney 502.
There being a division of opinion of the
counsel as to the admissibility of parol
evidence to vary a written instrument, it
is deemed necessary to refer to it in the
opinion of the court. It is true there is a
great deal of discussion about the parol
evidence rule in Pennsylvania; many
jurists will admit there is no parol evidence
rule in this state. As was said in Jack v.
Dougherty, it is plain from all the cases on
this point, that any discrepancy which
may appeararose entirely from a difference
of opinion of the judges, as to what was or
what was not inconsistent with the terms
of the deed; some judges thinking that
the mention of any particular condition
in a deed, without more, expressly negatived the fact of its being founded on any
other or greater consideration, while
others conceiving that the law did not
require the true or the whole of the true
consideration to be inserted, to give the
deed validity, thought it unreasonable to
make the recital of a consideration in a
deed binding upon the narties, so as to
preclude them from showing the whole or
true consideration wherever the ends of
justice might require it. It was held not
to be Inconsistent with the intention of
the parties to admit parol evidence to
show what the true consideration was.
The rule excluding parol evidence to alter
a written instrument does not prevent the
giving of parol evidence to show the consideration of a deed if it is not inconsistent

with that mentioned in the deed. Buckley's Appeal, 48 Pa. 496; Taylor v. Preston,
79 Pa. 436. There being no condition or
trust created, an action of ejectment cannot be maintained. Ejectment will lie to
compel the performance of a condition
but not the payment of a consideration. The remedy ofplaintiff is by action
on contract and not ejectment. Cook v.
Trimble, 9 Watts 15; Perry v. Scott, 51 Pa.
124. The act of April 26, 1855, does not
make this deed invalid, as it states that
any disposition within said period of one
calendar month, bonafidemade, for a fair
and valuable consideration shall not be
hereby avoided.
ADAmSON, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

Samuel Smith died January 9, 1902. On
December 17, 1901, or before, he made a
contract with the Methodist Church, in
Good Hope, to devise to it all his property,
real and personal, in consideration of its
providing for him a home during the rest
of his life, and a Christian burial after his
death. The Church immediately provided
for him, and continued to provide for him
a home until his death, and, presumably,
buried him in a becoming manner. On
December 17, 1901, Smith, in execution of
his part of the contract, made a will containing the devise stipulated for. Whether
before or after his death, the Church took
possession of Smith's land.
Smith was 85 years old when he made
the contract, but what his health and state
of constitution were is not revealed by the
evidence. By the American Tables his expectancy of life was 2.77 years. What the
value of his estate was does not appear,
nor, therefore,; what the value of the estate
expectant upon his death. The consideration mentioned in the deed (to be referred
to later) was $700. The cost of burial
might be$30 or $60. We cansee no reason
to doubt the sufficiency of the consideration which the Church offered, to make it
equitable to compel Smith, or his heirs, to
perform his contract. Equity will specifically enforce a contract to devise. Brinker
v. Brinker, 7 Pa. 53; Hoffner's Estate, 161
Pa. 194; Page, Wills, p. 91.
One of the contracting parties is a
Church. The 11th section of the Act of
April 26, 1855, 1 P. & L. 537,'forbids the
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and as the supersedure of the devise was
devising or conveying to any body politic
or person in trust for religious or charita- the consideration for the deed, the deed
has such consideration that it is not
ble uses, unless the devise or conveyance
avoided by that act.
is attested by two creditable witnesses at
The deed even if valid is not a releast one calendar niouth before the devocation of the will. If valid it is an
cease of the testator or grantor; but "Proademption of the devise because it passes
vided, that any disposition of property
the land from the ownership of the testator
within said period bona fide made, for a
before his death, so that the will can no
fair and valuable consideration, shall not
longer operate on it. If invalid, it did not
be hereby avoided." If the consummated
devise or grant would, under this act, be withdraw the land from the testator's
ownership so that the devise continues to
invalid, the contract to devise or grant
operate.
would doubtless be.
The will was nqt probated, and possibly
The will was in fact made by Smith, in
the defendant could not, for this reason,
conformity with his agreement. Was it
have claimed under it; Tozer v. Jackson,
valid ? It was, if it was made for a fair
164 Pa. 373,384. (But f Hays v. Harden,
and valuable consideration. That it was
6 Pa. 409) But he is claiming under the
made for a fair and valuable consideration,
deed if the will became revoked, or, because
the evidence submitted to the jury warnot probated, or because the devise in it
rants a verdict. The will was not attested
was adeemed, is not a sufficient assurance.
by two witnesses, and even if the testator
It is not necessary that all the tenantshad not died within a calendar month
in-common, of a tract of land, should unite
afterwards, this would have avoided a
in an ejectinent for its recovery; Mobley v.
charitable devise in it. Gray's Estate, 147
Bruner, 59 Pa. 481; and hence, there was
Pa. 67. The testator also died eight days
no error in Jones' bringing the action
less than a calendar month after making
alone. He could recover, in any event,
it. This would have been enough to avoid
only his undivided share.
such a devise. But, as the devise was
If the object of the ejeetment is to enbought for a "fair and valuable consideraforce the payment of the $700, there are
tion," it was not charitable, though the
two objections to it. (1) Ejectment, after
purchaser of it was a charitable corporaconveyance, is not the remedy for enforction.
ing the payment of purchase money. ReTwo weeks after making his will, Smith
sort must be had to assumpsit, or to
conveygd the same land to the church, in
scirefaciason the mortgage, when one has
consideration, so the deed recited, of $700,
been given. The church has given no
but no money was in fact paid. No consideration, additional to that for the de- mortgage. The deed contains no condition nor does it stipulate, so far as
vise, was intended to pass. The purpose
of this conveyance was evidently to take
appears, for a lien. (2) The administrator
of Smith, or his executor, only, can bring
bhe place of the devise. The devise was,
the-action for the purchase money. The
as such, revocable, though practically
specific performance of the contract to deheir as such, has no power to sue in any
vise could have been compelled, that is,
form, for it.
not.by making Smith literally devise, but
Judgment affirmed.
by charging the laud in the hands of the
SMALLWOOD vs. CARLISLE CLAY
heirs with a trust in favor of the church.
COMPANY.
Page, Wills, 91. The church agreed to
accept the deed, as a substantial performPrincipalandagen-Contractof employance of the original contract. Being a conmentfrom year to year-esinding oj
veyance, it was not, as a will, revocable.
contract-Loss of profits as element of
Like the will, however, it was not attested,
damage-Provinceof court and jury.
so far as appears, by two "credible, and at
the same time disinterested witnesses,"
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
nor did the grantor survive the execution
was employed as exclusive
The
plaintiff
as
month.
But,
of it for a full calendar
agent of the defendant, to sell clay, for
the consideration of the devise was suffi$5,000 per year, and, in addition, fifty
cient to support it, despite the act of 1855,
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cents per ton on all clay sold. The plaintiff employed sub-agents, and extensively
advertised at cost of $1,000, but for the
first year sold only 10,000 tons of the product.. The defendant company, . after
twelve months, being dissatisfied with
plaintiff's work,employed two new agents,
and a month later discharged plaintiff.
The second year the new agents sold20,000
tons. At the end of this time plaintiff
sues for eleven months' salary and $10,000
damages.

and BIsHoP for plaintiff.
Contract is entire. Defendant cannot
relieve himself on a quantum meruit. 5
S. & R. 101; 1 W. & S. 301; 32 Pa. 506.
An employee for a fixed period, who has
been wrongfully discharged, may treat
the contract as existing, and sue for his
salary as it becomes due. Allen v. Colliery Engineers, 196 Pa. 512.
MAYs and JONE for defendant.
Though loss of profits constitute an element of damage, the jury will not be allowed to speculate as to their amount.
Rightmire v. Hirner, 188 Pa. 325.
The contract of agency was revocable at
will. Kirk v. Hurtman, 63 Pa. 97.
SHERBINE

OPINION OF THE COURT.

The first thing to consider in this case
is whether the original coritract was still
in force when the defendants discharged
the plaintiff. If it was, there can be no
doubt but that defendants by so doing subjected themselves to an action for breach
of contract. To determine this we must
look into the stipulations of-the contract,
which provided that the plaintiff was einployed asexclusive agent of the defendants,
to sell clay, for $5,000 per year, and in addition 50 cents per ton on all clay sold.
This, we think, is a contract from year
to year, which may continue for an indefinite number ofyears, but must continue
at least for one year. Either party to the
contract had a right to rescind the contract at the end of any one year without
incurring liability for breach of contract.
But. we hold, that if either party would
have rescinded the contract during the
continuance of one of the years, it would
have made him liable for a breach of contract.
The principle, that when one is employed
as an agent for no definite time it is a hiring at the will of both parties, and he may
be discharged without notice, is well established in Pennsylvania by the cases of
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Kirk v. Hartmau & Co., 63 Pa. 97, and
Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426. It is true
that in one sense the contract upon which
thi's action is brought is indefinite as to
time, i.e. as to thenumber of years during
which it is to continue; but it is also definite in the sense that it can only be rescinded at the end of any one of the consecutiveyears.of performance. Therefore,
the defendants had no right to discontinue
their contract after the plaintiff had commenced performance for one month in one
of these years. In the case of Kirk v. Hartman, supra, the contract was to pay the
plaintiff $3000 in equal quarterly payments.
and it was held that this was a hiring for
one year.
Had the defendants, after being dissatisfied with plaintiff's work at the end of
twelve months, given him a discharge,
there could be no doubt but that the defendants would be discharged from any
further liability. But, by retaining him
and permitting him to commence work in
the second year, they tacitly agreed that
he should work the entire year. "Where
parties have entered into a contract for a
certain period of time which has elapsed,
and their connection still continues, they
are held to have renewed the contract by
tacit re-location without any new agreement being entered into." Wallace v.
Floyd, 29 Pa. 184; Sinesv. Superintendent
of Poor, 58 Mich. 503, and Patterson v.
Suffolk Maiufacturing Co., 106 Mass. 50.
It is contended on the part. of the defendants that since they secured other
agents at the end of the year, at which
time they had a right to revoke, this was
a sufficient revocation of the agency, and
that if plaintiff continued to work for them
they would, at the most, be liable only on
a quantummeruit. This might be true,
if the plaintiff had had reasonable notice
of their appointing the agents; but the
facts do not say that plaintiff had such
notice, therefore we must presume that he
had not such notice, which is necessary in
order that it may act as a revocatioli.
Huffcut on Agency, (2nd Ed.) sec. 66, p.
80
The defendants claim that they, having
employed the plaintiff as their exelu.iv
agent, in the event of the plaintiff'A
having secured sub-agents he committed
such a breach of duty to his principal as
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would justify his dismissal. With this
theory we cannot agree. The proper construction to be placed upon "exclusive
agent" is, that defendants should be prohibited from employing other agents, and
not that plaintiff should not be allowed to
employ assistants to help him in the execution of his duty. This construction, we
think, the defendants admit to be the
proper one when they set up as a defense
to this action, that defendant's appointing
two agents at the end of the first year was
a sufficient revocation of the agency.
And, when considering the nature of the
employment, we cannot see that there
must be a vast amount of skill or discretionary power exercised in the selling of
clay, but we rather see the great necessity
of employing sub-agents. We cannot see
that this should furnish any reason for
the defendants to complain about, because
their main object is to sell clay, and they
should be willing to acquiesce in everything that is in furtherance of their object.
The next question is the measurement
of damages.
It is the policy of the law in giving damages for breach of contract to compensate
the injured party so far as it can be done
by money, so as to put the injured part in
the same position as if the contradt had
been performed.-Wilkinson v. Terree, 24
Pa. 190; Garseed v. Turner, 71 Pa. 56. This
action having not been commenced until
after the expiration of the termn, the measure of damages would be, primafacie;the
unearned stipulated salary for the eleven
mouths. But the defendants may show
in mitigation of damages what the agent
has earned during the time, or what he
might have earned if he had acted prudently. And the burden is upon the defendant to do so, if he wishes to mitigate
the damages.-Hand v. Clearfield Coal
Co., 143 Pa. 408; Emery v. Steckel, 126 Pa.
171; Chamberlin v. Morgan, 68 Pa. 168.
But to allow the plaintiff to recover the
elever. months' salary only, would not sufficiently compensate him so as to put him
in the same position as if the contract had
been performed. The plaintiff invested
$1000 in advertising the business, and this
fact must be considered in the amount of
damages. Blackstone v. Buttermore, 53 Pa.
226. The plaintiff was to receive 50 cents
on every ton of clay sold, and this must also

be considered in measuring the damages.
Blair v. Laflin, 127 Mass. 518. The duty
of measuring the damages is-for the jury,
under the proper instructions from the
court. We, therefore, instruct thejury that
they consider the facts,that there are eleven
months salary due, that plaintiff invested
$1000 in advertising the business, and that
the two agents employed by the defendants sold 20,000 tons of clay the second
year, as a guide in the performance of their
duty.
Judgment for the plaintiff, damages to be estimated by the jury.
GROSS, J.
OPINION OF THlE SUPREME COURT.

The plaintiff in this case was employed
at a salary of $5,000 per year. The period
for which the employment was to run had
not been specified. The court below instructed the jury that the arrangement
constituted a contract from year to year,
though it appeared that monthly payments were made, and since the service
was continued without objection after the
expiration of the first year, it was- presumed to continue for another. In this
we think he was correct. The mere fact
that the payments of a salary are made in
quarterly, Kirk v. Hartman, 63 Pa. 97,
monthly, Kane v. Moore, 167 Pa. 275, or
weekly, Allen v. Colliery Eng. Co., 196
Pa. 512, Philadelphia, P. & P. Co's Estate, 4 D. R. 57, installments, will not
change the character of the employment.
Nor was this a question for the jury.
Had the facts been disputed as in Nixon
v. Myers, 141 Pa. 478, the rule would be
otherwise.
The contract being then one foi. yearly
employment, had the defendant the right
to discharge the plaintiff? He was dissatisfied with the services, but it does not
appear that there was any reasonable basis
for complaint. The court, as a matter of
law, instructed the jury that no such incompetency of the servant, or ground of
dismissal, had been shown. Under thecircumstances of this case, we think this was
proper. Where the facts as to the reasonableness of the discharge and the character of the service performed, are in dispute, it is for the jury. Peltz v. Printz, 186
Pa. 345; Wilke v. Harrison Bros., 166
Pa. 202. But where they are undisputed,
it is for the court to determine. Peniston
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v. Huber Co., 196 Pa. 580; Elliot v. Wanamaker, 155 Pa. 67.
The contract being then a yearly one,
and the plaintiff having been discharged
without just cause by the defendant during the continuance of the term, he was
entitled to either treat the contract as
existing and sue for the salary as it became due, or he may sue for the breach of
the contract at once, or at the end of the
contract period. Allen v. Colliery Eng.
Co. 196 Pa. 512. In this case the latter
course has been pursued. The amount of
the damages recoverable was properly left
to the determination of the jury, but complaint is made of the Instructions as to the
elements of damage to be considered. Did
the court below correctly state the law ?
"If the contract was broken by the defendant, the plaintiff was entitled to be
placed in the same position, pecuniarily,
as he would have been had the contract
been kept. " Garsed v. Turner, 71 Pa. 56.
Under the agreement two elements of
compensation were provided for-salary
and commissions. For eleven months the
former was not paid, and the jury was
properly told that, primc facie, the measure of this damage was the amount contracted for, and unpaid. 20 A. & E. Enc.
of Law (2nded.) 87; Emeryv. Steckel, 126
Pa. 171 ; Schuth v. Aber, 18 Sup. 174. We
say .prima fack, for the defendant could
have shown that expenses were payable
from the amount agreed upon, or that other
employment had been obtained in the
meantime to lessen this amount. But he
did not do so, and the burden of proof was
upon him. King v. Steirin, 44 Pa. 99;
Emery v. Steckel, aupra.
The second element of compensation
which the jury was Instructed to consider,
was the loss of a commission of fifty
cents per ton on all clay sold. It is true
that loss of profits may be recovered,
where there has been a breach of the contract, provided the money value to the
plaintiff can be clearly shown, and the
jury is not allowed to speculate as to the
amount. Where there is reasonable certainty, such damages are properly allowable. Gauge Co. v. Valve Co., 184 Pa. 36;
Blair v. Laflin, 127 Mass. 518; Anvil
Mining Co. v. Humble, 153 U. S. 540;
Baker Transfer Co. v. Co., 42 N. Y. Supp.
76, are Illustrative cases. It will be noticed

in the two first cases cited that the commission was to be paid, the plaintiffs not
being required to make any outlays.
Therefore, mere evidence of the amount of
the sales was sufficient on which to base a
calculation of the loss of profits. In the
third case, where damages were claimed
for loss of profits in mining ore, the number of tons with the cost of mining each
was shown, and in the fourth the number
of tons of ice, the selling price, and the
cost of handling were proven.
But where there is no evidence which
can guide the jury in estimating these
damages, the court will not submit the
question to the jury. Lentz v. Choteau,
42 Pa. 435, approved in Rightmire v.
Hirner, 188 Pa. 325. It is not the sum
stipulated for, but the loss of profit which
would have been made, which must
measure the damage. Nixon v. Myers,
141 Pa. 477.
In the case before us it is clear that loss
of profits were recoverable, in case the
jury had been given proper datA on which
to estimate them. But we are of the
opinion that such evidence was not produced. No testimony was offered to show
the expense to which the agent would
have been put to sell each ton. The
amount sold appears, but it would be
manifestly unfair to allow a recovery of
fifty cents for each of the tons sold, when
it is apparent that the cost of finding a
market for each was considerable. Tosell
one-half this quantity during the first
year, the plaintiff was compelled to employ
sub-agents, and advertise extensively at
large expense. It appears that the defendants employed two men in this work
the second year, though at what cost we
know not. In the absence of proof as to
what was the loss, the question should
not have been submitted to the jury, and
in so doing the lower court committed
error. The jury was further told to consider the money paid for advertising the
first year, in estimating the loss. This
expenditure was made by the plaintiff to
enable him to sell more of the product,
and thus Increase his commissions. In
this way, and by other means, he marketed
10,000 tons, and earned $5,000 in additibn
to his regular salary. It. was done for his
own benefit and the defendant was under
no liability to reimburse 1dm. We are,
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The note, which is the basis of defendanut's claim for a set-off, did not mature
until two months after Flickinger's death.
Therefore, the bank could not bring an
action on said note until the expiration of
SHAPLEY, ADMR., vs. FARMERS'
the two months.
BANK.
The instant Flickinger died the rights of
other creditors commenced, and the right
Cancellationof discount of a note-Set-off of set-off could not be exercised to their
-Stoppage in transitu-Insolvency.
detriment.
As the note to the bank did not mature,
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
his representative was entitled to demand
William Flickinger, deeply insolvent,
and receive from the bank the amount of
applied to the bank for the discount of a
the deposit as assets. When Flickinger
note for $4,000. The note was at two
died the bank had no claim on which it
months, discounted, and his account was could sue, while Flickinger's right of
credited with the proceeds less the disaction was perfect before his death. But
count of. $40.00. The same evening Flickat the moment of his death the law took
inger committed suicide, and it became
possession of his estate for the benefit of'
noised abroad that he was indebted $30,his creditors, he being insolvent. It was
000 above all assets. The bank next mornnot the case of mere, voluntary transfer,.
ing credited his account with the $40,
but new rights sprang into being on the
charged him with $4,000, and, as soon as
instant of his death.
Shapley was appointed administrator, tenHence the riglits of creditors attached at
dered him the note. He refused to accept,
once, and equity demanded equality among
and instantly sued the bank. The bank
the creditors. Skiles v. Houston, 110 Pa.
defended (1), that it had rescinded the
254.
loan on discovering the insolvency of
Dougherty Bros. & Co. v. Central NaFlickinger; (2), set-off of the note.
tional Bank, and others -of like nature,
PHILLIPS and CISNEY for plaintiff.
cited by counsel for defence, are cases
Tne bank lost the right to cancel the
treating of an assigned estate.
discount when it accepted the $40 interThe decedent's death having terminated
est. 4 Pa. 32; 1 Binny, 221; 15 S. & R. 108;
the relationship of cdntinuousand mutual
3 Binny, 135.
A debt not due at testator's death cancredit, the creditor cannot complain, and
not be set-off against an action by the adcannot have his set-off, because the law
ministrator. Bosler's Administrators v.
administers the assets at the time of death,
Exchange Bank, 4 Pa, 32; Chapman, et al.
and creditors and heirs become interested,
v. The Bank, 120 Pa. 86.
whilst the assignor has his liberty of an]DRumHELLER and SHERBINE for defendant.
ticipating payment, providing there is a
Since Flickinger was insolvent, and the residue after payment. He passes his
bank had not made actual payment, it
estate and all his rights, subject to all
had an equitable right analogous to stopequities which apply to himself. His aspage in transitz before delivery of the
signee is but his hand in the distributiojt
goods. Dougherty et al. v. The Bank, 9
W. N. C. 1. The bank has the right of of his estate. Hence, a voluntary assignset-off. Penn. Bank v. Farmers' Tiank,
inent does not alter the status of the rights
130 Pa. 209.
of creditors as death does of decedent's
OPINION OF THE COURT.
estate. Greenv. TheNat. Security-Bank,
When the decedent's estate is insolvent,
13 Phila. 146; Jordan v. Sharlock, 3 Norris
the rule as regards set-off in Pennsylvania
369. The right of stoppage in transitu
is, "The party claiming the benefit of the does not apply, as the bank had delivered
set-off must have a right of action on his
the proceeds of the note to the decedent,
claim the instant the decedent dies, that
by placing a credit of $3,960 on Flickis, his claim must be due when the deceinger's account. That act was equivalent to
dentdies." Skilerv. Houston, 110Pa. 254;
handing the proceeds to Flickinger, who
Bosler v. Exchange Bank, 4 Pa. 32; Light
handed it back .14 a drp)'it. It constiv. Leininger, 8 Pa. 403; Jordon v. Shartutes a delivery of pusse. siou to Flickinger;- it took the proceeds from the bank's
lock, 3 Norris, 366.
therefore, of the opinion that this instruction was error.
The judgment is reversed, and a venire
facias de novo awarded.
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authority and placed them in Flickinger's
power, to check out and do as he pleased
with them.
The proceeds were left there as a deposit; it was such a delivery of possession
as the nature of the contract and the business world requires and sanctions. The
last act of the contract was finished, hence,
the contract being completed, the bank
has no right to rescind it at this stage.
Judgment for plaintiff for the amount
of the proceeds of above note.
SCHNEE, J,
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

When Flickinger obtained the discount
he was insolvent. Before he had checked
against the proceeds of the discount, he
died, and the bank cancelled the discount,
by crediting his account with the discount, charging it with the $4,000, and, as
soon as an administrator was appointed, by
tendering the note to him.
It has been decided, on several occasions, that, under these circumstances, the
bank has a right to retract the loan. The
money is still in fact in its possession.
The giving of the credit on the bank's
books is simply one step towards putting
the money in the discountee's hands. Until he draws a check and the bank honors
it, the money is virtually in transitu from
the bank to him, and the former, on discovering his insolvency, may arrest it.
The process is assimilated to stoppage in
transitu by a vendor. Dougherty v. Cent.
Nat. Bank, 93 Pa. 227; Laucaster County
Nat. Bank v. Huver, 114 Pa. 216 ; Warner
v. Hare, 154 Pa. 548.
The right of stoppage in transitu, may
be enforced notwithstanding that a creditor of the vendee has levied on the goods,
or that a bona fide purchaser has bought
them. Burdick, Sales, p 224, 22.5; Benjamin (R. M.) Sales, 184. In the cases
cited supra,the right of the bank torecall
its discount and its grant of credit to the
discountee as against his assignee for the
benefit of creditors, is recognized. Death
transmits the rights of the discountee to
his administrator, but it does not enlarge
them. Neither the administrator, nor the
creditors, or next of kin, of whom he is
trustee, pay value. Wedoubt not that the
vendor's right of stoppage in transitu
could be asserted, as well against the administrator of the vendee, as against his
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assignee for value, and for the same
reason, the lending bank's right to arrest
the progress of the money lent to the borrower, is available, against the assignee for
value, or the administrator (who is not an
assignee for value) of the borrower.
The learned court below remarks that
the giving of credit to Flickinger was
equivalent to the payment to him of the
proceeds of the discount, and the immediate deposit by him, of these proceeds to
his credit. So it was for some purposes.
But the cases cited suprarefuse so to consider it, when, on account of the insolvency of the discountee, the bank revokes
betimes the discount. Had they so considered it, the decisions must have been
different, for then, at the time of the assignment of the deposit by the depositor,
the bank would have had no matured
counter-claim, and it could not set-off one
becoming mature later, against the assignee. Chipman v. Ninth Nat. Bank,
120 Pa. 86; Dougherty v. Central Nat.
Bank, 93 Pa. 227.
The learned court below has dealt with
the problem before it as one only of setoff. Flickinger, it conceives, had a
deposit in the bank, presently payable to
him. The bank had a note against him,
which did not mature for two months.
His estate was insolvent. Hence, it concludes, the bank cannot set-off the note
against the deposit. We .think it was in
error in regarding the right contended for
as simply that of set-off.
Judgment reversed with v.f. d. n.
IN RE JOLLOPE'S ESTATE.
Decedent's estate-Locality of administration-Conflict of laws-Act of June

26, 1895-Domicile of deceased owner
and not the situs of personal property
governs its transmission.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Jollope, a citizen of Virginia, had
a claim against the United States for
money spent by him, for it, in the purchase of mules for the army. Dying, he
had sundry creditors in Pennsylvania, and
William Jones was made administrator.
No administrator was raised up in Virginia. Jones obtained from the United
States fourteen thousand ($14,000) dollars,
and filed his account. This being con-
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firmed, an auditor was appointed to make
distribution. The Virginia next of kin
claim the fund, alleging (1) that the Virginia law as to distribution among relatives and not the Pennsylvania law applies; (2) that the Virginia statute of
limitations of four years, has barred the
claims, although the Pennsylvania statute
would not bar them; the Pennsylvania
statute prescribing six years.
MoREHoUSE and BRUNDAGE for the
plaintiff.
Distribution of personal property is
overned by the law of deceased owner's
domicile. By it the rights of legatees, and
the next of kin are determined; 16 Conn.
127; 3 Cranch. 319; 3 Metc. 109; 37 W. Y.
Supp. 429; 9 Mass. 337; 2 Kent's Comm.
428.
Debts due from U. S. are not such assets
within the meaning of Act March 18, 1832,
as to give the Register in Pennsylvania a
right to appoint an administrator for the
purpose of satistying the claims of creditors
in Pennsylvania; 2 W. N. C. 684; 6 Wright,
467; 97 Pa. 173.
PRcxmvT and Yocum forthe defendant.
Administration necessary to pay debts
and collect assets; 5 B. Pa. 146; 134 Pa.
298; 43 Mich. 492; 61 Mich. 181.
Pennsylvania creditors must be paid before funds in the state are turned into the
domiciliary administration; 6 Binn. 363;
88 Pa. 131; 161 Pa. 218; 61 Pa. 478.
Since the administration is under the
Pennsylvania law, the Pennsylvania
statute of limitations applies.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

It is not controverted thatJones has the
right to the assets, that are before us for
distribution. There is no principal, or
doficiliary administration. The claim
was collected by the diligence of Jones. It
was carried into this state by the apparent
acquiescence of the legatees. Whatever
right they had to prevent the assets coming into the jurisdiction of the ancillary
administration, it has been lost, and they
must now abide by the laws of the state
that govern the distribution of these assets.
What these laws are we shall proceed to
ascertain.
At first blush we were of the opinion
that the ancillary administrator had no
right to collect this claim; that having
done so it was his duty to transmit it to
the domicile of the deceased. This opinion
was created by the doctrine promulgated
in Schley's Estate, 4 Phila. Co. 139. But
a careful examination of that case con-

vinces us -that we would not be warranted
in basing our opinion upon that decision.
In that case there was a domiciliary administrator who began the collection of
the claim against the government, and
afterwards appointed a resident of this
state to prosecute it. The latter proceeded
to do so, and after collecting the claim,
carried the assets into this state and attempted to take out ancillary letters. The
court properly refused the letters.
But in the case at bar, there is au entirely
different situation. The ancillary administrator exists, There is no domiciliary
administrator. The claim has been collected by the perseverance of the ancillary
administrator and with the consent, evidently, o1 those interested, and having the
right to object. Claims against the United
States may be received by the personal
representation of the claimant at any
place designated by the government for
payment. Dover v. Chapman, 83 Va. 67.
By paying to Jones the government designates Pennsylvania as the place for the
assets to be received. Coining here they
must be governed by our laws In their
distribution.
The claim of the plaintiff that the law
of the domicile governs the distribution is,
in a measure, true, but it is not applicable
until all the claimants within the jurisdiction of the ancillary administration have
been satisfied. Miller's Estate, 161 Pa. 218;
Page's Estate, 75 Pa. 87; Parker's Appeal,
61 Pa. 484.
The rule as stated in Dent's Appeal, 10
Harris 514, and Parker's Appeal, supra,is
this: "When there are claimants within
the jurisdiction of the ancillary administration, assets in Pennsylvania are no to
be transmitted to the domicile for distribution."
The administration, whether ancillary
or-domiciliary, is governed as to creditors
by the laws of the place where the representative acts and was appointed; therefore, all questions as to priority of debts,
the method of proving them in an ancillary administration, must be determined
by theolaw of the place where that administration is had, without regard to law of
the domicile of decedent or of the creditor.
Union Bank v. Smith, 4 Cranch (U. 8.)
518; Miller's Estate, 3 Rawle 319.
The princip'e deduced from these cases
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is clear, that the law of Pennsylvania will
govern the distribution of these assets
among the claimants in this State so long
as there are claimants within this State.
No distribution shall be made of the
assets in the possession of the ancillary
administrator among claimants in another State, notwithstanding that these
claimants are residents of the domicile of
the decedent. After all the claims in this
State have been satisfied, then the plaintiff can either have the balance distributed
among them by the ancillary administrator, or have it transmitted to an administrator to be appointed at the domicile of
the deceddnt. In either case, the laws of
Virginia will, of course, govern the distribution.
Tle court, therefore, is of the opinion
that the assets must be distributed among
the Pennsylvania claimants according to
our law; that the plaintiffs cannot plead
the Virginia statute of limitation. Judgment is therefore rendered for the defendants.
WALSH, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

A few principles will decide this case.
The decedent was not a resident of Pennsylvania. The only ground on which a
register of wills in this state had jurisdiction to grant letters was the presence in
his county of assets. The assets were the
claim against the United States. Tie
situs of a debt due to a decedent, is for the
purpose of fixing the locality of administration, that of the debtor. The United
States is the debtor. It exists in Pennsylvania as much as in Virginia, and in one
county in Pennsylvania as much as in
another. There was no want of jurisdictional facts.
But, if there was, the register has nevertheless, assumed jurisdiction and granted
letters. This decree cannot be collaterally
attached.
Nor is it collaterally attached.
No one
is claiming above the administration.
The administrator has received the money
and has filed his account. An auditor has
been appointed to make distribu,ion, and
the claimants have preferred their claims
before him. The only questions then are,
(1), the law of what state, Virginia or
Pennsylvania, determines who, as next of
kin, shall take the money, and (2), are
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creditors to be affected by the Virginia or
the Pennsylvania statute of limitations?
Probably, were there a domiciliary administrator in Virginia, the balance, after
satisfying creditors, would be, on his demand, sent to him for distribution. There
being none such, the next of kin immediately claim the fund. This fund is personalty, and it is entirely settled, that the
transmission at the death of an owner of
personalty is regulated by thelaw, not of the
situs, but of the domicile of the deceasea
owner. In so far as the learned court below has selected the distributees by the
Pennsylvania law instead of the Virginia
law, it has committed an error. Croswell,
Exec. p. 154, 168; Welles' Estate, 161 Pa.
218; Minor's Conflict of Laws, p. 328.
The learned court below has held the
Virginiastatuteof limitations inapplicable,
but has not thought it worth while to
state its reasons or the authorities on
which it relied. It has been repeatedly
held in Pennsylvania that an action in
this state upon a debt arising in another
state, would not be barred by the statute
of limitations of the latter state. 11 P. &
L. Dig. 18738; Sea Grove Building and
Loan Association v. Stockton, 148 Pa. 146S;
Wood Limitations, 29; Minor, Conflict of
Laws, p. 522. The act of June 26th, 1895,
P. L. 375, provides, however, that when a
cause of action has been fully barred by
the laws of the state or country in which it
arose, such bar shall be a complete defence
to an action brought thereon in any of
the courts of this state. As the debts arose
in Virginia, and had been barred by the
Virginia statute of limitations, they were
likewise barred at the time of the distribution.
Decree reversed with procedendo.
HAMMETT vs. THORPE.
Recording ofdeeds-Act of .ay 19, 1893Actual and constructive notice-Terretenant not permitted to set Ul in an
ejeetment the same defense already set
up under a scirejacias6ur mortgage.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
John McCauley, owning a tract of land
on which, with his family, he resided, conveyed it to his wife, Catharine, August
10, 1898. This deed was not )ut oil record
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until Nov. 9, 1898, but McCauley continued to reside on the land as before. On
Sept. 13, 1898, he borrowed from Hammett, $2,500, on bond and mortgage on the
premises. The debt not being paid, a
scirefacias on the mortgage was issued,
naming Thomas Thorpe, to whom Catharine McCauley conveyed the land on Jan.
6, 1899, terre-tenant.
Thorpe pleaded
that he held no land bound by the lien of
the mortgage, and that he was not terretenant. He furnished evidence that Catharine was in possession of the premises
when the mortgage was made, that Hammett then had express notice of the conveyance to her. The verdict and judgment were for plaintiff against McCauley
and Thorpe. A sheriff's sale was had at
which Hammett became purchaser. This
is ejectment against Thorpe. The defense
is on the ground that as against him the
mortgage was not a lien.
BRENNAN and MILLER for theplaintiff.
A voluntary conveyance can be imipeached by subsequent creditors. 31 Pa.
241 ; 14 Pa. 489.
Failure to record within 90 days puts
the purchaser from grantee upon inquiry.
181 Pa. 317; 91 Pa. 163. Terre-tenant under a scire facias sqr mortgage defined.
16S. & R. 425; 8 Pa. 491.
DELANEY and MYERS for the defendant.
A subsequent deed has no priority over
a former unrecorded deed, when the
grantee has notice of the existence of the
former. 19 Wend. 338; 47 Pa, 141; 113
Pa. 482 ; 40 Pa. 206.
Actual possession of land is constructive
notice to purchasers. 7 Watts 261; 12
Wright 238; 6 Wend. k13; 105 Pa. 543.
The husband's receiving further credit
after date of and prior to recording of said
deed does not avoid it. 105 Pa. 274; 71
Pa. 450.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

John McCauley owned a tract of land
on which he and his family resided.
August 10th, 1898, he conveyed this land
to his wife, Catharine McCauley, the consideration, supporting this conveyance,
was that of natural love and affection, and
valid asagainst all, exceptingthose having
lawful claims against the estate of the
grantor at the time of the conveyance; in
the absence ofsuch claims, the conveyance
vested in Catharine an estate in fee simple.
September 13th, 1898, he borrowed from
Hammett $2,500, on bond and mortgage
on the premises previously conveyed to

Catherine, After the conveyance of McCauley to his wife, McCauley and family
continued in possession same as before.
Mrs. McCauley recorded her deed Nov.
9th, 1898, on the 91st day after conveyance
to her.
The mortgage to Hammett was recorded
subsequent to the recording of the deed
to Mrs. McCauley.
We must now determine the equities existing between Mrs. McCauley and Hammett. The Act of March 18, 1775, as to
the recording of deeds and conveyances,
enacted: "Every deed or conveyance shall
be recorded in the office for the recording
of deeds within six (6) months after the
execution of such deed or conveyance, and
every such deed and conveyance that shall
not be proved and recorded, as aforesaid,
shall be adjudged fraudulent and void
against any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee for a valuable consideration, 'unless
such deed or conveyance be recorded, as
aforesaid, before the proving and recording of the deed or conveyance under which
subsequent purchaser or mortgagee shall
claim.'"
The Act of March 18, 1775, was amended
by the Act of May 19,1893, which required
that "all deeds and conveyances be recorded within ninety days after the execution of such deeds or conveyances, and
every such deed and conveyance which
shall not be proved and recorded, as aforesaid, shall be adjudged fraudulent and
void against any subsequent purchaser or
mortgagee for a valid consideration." In
the case of Frees v. Null, et al., it was held
that the Recording Act of March 18, 1775,
relates not only to deeds and conveyances,
but also to mortgages. This construction
is supported by the 1st section of the act,
which provides that if the prior conveyance be not recorded in six months it shall
be adjudged fraudulent and void "against
any subsequent purchaser or mortgagee
for valuable consideration."
Question now arises whether under
Act of May 19, 1893, a deed recorded after
the statutory period of ninety days, but
prior to the recording of the subsequent
deed or mortgage, will be given precedence as under Act of March 18, 1775.
This question is answered in 162 Pa. 443,
Davey v. Ruffell, in which it was held
the Act of 1893 was effective to change
the Act of 1775 in only one particular, in
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that it reduces the time within which a
deed must be recorded from six months
to ninety days. In all other respects the
law remains as before.
Mrs. McCauley, 'who, we have decided,
took an estate in fee by the conveyance
from her husband, conveyed the land January 6, 1899, to due Thorpe, he thereby
receiving the estate in fee, free from the
incumbrance of the mortgage given by
John McCauley to Hammett.
The $2,500, loaned by Hammett, not
being paid, a scirefacias on the mortgage
was issued, naming Thomas Thorpe terretenant. Thorpe claimed he held no land
bound by thelien of the mortgage, and was
not terre-tenant. The verdict and judgment were for the plaintiff, against both
McCauley and Thorpe. A sheriff's sale
was had at which Hammett became purchaser. He now brings this ejectment
against Thorpe.
In Trickett on Liens, Vol. I, Page 260,
we find; "No one is a terre-tenant who
has no connection with the debtor's title,
or who, though deriving title from him,
did do by a conveyance earlier than the
judgment, or the attachment of its lien.
Such a one must not be made a party to
the sci. fa., and if he is, "omission to
include him in the judgment will not be
erroneous."
"If one whose title is not derived from
the defendant, or was derived from him
before the judgment was recovered, is
cited as a terre-tenant, a judgment recovered against him will not be conclusive of his title, even if appears and defends."
It was held in Mitchell v. Hamilton, 8
Br. 486. A judgment in a scire facias
quare executio non, against an occupant
under a title adverse to that of the judgment debtor, does not preclude the oecu-pant from setting up his adverse title
in an ejectment brought against him by
the sheriff's vendee. When a terre-tenant
has not only the debtor's title, but a title
independent of it, he may avail himself
of each in its proper place, of the debtor's
title, by showing at the trial of scirefacias
that the debtor had parted with it before
the rendition of the judgment, and of his
independent title at the trial of an eject-,
ment. If first be found against him he is
concluded so far, but he may still recur to

the second, which was not involved in
the issue.
The court is now of the opinion that
the verdict and judgment, rendered
against McCauley and Thorpe, was
only conclusive as to Thorpe, in any
claim as to title which he might have
asserted as holding under J. McCauley,
and Thorpe by reason of such verdict
and judgment is nbt estopped from setting up as a defence in this action of
ejectment, the title which he claims to
have received by Catharine McCauley's
deed of January 6, 1899.
Judgment accordingly rendered for the
defendant.
HINDMAN, J.

OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
McCauley's deed to his wife was made
August 10, 1898, and was recorded Nov. 9,
1898, one day after the expiration of the
ninety days allowed for recording. She
conveyed the land to Thorpe, Jan. 6, 1899.
McCauley made the mortgage to Hammett, Sept. 13, 1898.
The scire facias upon the mortgage,
named Thorpe as terre-tenant. He pleaded
that he held no land bound by the lien of
the mortgage. It was permissible to him,
under this plea, to show that the Hammett mortgage had been recorded, either
never, or not until after the record of the
conveyance. He could also show, as he
attempted to show, that Mrs. McCauley
had possession of the premises, when the
mortgage was made, and that Hammett
had express notice of the previous conveyance to her. He failed to convince the
jury, or the court, of the truth and sufficienqy of these defenses, for the verdict
and the judgment were against him.
The learned court below was of opinion
that this judgment was not decisive, but
that, in this ejectment, Thorpe can again
show that he holds the land free from the
mortgage. Mitchell v. Hamilton, 8 Pa.
486, is cited as authority. A singular inconsistency afflicts the decisions upon this
question. Colwell v. Easley, 83 Pa. 31.
And in Hulett v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 114
Pa. 142, the writer of the opinion astutely
evades a decision of it, by remarking that
it does not arise on the record. Cf. 1
Liens, 261. He does declare, however,
that it was competent for the alleged
terre-tenant to defend, on the ground that
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when he or his grantor bought, the land
was not subject to the mortgage, nor did
it become subject to it on its execution.
He also affirms that a verdict and judgment against the terre-tenaut, on such a
defense, was valid.
But, wily is it valid, if it is of no utility?
Why suffer the time of the court to be asstimed, and the attention of the jury to be
detracted, in an investigation, the resultof
which determines nothing? If the terretenant defends that the mortgage has beetn
paid, or has been released, he is certainly
concluded, says Clark, J., as to such matters, 114 Pa. 142. But, can any valid
reason be discovered for holding that he
may also defend on the ground that by
some other occurrence than payment or
release, or effiux of the lien of a judgment,
his land is not subject to the lien, and yet
that the verdict andjudgment against him
shall not conclude him? If the decision
of such defences is to avail nothing, they
should not be suffered at all. The evidence of Thorpe ought to have been excluded as irrelevant. Thejudgment would
then have gone againt him, it is true, but
he could have urged, in this ejectment,
that as he could not be heard, under the
sci.fa. and- therefore was not heard, asto
his defence, it should be open to him now.
He was heard under the scire facias, his
defence was investigated; it was found
untrue in fact, or insufficient in law. Why
should he be allowed to try again? Intereet reipublicae ut sit finis litium. We
think the decision in the proceeding on
the scirefacias final, and it was against
Thorpe.
Judgment reversed with v. f. d. n.
CONE vs. TROLLOPE.
.Afarried women- Validity of a judgment
confessed by a husband to a wife for her
separateearnings received by him before
and after passageof Act of June 8, 1887,
P. L. 882.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.
Cone issued execution against Trollope,
and the proceeds of the sale of his land,
viz.: $1,200, were in court for distribution.
Jane Trollope, the wife of defendant,
claimed under a prior judgment for $850,
which had been earned by her as a worker
in a shoe factory, and which had been paid

month to month by her employer to her
husband.
He then confessed judgment to her after
the debt had arisen, for which Cone recovered hisjudgment.
Cone denied the right of Win. Trollope
to take the money, because the 'wages belonged to the husband, and the judgment
was in substance a gift to the wife. The
wages were earned in the years 1886, 1887,
1888, 188) ,1890, in about equal parts.
HUBiLER and BENJAMIN for plaintiff.
The wages earned prior to Act of June
3. 1887, belong to husband. Alton v.
Conn, 114 Pa. 183.
CARLIN and LLOYD for defendant.
Married women are entitled to their
separate earnings. Lewis' Estate, 156 Pa.
337.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

This case falls within the acts of assembly as to whether the wages earned by
Mrs. Trollope. but paid to her husband,
tile defendant, belong to herself, or her
husband.
The act of April 3, 1872, P. L. 35, in
Section 1 provides that a wife shall be entitled to her separate earnings; but in
Section 2, the act further says "To prevent any fraudulent practices under this
act, before any married woman shall be
entitled to its benefits, she shall first
present her petition, under oath oraffirmation, to the Court of Common Pleas of the
city or county where she resides, stating
her intention of thereafter claiming the
benefits of this act. "
The act of June 3, 1887, P. L. 332,
Section 1, provides that every married
woman shall have the right to acquire
and hold property in the same manner as
if she were a feme sole, and the "property of every kind owned, acquired, or
earned by a woman before or during her
marriage, shall belong to her, and not to
her husband, or his creditors."
The decisions hold that the act of June 3, 1893,
P. L. 344, was intended to place the rights
and powers of married women upon a
broader, more comprehensive and better
defined bssis than was accomplished by
the act of 1887. Both of these acts give
the wife an absolute right to her earnings, and they remove the necessity of the
petition as required by Section 2, of the
act of 1872.
The act of 1887 is applicable to the case
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at bar, which is a claim for wages. Lewis'
Estate, 156 Pa. 337, and other authorities
hold that the first section of the act of
1887 includes the wages of labor earned by
a married woman.
Cone offers no other evidence to support
his claim that the money belonged to
Trollope, and that the judgment was a
gift to the wife, than the fact that Trollope
held the money in possession. This evideuce is not sufficient. "The mere possession by the husband of his wife's money
is not evidence of title in the husband, but
he is presumed to hold it in trust for her."
Grabill v. Moyer, 45 Pa. 530, 1863; Hamill's
Appeal, 88 Pa. 368, 1879; and Gicher's
Admr's v. Martin 50 Pa. 138.
A wife has the same right as other
creditors to secure a debt due her by her
husband. It being established that this
money belongs to Mrs. Trollope, the presumption that the judgment was not bona
fide is eliminated from the case. Therefore,
the case must be decided according to the
clear interpretation of the statutes.
Mrs. Trollope, having failed to comply
with the requirement of section 2, of the
act of 1872, judgment is entered for the
plaintiff, for the wages earned by her
prior to June 3, 1887; those earned after
that date belong to Mrs. Trollope.
KLINE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
The act of June 3, 1887, P. L. 332, was
enacted, pending the employ by which
the wages of Mrs. Trollope were earned.
One of its provisions was that "property
of every kind owned, acquired, or earned
by a woman, before or during her marriage, shall belong to her and not to her
husband or creditors." At common law
her wage-earning power, and therefore
her wages, belonged to her husband. Atton v. Corn, 114 Pa. 183. The judgment
confessed by the husband to her for $850,
was for wages earned in equal parts,
during the years 1886, 1887, 1898, 1889
and 1890. In 1886, therefore, $170 was
earned. In 1887, prior to the passage
of the act of 1887, about one-half of $170, or
$85, was earned. These sums, equalling
S255, were the property of the husband.
The remainder of the $850 or $595, belonged
to the wife. Lewis Estate, 156 Pa. 337;
8 P. & L. Dig. 13743.
She did not as she might have done,

give this $595 to her husband. It was
proper for him to repay it, or to secure the
re-payment ofit by ajudgment. Meckley's
Appeal, 102 Pa. 536; Patton v. Conn, 114
Pa. 183.
Had the husband given the
wages earned before June 3, 1887, to his
wife, and while lie was not indebted, as he
could have done, Conley v. Bently, 87 Pa.
40 he could have properly included them
in the judgment. But as tile judgment
was not confessed until after the indebtedness of Trollope to others had arisen, he
was not then able, as against creditors, to
make a gift to his wife.
The judgment confessed to her is for too
large a sum. Does this fact make it
wholly void, or is it void merely for the
excess beyond the actual debt. It does
not appear that any fraudulent intent existed, and none will be presumed. The
parties may have believed that, even at
common law, the wife's wages belonged to
her. It strikes the unsophisticated man
as harsh, that a woman should toil for the
benefit of her husband's creditors. It is
proper, therefore, to award to Mrs. Trollope $595 and interest. Meckley's Appeal,
102 Pa. 536; Howard Watch Co. v. BedilIon, 131 Pa. 385; Hawley v. Griffith, 187
Pa. 306.
Appeal dismissed.
BARNETT vs. BASSETT.
Power of attorney given by husband to
wife to conveyproperty-"F'orme and in
my name to grant"- Validity of conveyance by wife in her own name as to a
subsequent conveyance by husbandWhat circumstanceswill induce a court
of equity to enforce the first conveyance
despite statute of frauds.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

John Harris, owning a lot in Carlisle,
executed a paper in which he authorized
Jennie Harris, his wife, "for me and in
my name to grant" the lot.
Three months afterwards she made a
deed to Bassett for the lot, her husband
being in California, in which she named
herself as grantor, making no reference to
the power, and which she signed and
sealed.
Two years afterwards Harris conveyed
the lot to Barnett. Bassttlhad taken pos-

256

THE FORUM

session immediately after the conveyance
to him.
The purchase money paid by him had
been in part used by Mrs. Harris in her
support, and $1,000 of it was paid by her
to her husband on his return from the
West.
This is an ejectment.
DyVER and CORE for plaintiff.

In order to execute a conveyance under
seal the authority given must be 'under
seal. Gordon v. Bulkeley, 14 S. & R. 331.
The deed is void, for it was not executed
according to the power of attorney. Mussey v. Scott, 7 Cushing (Mass.) 215.
EIBBERT and KLINE for defendant.

A power need not be mentioned in deed
of conveyance. McCreary v. Bomberger,
151 Pa. 323.
If the husband accept the benefit of the
bargain, he must adoptitas his wife made
it. Spath's Estate, 144 Pa. 391.
OPINION OF THE COURT.

Barnett claims title from Harris, and
brings this action in ejectment against the
defendant, Bassett.
Both parties have laid some stress on the
question whether the power, and deed
thereunder, were properly sealed in compliance with the law requiring a power
under seal to convey an instrument under seal by attorney.
This question, however, is extraneous,
inasmuch as the facts set forth are silent
regarding it, and we must therefore assume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that the formalities of the law in
this respect, were complied with. Did
the wife give a valid title to the land in
dispute, uotwitbttanding the fact that she
transcended her power?
We do not think, under the existing
law, that the former disabilities of coverture bear upon the question at all.
A wife may now act as the agent of her
husband, or any other person, and they
will be bound by her acts, if she keeps
within the scope of her authority, just as
effectually as the acts of any agent bind
his principal. The acts of 1887 and 1893
have removed the ancient disabilities of a
married woman to such an extent that she
is now, with a few exceptions, as free to
act as afeme sole.
The act of April 22, 1891, also gives her
the power to sell lands, tenements and
hereditaments by. her held in trust, or un_der power, as freely as afeme sole.

It is, however, to be observed that she
cannot make a conveyance of her own land
witljout her husbandjoins in the deed. In
the case at bar, however, she conveyed, or
attempted to convey, her husband's land
and not her own.
The husband having empowered her
thus to act, she had undoubtedly a right
so to do, but like any other agent, must
keep within the boundaries of her authority. The question now is, would this
breach of her power, invalidate the title,
she is alleged to have conveyed. By
authority of the power, she was to convey
the lot "for me and in my name, " but on
the contrary, she named herself as grantor,
nor did she refer or allude in any way to
the power she had received, giving her a
right to make a conveyance in the husband's name,
In Allison v. Kurtz, 2 Watts 185, and
also Jones v. Wood, 16 Pa. 25, it was held
that a deed in execution of a power need
not recite the instrument creating it, if it
can only take effect by virtue of the
power. There is no question, but that the
deed in the present case could only take
effect by virtue of the power, but we cannot reconcile this rule with the statute of
May 25, 1897, which is as follows: "Whenever any deed of conveyance or other
instrument of writing haS been heretofore
executed or acknowledged, or both, under
any power sufficiently authorizing the
same, which power has been recited in
said deed or other instrument, shall have
been informally executed by an attorney
in his own name, reciting his authority,
instead of being in the name of the
principal or principals, such deed, or instrument, shall be taken to be of the same
effect as if executed in the name and behalf of the principal or principals as party
or parties thereto.
If this statute is to be observed strictly,
the variance in the requirements in the
present case, with those named in the
statute, must invalidate the deed she conveyed. The statute requires the deed t
be "sufficiently" authorized, and this was
unquestionably not an authority to convey
in her own name, nor as the statute
requires, was reference made to the power,
it being indisi)ensable to recite same in
the deed.
Furthermore, the wife's vendee was
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affected by notice, and had he gone to
the record would have found. at least, that
no deed to her had been placed thereon.
He would then have been put upon his
guard and the consequences of his failure
to investigate must be borne by him.
There is no doubt but that the husband
committed a fraud by receiving part of
the purchase money from this void conveyance, and then conveying the lot to
Barnett, but from all the facts in the case,
we are constrained to say that Barnett
has the valid title and Bassett must look
to Harris.
Judgment is accordingly entered for the
plaintiff.
BOuTON, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.
That the owner of land may sell and
convey it by an attorney, need not to be
said. We know no obstacle to a wife's being constituted this attorney. She can be
the donee of what is known as a power of
appointment. fDiffenbaugh v. Harris, 18
W. N. C. 357, and for a similar reason, of
a power of attorney. Mrs. Harris, being
mande attorney for her husband, executed
a deed for the land, three months afterwards to Bassett. She, however, named
herself as grantor, and signed and sealed
the deed as if she was the grantor. It
should have purported to be her husband's
deed, and his name and seal should have
been subscribed to it. Devinney v. Reynolds, 1 W. & S. 328. Had it purported
to be John Harris's deed, or even the deed
of Mrs. Harris, as his attorney, it might
be deemed valid. Baum v. Dubois, 43 Pa.
260. Being what it is, it is wholly invalid
to pass the estate of John Harris in the
absence of facts which would justify its
reformation. Lessee of Clarke v. Courtney, 5 Peters, 319; Ballas v. Hays, 5 S. &
R. 427; Hefferman v. Addams, 7 W. 116 ;
1 Am. & Eng. Encyc. 1036, 1041 ; 3 Washburn, Real Prop. 249. The validity of
the deed, in Henry v. Warner, 51 Pa. 276,
reposes, apparently, on the act of March
14, 1855.
The act of May 25, 1897, P. L. 81, does
not validate Mrs. Harris's deed, because
that deed contains no reference to the
power, and because the act applies only to
deeds which had been made before its passage.
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The cases cited by counsel and the
learned court below, to the effect that
when the donee of a power executes a
deed which makes no reference to it, the
deed shall nevertheless be valid, are inapposite. A power of attorney is not a
power of appointment. The attorney is a
mere agent for a living principal, and his
power is revocable and the doctrine with
respect to the execution of the two kinds
of power, has undergone a different development.
The deed was executed by Mrs. Harris
without the joinder of her husband. Of
her own estate she could not dispose without his assent expressed in the deed or
contract, but she may execute alone, a
power of which she is the donee, Diffenbaugh v. Harris, 18 W. N. C. 357, to convey the land of another. Her husband's
assent is necessary neither to the reception nor to the exercise of the power. But
Harris himself conferred the power, and
for the purpose, doubtless, of its being exercised in his absence.
But, though the deed, without extraneous facts,' has not passed to Bassett the
estate of Harris, these facts are sufficient
to justify a reformation of the deed. Had
the deed, though intended to convey tract
a, mistakenly described tract b, the
grantee could, by showing the mistake,
reform the deed, or, the deed being treated
as reformed, defend the possession by
means of it. Trexler v. Fisher, 130 Pa.
275. The defective certificate of acknowledgment of a married woman's deed may
be reformed so as to give validity to it.
The evidence would support a decree for
reformation of the Mrs. Harris deed.
Immediately after its execution, possession of the land was taken by the grantee,
Bassett. He also paid the purchase money.
Some of this money was used by Mrs.
Harris for her support during the absence
of her husband. On his return, she delivered to him $1,000 of it. The power of attorney was in writing. The evidence
shows that, in the exercise of this power,
the attorney, Mrs. Harris, agreed to convey the land in dispute for a determinate
price. None of the terms is uncertain :
The deed, though it does not pass Harris'
)etate, is evidence of the contents of the
contract between Mrs. Harris-and Bassett.
Is there such partial performance of the
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oral contract to convey as would induce a
court of equity to enforce it, despite the
statute of frauds? The courts will enforce
such a contract, when in pursuance of it
the vendee has taken possession of the
premises, and has either paid all the purchase money, or made improvements
which are unsusceptible of compensation
in damages. Instant possession was taken
and it has been retained by Bassett. He
has also paid all the purchase money.
Thus the statute has been substitutionally
satisfied. Jamison v. Dimock, 95 Pa. 52;
Miller v. Zufall, 113 Pa. 317; Anderson v.
Brinser, 129 Pa.376. It would be contrary
to equity after this, after the receipt of the
purchase money by Mrs. Harris for her
husband, and of a considerable portion of
it by himself, to permit him to deny the
conveyance and recover the land.
Barnett, the plaintiff, is in no better position than Harris. He was advertised,
by Bassett's possession. of the nature of
the claim of the latter.
Judgment reversed.
HEILMAN vs. RICHARDS.
8cirefacias sur mortgage-Conveyancein
defraud of creditors.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

Richards made a mortgage to Heilman
for $2,500.00, the object. of which was to
defraud his creditors, no debt existing at
the time, to Heilman. Subsequently a
judgment for $1,000.00 was recovered
against Richards by a creditor, on which
a sheriff's sale took place and the land
was bought by William Ellinger. The
price paid was $1,140.00, and the creditor
No other debts exist.
was fully paid.
Heilman now sues out the mortgage,
naming Ellinger as terre-tenant, who
pleads that the mortgage was void. At
the trial lie showed the above facts.
LAUBENSTEIN and DAVIS for plaintiff.
A purchaser who tins assumed to pay a
mortgage debt on the land cannot dispute
the validity of the mortgage. Lennig's
Estate, 52 Pa. 138; Girard Co. v. Stewart,
86 Pa. 89; Merriman v. Moore, 90 Pa. 78.
One purchasing under and subject to the
payment of a mortgage given by his
vendor, is a purchaser. as between himself and his vendor, of the entire estate,
and is liable to pay the mortgage as part
of the purchase money due from him.
171 Pa. 328.

and TURNER for defendant.
A conveyance of land to delay, hinder,
or defraud creditors of the grantor is voidableat the suit of such creditors. Thompson v. Dougherty, 12 S. & R. 448, 17 Pa.
344. Where a mortgage has been executed
on land with a fraudulent intent, the
mortgagee cannot claim the land even if
a debt actually existed, or was owing the
parties. McKee v. Gilchrist, 3 Watts 230
BORYER

OPINION OF THE COURT.

That the express intention of Richards
in making this mortgage was to defraud
creditors, cannotbe disputed, and needs no
reflection. The only possible question then
that arises in this case, as it strikes me, is,
whether Heilman was in collusion with
Richards in this fraudulent scheme. Did
Heilman have knowledge of Richards'
fraudulent purpose in the making of this
mortgage, and aid and assist Richards
in carrying it. out? From the construction
of the facts "the object of which was to
defraud creditors," we are led to the conclusion that he was an active participant
in the fraud, and to further substantiate
this claim, it was proved on the trial by
Ellinger, the terre-tenant, that the mortgage was void. This being so, he took no
title to the land against Ellinger, even if
he paid full value. A conveyance of this
kind, purporting on its face to be an
absolute conveyance, but in reality accompanied with a secret trust, is manifestly a contrivance by which creditors may
be hindered and prevented in the recovery
of their debts. It is tile secrecy of this
act, a transaction incompatible with that
which appears on the face of the transaction, that constitutes its illegality. In
such a case, the intent to cheat, common
to both parties, enters into the whole
transaction and makes it fraudulent from
the beginning. Numerous cases can be
cited to prove "that a mortgage made for
the purpose of hindering, delaying, and
defrauding creditors, whether it is purely
gratuitous, or there is an inadequate, consideration, will be void, not only as to
creditors intended to be defrauded, but as
to all creditors existing at the time, who
might be hindered, and delayed, and defrauded by it. Barrett v. Nealon, 119 Pa.
171; McKee v. Gilchrist, 3 Watts 230. All
debts being paid, Ellinger took a good
title under the deed at sheriff sale.
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Judgment is therefore rendered for defendant, in behalf of terre-tenant.
OSBORNE, J.
OPINION OF THE SUPREME COURT.

The mortgage, though designed to defraud Richards' creditors, was valid as respects the parties to it. It was also valid
as to those who became creditors subsequently under circumstances indicative
that they had knowledge of its existence.
The learned court below has assumed that
although the judgment on which the
sheriff's sale took place was recovered
later than the mortgage, it was founded
on a credit into which the creditor entered, without such notice of the mortgage
as obliged him to know of its existence.
'At the sale on the judgment, Ellinger
purchased the land for $1,140.00. Was the
bid intended to be subject to the mortgage? If Ellinger assumed the mortgage
to be valid, he estimated the land as worth
at least $3,640.00; that is, he intended to
pay $1,140.00 for the equity of redemption.
He now avers that he has bought for
$1,140.00 not the equity of redemption only
but the unencumbered land.
The $1,140.00 were more than enough to
pay in full the judgment on which the
sale took place, so that the creditor has, in
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fact, not been defrauded. But, Ellinger
is now in his place, for he has paid the
money. He would be attempting a fraud
were he now asserting as a purchase of the
unencumbered fee for $1,140.00 what was
in fact the purchase of the mere equity of
redemption.
The evidence casts no light on the probable intention of Ellinger in making the
purchase. Did it appear that the land was
worth and would probably have brought
$3,640.00 at a sheriff's sale, it would probably have been proper to submit to the jury
the question whether Ellinger intended to
buy and pay for the land subject to the
mortgage, or with the intention of alleging that the mortgage was void as to him.
In the absence of such evidence, we think
it is to be assumed that the mortgage having been made for the purpose of defrauding the judgment creditor, he and the
purchaser at his sale knew of their purpose, and intended to buy the land plus
the right to challenge the validity of the
mortgage. In that case, the $1,140.00
would represent, not the value of the
equity of redemption, but that valuellus
the value of the chance of showing that
the mortgage was invalid.
Judgment affirmed.

